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Glossary
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In the context of a developing country like Bangladesh, studying governance is not an academic exercise but a
means to understanding if and how the openness, transparency and accountability of the system will impact on
the effectiveness of services delivered to the poor and the disadvantaged. After fifteen years of democratic rule
in Bangladesh, the system remains unconsolidated, politicised, confrontational and marred by bad
governance. The Centre for Governance Studies at BRAC University in Dhaka was established in 2005 to
further understand the complexities and to identify the constraints facing governance in Bangladesh. In addition
to its research projects, the Centre offers a Masters programme in Governance and Development focused on
the continuing education of civil servants.
Starting the State of Governance research project, we committed ourselves to looking at those aspects of
governance which have worked and why. We found examples of governance successes, but - to no surprise -
we also found that patterns of governance problems are strongly embedded in the system. The intention of our
first report was to review, through in-depth critical literature surveys and targeted primary
research, the knowledge we have of governance in Bangladesh and to form a baseline for future research. Our
research so far and the findings of the Report will be used in subsequent years to develop replicable measures
of governance that are relevant to the Bangladesh context. Thus, while the Report is a fair reflection of the
contemporary state of governance in Bangladesh, it represents only a beginning of our work on the subject.
The completion of the Report in a short period of time, from May to November 2006, was possible due to the
partnership with BRAC Research and Evaluation Division (RED) directed by Dr. Imran Matin. A team drawn from
the RED Governance Group, under the leadership of Dr. Naomi Hossain, was responsible for the research and
drafting of the Report in consultation and collaboration with the Centre's staff. External expert advisors were
invited to comment on the ongoing work in a peer-review process and to conduct pieces of primary research
when in-house expertise was not available. The Report reflects the excellence of the research team who
deserve recognition for their seriousness, dedication and commitment to de-mystifying the subject of
governance in Bangladesh. We brought a new generation of scholars to the team believing that it is they who
should engage in the discussion of governance in Bangladesh. The Report benefits from their critical
perspective and we hope that the skills acquired in its preparation will enhance future Bangladeshi scholarship.
As with any collaborative project, there are too many people whose contributions were indispensable to
assuring the standard and quality of this Report to be acknowledged individually. Among them are the
members of the Advisory Group under the leadership of Dr. Akbar Ali Khan, former Director of the Centre for
Governance Studies, whom I would like to thank for the intellectual leadership of the research project and the
Report. I also would like to express my gratitude to the Royal Netherlands Embassy whose continued support
of the Centre financed this project.
Director, Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC University
State of Governance
Manzoor Hasan
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There is little doubt that concerns about governance continue to feature prominently in Bangladesh, both
domestically and internationally. Political turmoil and violence, the politicisation of the public administration and
concerns that corruption obstructs private sector investment and public service delivery are key elements of
what is widely deemed a 'crisis of governance'. These mount amid newer concerns about security and the
perceived rise of Islamic militancy. Questions that arise in this context include whether the state and law
enforcement agencies can effectively police such developments, and of what shape effective authority will take,
given the vacuum of trust and legitimacy in public institutions.
The State of Governance project aims to enter the debate about governance by examining the evidence and
analysis of the issues, in particular to enable assessment of change over time. The present
report is the first in what is intended to be an annual series designed to monitor the
governance situation. The present Report reviews the extensive evidence on governance and presents findings
of targeted primary research in order to provide a foundation for further empirical governance research and
analysis.
Three themes run through . The first is searching for success, with
the intention of learning from what has worked in efforts to combat bad governance. The search for success
was not always successful, however, partly because the literature is oriented toward uncovering and remedying
failures, and partly because direct approaches to tackling governance failures tend to be difficult (e.g., the Anti-
Corruption Commission). The second theme is gender-equitable and pro-poor governance: the Report attempts
to answer why Bangladesh has made such impressive social and developmental progress when governance
appears to have been so weak. The Report suggests that the evidence on bad governance in the social sectors
fails to note that under particular circumstances, poor citizens have actively pursued their entitlements with
supportive inputs from civil society and the media; and, again under particular circumstances, local political
rivalry has energised service provision in ways that benefit the poor. The third theme is 'bad governance with a
human face': the Report explores the full set of incentives and constraints faced by public servants, partly in an
effort to avoid demonising frontline workers as the chief culprits in the system of bad governance. A key
discovery and potential point for intervention is that morale among public sector workers is astonishingly low.
Four findings stand out from across the seven main thematic chapters. First, that partisan politics has
permeated all aspects of public life. This is not a new development, but it represents a deepening of an ongoing
State of Governance
in Bangladesh 2006
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xiii
problem. There are four dimensions to the penetration of politics: a) public institutions have become forcibly or
illicitly partisan throughout their operations and structure, from recruitment through to retirement and at most
stages in between; b) political parties have become institutionalised at the local level and now have functioning,
semi-responsive local structures, enabling them to ensure loyalties of local government representatives and to
control or influence local development processes and administration. This process is not entirely negative as
local political rivalry may galvanise more effective service provision: but at best, this is good politics, not good
governance; c) civil society is also believed to have acquired a partisan tilt; and d) a positive dimension to the
politicisation of public life is that politics is highly participative, featuring high levels of interest and engagement
in politics.
The second main finding is that formal accountability mechanisms are weak, partly because of partisan
penetration of public institutions, and partly because formal rules are absent or inappropriately framed.
However, there are signs that informal pressures may be strong, particularly where tangible resources and
services are at stake. A third finding is that demand for reform is mainly generated externally, primarily by and
through donor activity. Fourth, knowledge of governance is patchy and sometimes lacks independence, in large
part because much of it is produced by or for media and civil society and donors and is therefore oriented
towards news-making and advancing a particular reform agenda.
Despite the pessimism with which Bangladesh's governance performance is widely viewed, there are several
causes for cautious optimism. These include rapid progress on human development, poverty reduction and
economic development which suggests either that governance failures are not so extreme as to paralyse
development, or else that strategies have been found to work around governance failures. There is greater
scope for responsiveness among political parties, and signs of effective informal pressures for accountability,
with help from the media and civil society. Finally, our knowledge of governance lacks the degree of
independence that would enable a more sober and balanced assessment. Some internally-driven reforms are
not adequately documented or highlighted. There is likely to be more progress towards beating bad
governance than this Report has been able to show.
The scope of is comprehensive, covering many of the main debates
and issues relating to the governance institutions and functions of the state; the major national political parties;
key aspects of the economic process; the public administration, national, local, rural and urban; the role of the
media, NGOs and civil society; and the impact of governance on policies of direct relevance to poverty
reduction and the poor. This broad perspective was deliberately adopted in order to shed light on how the
performance of state institutions shape social and economic outcomes, as well as on how non-state actors and
institutions influence governance. The broad viewpoint was applied to help frame the problem so that it
becomes possible to see how the pieces of the puzzle fit together. The Report is divided into nine chapters. In
addition to the initial, overview chapter, the analyses and findings are presented in seven topical chapters, each
representing a dimension or area of governance. The final chapter presents conclusions.
Chapter Two reviews developments in party politics, the changing composition and power base of the political
class, the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, concluding with a detailed analysis of the factors behind
State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
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the failure to consolidate democracy to date. The chapter is based on a review of the existing literature, key
informant interviews with national political figures; and extensive original research into local party politics at the
upazila level and below, conducted in 2006.
Chapter Three looks at two areas of the economy where the quality of governance has been of particular
interest since the return to democratic rule in 1991. The first, macroeconomic management, is generally
considered to have been successfully governed; the second, the investment climate, is widely acknowledged to
suffer key governance failures, particularly the control of corruption by regulatory and service-providing
agencies, and the supply of infrastructure. The chapter is based primarily on a review of the literature, including
'grey' literature and newspaper reports. It also features findings from a case study of the Bangladesh Bank, and
the investment climate section is informed by key informant interviews with successful Bangladeshi business
owners, and with officials and staff from relevant Government agencies.
This chapter addresses the performance of the public administration. It explores the implications of the
changing national and global context, describes the structure of the civil service and outlines the scope for
citizen orientation and administrative reform. Based on original research with current and former civil servants
and recent graduates, including those considering civil service careers, the chapter explores politicisation,
problems within the recruitment process, and the changing status and perceptions of the civil service.
This chapter outlines key issues in the justice sector, locating them within the context of policy and
developments in law and order and access to justice. It highlights the growing politicisation of the judiciary,
where governance conditions deteriorated markedly over the 2000s. The chapter discusses the growing
importance of NGO interventions designed to , and the
problems and prospects for police reform. The chapter is based primarily on a review of the development
literature on law and access to justice, as well as qualitative research into the incentives and professional
experiences of police officers conducted in 2006, and an assessment of the legal empowerment activities of four
NGOs, based on informant interviews and a review of programme and research literature, also in 2006.
Democracy has brought popular representation to local government, but not effective powers to enact the
popular will. Central Government maintains substantial control over both rural and urban local government.
Partisan influence rather than functional and fiscal capacities of local government has deepened at the local
level. Based on the literature and some original research into participation by the poor in urban local politics,
Chapter Six explores the challenges faced by rural and urban local governments, reviewing the literature on the
autonomy of local government; institutional arrangements for rural and urban local governance; the extent and
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xv
effectiveness of mechanisms for accountability and participation, including by women; and finally, service
delivery.
Chapter Seven looks at the role played by development NGOs, civil society and the media in attempting to
combat bad governance. It looks at the exceptional qualities of NGOs and civil society organisations in
Bangladesh that have enabled them to flourish through the first half of the 2000s, at a time when donor attention
to the sector was declining globally. In part this reflects their growing role in the governance domain in
Bangladesh. The chapter also provides a preliminary assessment of the role of the mass print and broadcast
media in promoting good governance, based on a literature review and key informant interviews. The roles of
both civil society and the media in good governance are constrained by their own internal governance
weaknesses, their financial dependence on the Government, and concerns of reprisals from the Government or
ruling party.
Chapter Eight addresses the question of why Bangladesh has managed to achieve relatively good social sector
and developmental performance amidst the range of governance failures. It reviews the evolution of policy in
safety nets and education in the 1990s and evaluates the evidence on corruption and accountability in each
sector. With respect to corruption, while it is clear that leakage is a problem influential studies on the extent of
corruption are likely to have overstated the problem; they also do not distinguish between levels and types of
leakage in a way that enables a clear understanding of how corruption occurs. The chapter also reviews key
accountability relationships governing social safety nets and the education sector, outlining some of the social
and political implications of reforms for accountability in front-line institutions and facilities. In the absence of
formal accountability institutions, informal pressures have often effectively compelled service providers to
supply at least a minimum level or quality of services.
The Report concludes with a review of its contribution, with a focus on its integrated, multidisciplinary approach.
It lists in detail areas which were not covered, but which have been identified as key governance issues and
subjects for future research. It also discusses some of the limitations of the present Report and briefly talks
about the steps to be taken for the continuation of the research project on the state of governance in
Bangladesh.
Chapter 7: Civil society and the media
Chapter 8: Social protection and social policy
Chapter 9: Conclusions and next steps
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006 was produced over the period May-November 2006 in
partnership between BRAC University Centre for Governance Studies and BRAC Research and Evaluation
Division. Background papers and other contributions to the final Report are available on the Centre for
Governance Studies website: www.cgs-bu.com.
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The state of governance in
Bangladesh 2006:
an overview
1.1 The purpose
1.2 The context
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
Government That Works
Crisis in Governance
is the first product of a long-term research programme initiated by
the Centre for Governance Studies at BRAC University, prepared in partnership with the Research and
Evaluation Division of BRAC. The mission of the Centre for Governance Studies is to build local governance
capacity by fostering a new generation of researchers, public administrators and citizens with a critical and
analytical perspective on governance. For the Research and Evaluation Division of BRAC, the Report represents
an extension of its longstanding focus on research into the conditions that affect poverty and development.
The present Report is the first in what is intended to be an annual series. It provides an extensive review of the
evidence on governance in Bangladesh, and is intended to provide the foundation for further empirical
governance research and analysis. The objective of that research will be to devise tractable and replicable
measures of selected dimensions of governance that will form a baseline for assessing and monitoring change.
Why do we need another report on governance in Bangladesh? There can be little doubt that concerns about
the state of governance in Bangladesh continue to rise. Political turmoil and violence, the politicisation of the
public administration and concerns that corruption obstructs private sector investment and public service
delivery are key elements of what is widely deemed a 'crisis of governance'. These mount amid newer concerns
about security and the perceived rise of Islamic militancy. Questions that arise in this context include whether
the state and law enforcement agencies can effectively police such developments, and of what shape effective
authority will take, given the vacuum of trust and legitimacy in public institutions.
One reason to continue to monitor the state of governance is that the dimensions and priorities of governance
have changed over time. The first major donor assessment of Bangladesh's governance, the World Bank's
in 1996, analysed the performance of 'core' public sector agencies as background to a
reform agenda that included downsizing government. Independent confirmation of the problems with
governance came with the 1998 publication of the Centre for Policy Dialogue's (CPD) Review of Bangladesh's
Development 1997, . By the 2000s, governance was firmly established as one of the key
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issues in Bangladesh's development and the lens through which other development topics were viewed.
DFID's influential series (the Bangladesh study was published in 2002) took a
political and tactical approach to poverty reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) (Duncan 2002). Since then, the World Bank's analytical work on Bangladesh has increasingly
focused on governance, with and , both in
2002, a 2003 that focused on governance, and in 2006, a
document that again comprehensively addressed issues of governance. The Asian Development Bank
(ADB) has also weighed in with a thorough assessment of the key governance institutions (ADB 2003).
Domestic civil society, research institutes and policy think-tanks have taken this debate further, particularly
recently. Through publications, use of the media and dialogue, detailed domestic agendas on key governance
issues have emerged. Vitally, these activities have created informed domestic constituencies, particularly - but
not exclusively - among educated elite groups. CPD is the undisputed leader of such activity, and CPD's annual
the model on which the present report was structured. The
Power and Participation Resource Centre (PPRC) is also preparing an annual report on governance in
Bangladesh. These and numerous other activities have meant that the governance debate is no longer
exclusive to donor and aid policy circles, even though donor literature and reform programmes still carry
disproportionate influence.
What will contribute to this debate? The State of Governance
project aims to shift the debate about governance on to more solid ground by providing robust, regular
evidence and analysis of the issues, in particular to enable assessment of change over time. An important
benefit of good governance- and one that Bangladeshi citizens currently lack, in part because of the widespread
discourse of bad governance - is trust in public institutions. For this reason, the reports will contain a focus on
finding out whether and how governance is improving, as well as on where and why it is not. There is no
shortage of literature on the governance situation, but there are gaps and concerns about the quality and
authority of the evidence on which it is based. The report finds that much of the most influential knowledge of
governance in Bangladesh is produced either by the domestic media and civil society, or for or by donor
agencies. While much of this is informative and high quality work, not all is. Worse, bad surveys tend to reduce
the credibility of all research, as politicians become adept at picking holes in weak methodologies. In addition,
some issues receive too little attention and others a disproportionate share; there are gaps in our empirical
information, and concerns about the quality of the analysis in some highly influential pieces of knowledge of
governance.
Governance has many meanings and uses. In Bangladesh, the public discourse of governance often treats
governance as shorthand for Bangladesh's dismal showing on Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI). For five consecutive years, 2001-2005, Bangladesh ranked as the most corrupt country
in the index, moving up to joint third place in 2006. What does this tell us about the state of governance in
Bangladesh?
As an illustrative exercise, let us briefly look at how Bangladesh compares to other countries that perform poorly
on the CPI. Table 1 draws together some comparative indicators to explore this issue, listing the 15 most corrupt
countries according to the 2006 CPI (columns 1 and 2). Five of the 15 have had UN peacekeepers in the last
five years (column 3); notably, Bangladesh has supplied UN peacekeeping forces to every peacekeeping
mission shown in the table. Column 4 shows Freedom House's 2006 rating of political rights and civil liberties:
1
Drivers of Pro-poor Change
et al
Taming the Leviathan Improving Governance for Poverty Reduction
Development Policy Review Country Assistance
Strategy
Independent Review of Bangladesh's Development
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1.3 Perspective and method
1 For example, NGOs (DFID's second Big NGO report, Verulam Associates 2005; World Bank 2006a) and constraints to private sector
development (Alamgir et al 2004).
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only Bangladesh is assessed as being 'Partly Free'. In contrast to most of the others, Bangladesh is not a
conflict or post-conflict state, made a transition from military to democratic rule in 1991, and has, more or less,
maintained a constitutional parliamentary democracy ever since. Column 5 shows figures from the World Heath
Organisation on under-five child mortality. Except for the East European country of Belarus, Bangladesh and
Uzbekistan share the lowest rate, 69 per 1000. Column 5 also shows that Bangladesh has sustained an average
annual reduction in child mortality of 5.3 per cent per year between 1990 and 2003. In most of the other
countries, under-five mortality is shown to be increasing.
The objective of Table 1 is to raise questions about the value of relying on a single indicator as evidence of the
conditions of governance in a country. One reason for avoiding doing so is that both the CPI and the World
Bank governance indices are based primarily on surveys of foreign investors and international organisation staff,
with the focus on political risk and predictability in the legal and administrative environment, particularly as these
affect businesses and financial institutions.
The Report takes a different view of governance and development. First, it views development as
multidimensional: it cannot be collapsed into an aggregate metric such as the annual rate of change of gross
domestic product per capita. Development encompasses child mortality, literacy, access to potable water,
responsive local government and personal security, to name only a few dimensions.
*Annual Rate of Change (%) 1990-2003
Transparency International 2006; Freedom House 2006; WHO 2005Sources:
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Table 1. Bangladesh in comparative perspective: an illustration
Second, the view in the present report is of governance as the process by which the institutions charged with
achieving development do their jobs. This includes non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations
and private firms as well as the public sector or state. Most of the jobs are mundane but essential, and of direct
concern to citizens such as making schools function properly, ensuring reliable water or electrical power,
providing basic medical care, maintaining law and order. It is not clear that all of these mundane activities carry
much weight in national-level governance indicators.
This multidimensional view of governance determines the research strategy adopted in the Report. Because
governance is so contextual, there is no single model or method that works best for all sectors or dimensions.
We have necessarily employed an open multidisciplinary approach: each chapter in this report is based on the
contributions of researchers who were given relatively free rein to explore the literature and devise an
appropriate analytical framework. The analytical frameworks of the individual chapters differ because the
dimensions differ (e.g., primary education differs from macroeconomic policy-making) and because of the
analytical choices of individual researchers. This is the exploratory or inductive phase of a multi-year, perhaps
indefinite, research programme.
The selected themes of report respond to two points in the
Government of Bangladesh's 2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. First, that there is an unhelpful emphasis
on governance failures at the expense of understanding what works; and second, the "lack of clarity as to where
the governance agenda best interfaces with poverty reduction goals." (GoB 2005a: 161)
Throughout the process of preparing the Report chapters, the research team actively sought evidence of
successes in governance. With the intention of learning from what works, this effort also provides some balance
in what is an overwhelmingly negative discourse. While the Report identifies numerous incidents where bad
governance has been overcome, bypassed or tackled directly, the search for success was not, overall,
successful itself. In many sectors, it proved difficult to identify documentary evidence of improvements in
governance, even where anecdotal evidence suggests these may have occurred. In part, this is an artefact of
the literature, which for reasons outlined below tends to be oriented towards 'diagnostic' institutional reviews or
exposé-type research and reporting. In part, too, it may reflect the general lack of success in tackling bad
governance. The disappointing performance of the Anti-Corruption Commission is probably the best illustration
of how difficult it is to tackle bad governance directly.
Despite the lack of success in reforming bad governance directly, there have been some remarkable
developmental successes in the 15 years since the return to multiparty rule. These successes have mainly been
in the area of human development, and have benefited women, girls and the poor, particularly in education.
NGOs have played a significant role, but it is now widely acknowledged that public policy and Governmental
action have been central to a success that has substantially depended on massive expansion of access to
public services. More recently, there is evidence of acceleration in poverty reduction, with household income
and expenditure survey (HIES) data showing a 10 per cent decline in the proportion of the population living
below the poverty line over a five-year period up to 2005. This represents a doubling of the rate of poverty
reduction in the previous 10 years, which averaged around one per cent per annum.
These successes challenge the perception that pro-poor development depends on good governance. The
Report thus features an attempt to explain the 'conundrum' of bad governance with impressive social
1.4 Themes
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Searching for success
Gender-equitable and pro-poor governance
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development, as part of its focus on exploring how governance conditions affect poverty and the poor and
marginal. The chapter on Social Protection and Social Policy explores this 'conundrum' in some detail. One
conclusion it arrives at is that the poor are not all helpless victims of bad governance: poor citizens are actively
engaged in exerting informal pressures on (some) public service providers to perform. The media and civil
society are part of that story. The theme of governance, politics and the poor is also taken up in Chapters Two,
Six and Seven, which look at different dimensions of political participation, including participation mediated by
NGOs. Chapter Five reviews evidence about the legal empowerment of women and the poor through NGO
programmes in the areas of informal justice and access to formal justice. In all of these areas, there are definite
signs of progress in the extent and depth of political participation and access to justice among the poor and
poor women. In part because of its reliance on existing literature, however, the Report does not feature a
substantial direct focus on poor people and women. This is a weakness that future research of the Centre
intends to address more fully.
One area in which the Report is more successful is uncovering the human dimension behind bad governance.
Some of the primary research conducted, as well as other recent studies reviewed in the Report, explore the
incentives and constraints facing public servants. This counters the tendency in the literature to demonise
corrupt or inefficient teachers or policemen (etc.), without adequately contextualising their behaviour.
A headline finding from this work, and one which is surprisingly rarely considered in the literature on public
sector reform, is that public sector morale is astonishingly low across all levels and sectors within the public
administration, including law enforcement officials, teachers and education officials, staff of the Bangladesh
Bank, the judiciary, and senior administrators at the Secretariat. In brief, factors that contribute to low morale
appear to include: increasingly open public criticism of performance; regular reporting of corruption scandals in
the media; the ever-growing problem of political intervention in day-to-day professional life, which constrains
even the most basic of operations; the declining quality of recruits across the public administration, related to
corruption in recruitment and viewed a cause of poor performance; and the declining social status of the public
administration, in absolute terms, and relative to private sector careers. The Report suggests that addressing
the capacities and organisational cultures governing public sector performance will require a more
contextualised understanding of the full set of incentives and constraints faced by public servants. This includes
understanding the social contexts within which they relate to citizens and each other.
Reading may not give much cause for optimism. As this section
summarises, political competition is found to have entered all aspects of public life; accountability mechanisms
are weak; and where there is demand for governance reform, it has, to a substantial extent, originated externally
- mainly with donors. These findings are discussed below. However, reading across the sectors and between
the lines, there are some good reasons to avoid being pessimistic about the state of governance in Bangladesh,
as the final section argues.
The main finding of the Report is that political competition and partisan agendas have permeated all aspects of
public institutional and collective social life in Bangladesh. There are four dimensions to the penetration of
politics:
'Bad governance with a human face': the incentives and constraints of public servants
i) Partisan politics has permeated all aspects of public life
1.5 Findings: what do we now know about the state of governance in Bangladesh?
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Public institutions whose rules or mandate forbid party affiliation have become forcibly or illicitly
partisan
Party political structures have been institutionalized at the local level.
Civil society is also vulnerable to partisan influence
Politics is highly participative
. This starts with the recruitment process, and features in public complaints about political interference
in public servants' day-to-day working lives. Political considerations reportedly influence the distribution of
contracts, relief goods, schools, roads, and health facilities. Upazila level development committees are
influenced by local party actors. Senior civil servants' promotion or transfers occur on the basis of political
loyalty. Formal Executive control over lower judiciary appointments enable politics to influence the lower courts
and, most seriously of all, the politicisation of the upper courts has the potential to neutralise the most powerful
formal institutions for Governmental accountability.
At the end of 2006, it is the last leading party of Government, the BNP, which had achieved the most effective
penetration of public institutions. But there are reasons to believe that this process was in motion before 2001,
and is likely to continue regardless of which party wins the 2007 election. In other words, no one party can be
fairly blamed for the partisan coup.
The major political parties now have
formal organisations at local levels, right down to the ward which have some (albeit probably limited) influence
over candidates and priorities. This is clear evidence of progress towards more responsive political parties, even
if it has not yet led to sustained gains in their internal democracy. Two other aspects of the local level activities of
political parties are less positive, however. First, parties have far tighter control over local union parishad politics
than previously, with most candidates and incumbents directly involved with a major national party. The second,
parties have far tighter control over local development processes than ever before, in particular through
influence over upazila development committee decision-making and the distribution of resources at the union
level.
The growing capacity of formal party structures at the local level is likely to increase the efficiency with which
local resources are captured for the party. But having more effective party organisations at the local level also
makes mobilising local support more likely. To what extent does this occur by improving service provision and
development performance? What we do know is that there are two broad reasons why parties seek to influence
the distribution of resources. One is simple corruption: to siphon off resources to reward party activists or pay
for party programmes. Two is building their political capital. Parties seek to distribute resources as a reward for
or an incentive to vote for their candidate. But in the absence of certainty that any beneficiary will vote for your
candidate, it makes sense to demonstrate that your party can deliver development goods. It is this incentive of
local political actors that offers the most promising explanation of why despite partisan penetration of local
government and the local administration, rural service delivery has been scaled up highly effectively. At the
same time, partisan penetration undeniably reduces the scope for transparency and formal accountability,
enables leakage and corruption, and converts public safety nets into political patronage. So while some
improvements in local infrastructure or services may be attributed to good politics, it is still not good
governance.
. This includes the media and activist civil society
organisations, as well as professional associations such as cultural groups and associations of civil servants,
businessmen, lawyers, academics and journalists. Controversially, at least some of the major development
NGOs have also been implicated, although the aggressive and extra-legal official response to alleged partisan
activities by one big NGO may have been enough to alert the sector to the dangers of partisan tilt.
. The main positive dimension to the penetration of political competition is that
the population has become very engaged with politics. The main indicators are high voting turnout and
candidacy levels, but there also appears to be a growing appetite for political coverage in the media,
compounded by wider and deeper media distribution.
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ii) Formal accountability mechanisms are weak
… but informal pressures may be strong
iii) Demand for reform is generated externally
Partisan penetration is one reason why formal accountability mechanisms throughout the system are weak:
political affiliation reduces the scope for independent pressures on institutions and actors to adhere to rules.
The formal institutions to enable accountability are also either absent or underdeveloped. The Ombudsman is
an extreme example. Parliamentary Committees are neutralised to a degree by formal rules that limits their
effective oversight of ministries and the Executive. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has been effective, particularly
in protecting the rights of the marginal and the poor against the state, but this means of ensuring accountability
is also limited by the extent of Executive power. Mechanisms to make public servants accountable to citizens
and service-users are similarly weak, where these are present at all. In part, accountability failures are matters of
class and social status: for many public servants, accustomed to the idea that prestige, deference and high
status is a prerequisite of office, the notion that poor citizens have the right to question and criticize their
performance remains incomprehensible.
All of this ensures that regulated, formal systems for ensuring accountability of public representatives and
officials are weak. But patchy evidence is emerging that suggests effective informal pressures on service-
providers, particularly those on the frontline of service provision. It is worth noting that informal pressures
appear to be exerted by poor citizens when tangible gains are at stake, rather than civil rights such as the right
to information or free speech. There are a number of such examples in the Report.
Four factors contribute to the effectiveness of these informal pressures. The first is the media, which is an
increasingly important source of pressure to reveal at least the more overt forms of corruption. In many cases it
is the only source of external pressure experienced by public servants. The second factor is that citizens are
more willing to complain and scrutinise than before. The expectation that social and class hierarchies will
protect doctors, teachers, administrators and elected representatives from the complaints of poor citizens
appears to be less true than it once was: there are now clear signs that some poor citizens make active claims
for resources to which they believe themselves to be entitled, such as safety nets or relief goods. The
introduction of cash stipends in primary and secondary schools has also had the unintended beneficial side
effect of increasing scrutiny of school authorities by poor parents, suspicious of teachers' involvement in the
distribution of stipends. The general decline in the social status of the public administration has helped bridge
the social gap between poor citizens and public servants, as has the rise in general education. A wide public
discourse of criticism of the public sector in the media may also have helped, by making such complaints
legitimate in the public sphere.
A third factor supporting informal pressures on service-providers is the growing involvement of NGOs in
activities that encourage poor citizens to press their demands on public service providers. A fourth and final
factor may be positive pressures generated by competitive local politics, although, as noted above, the
evidence is not conclusive on this matter. It is worth noting that all informal pressures on service providers are
unregulated and can become dangerous; this was seen several times during 2006, when in the absence of any
effective formal mechanisms for hearing and responding to major injustices and regulatory and service-
provision failures, violence and rioting erupted in the garment sector and over persistent shortages of electricity.
The option of offering no system of accountability through repressing protest is visibly less realistic than it has
been in the past, and the public sector is faced with two possibilities; accountability to citizens through
regulated and formal mechanisms, or violent and unregulated revolt.
A somewhat unsettling finding of our research is that most governance reforms have been generated by
projects instituted and financed by donors. Governance has been emphasized in the donor agenda globally for
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several years, and is now considered indispensable to development and to the consolidation of the democratic
process. Although, as the Report demonstrates, it is possible to achieve growth, some security and to advance
the social agenda without good governance, it is widely acknowledged by the international community that the
longer-term prospects for democratic development will stall in its absence.
Good governance cannot, however, be imposed from outside without internal commitment to change and
political will to implement it. Donor projects can, and do, initiate much needed change in the way, for example,
the public administration or banking sector operate by introducing professional, modern management oriented
know-how and encouraging innovations. But there is a limit to how much these discrete projects can achieve.
There is no research to show if and where the 'tipping point' may be to notice a more systematic, systemic
change. Without the defined Government agenda and policy for instituting good governance - improvements in
the justice sector including the separation of the judiciary; transparency in contracts; clean recruitment
procedures for the public sector; or strengthening institutions of accountability to name a few - donor projects,
regardless of how necessary and beneficial they are, will remain a piecemeal approach of narrow scope and
effectiveness.
The lack of a domestic agenda for governance reform results in incremental and scattered interventions. That is
not in itself a bad thing. But by relying on donors to craft the agenda, Bangladesh limits itself to projects that are
defined by at least some external objectives or donors' preferences, even if donors go to great lengths to design
interventions based on local needs assessment. This may be explained in part by donors' hesitance to engage
in many issues due to high sensitivity of the Government to external criticism. The fact that Government agrees
to and partakes in governance-oriented programmes is not a sufficient substitute for policy.
Bangladeshi civil society and media, as shown in Chapter Seven, have done a good job in raising public
awareness of issues of governance. But while a discussion of governance flourishes in the public discourse, the
policy recommendations it generates are more likely to find a receptive audience among the non-government
elites and donors, and are yet to significantly contribute to generating strong demand for reforms.
Media and civil society organisations produce much of our knowledge of governance. This form of knowledge is
oriented towards capturing news headlines and/or to creating public awareness. It does this effectively. The
media and its partners in civil society have played what is quite possibly the central role in creating pressures
for accountability on public institutions and actors. The work of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has
been particularly effective in enabling some scrutiny of what are still opaque public institutions. Better still, there
are signs that a political culture is developing in which Government expects to have to respond to and explain
itself to an increasingly aggressive media and civil society.
The limitations of media and civil society governance information lie chiefly in their emphases: sensational and
newsworthy findings inevitably take precedence over more sober, mundane, yet equally important matters. This
can mean that the extent of corruption is overstated because insufficient attention is given to context and how
public institutions actually work. It may also mean that important governance issues, which lack media 'sex
appeal' are ignored entirely, such as public procurement reform.
Multilateral and bilateral donors produce, commission and support research and analytical work on governance.
As the bibliography of the Report illustrates, much governance analytical work on Bangladesh is in the form of
assessments of institutions or programmes for project purposes. Most research into governance, including
sample surveys, key informant surveys, institutional and case study analyses, review and discussion papers, is
also funded directly or indirectly by donor agencies. This includes the present issue of the
report, which is funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Bangladesh.
iv) Knowledge of governance is patchy and sometimes lacks independence
State of Governance
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If anything, the broadening of the discourse on governance has meant more donor funding for research and
dissemination activities than ever before, as donors seek to influence or create champions or constituencies to
demand reform. Not all donor-generated material on governance is made public, however, often because of
fears of treading on official sensitivities with respect to corruption or political interference. This means that much
of the governance material being consumed by donors is unlikely to have undergone peer review processes.
Because governance analytical capacity is limited in Bangladesh, donor funding for literature that remains 'grey'
also effectively crowds-out other work, including independent research.
On the other hand, donor assessments of governance that are made public tend to be highly influential. This
may be changing, particularly with the emergence of high-quality independent assessments by organisations
like Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) and Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS). Still the voice of
the World Bank on governance measurement remains dominant.
The difficulty of studying governance is illustrated most clearly in the case of corruption. The robust evidence is
weak, yet the headline influence on public perceptions is strong, as Chapter Eight discusses. One problem
arises with respect to methodology, and is not a problem specific to research on corruption and bad
governance in Bangladesh alone. By its very nature corruption is hard to study, and prone to hazard. There are
strong incentives to identify and publicise high estimates of public sector corruption, which are likely to receive
more public attention and which feed the public appetite for such stories. There are weak incentives to identify
areas in which steps are being taken to address corruption, particularly if these are undertaken by the
administration itself. There is limited incentive to undertake the more difficult, in-depth research into how
corruption and leakage operate within the context of service delivery. What this means is that grand corruption
is often missed, whereas petty corruption receives disproportionate attention and other leakages and practices
are represented inaccurately as corruption. The often populist nature of the research means that it frequently
fails to highlight where ordinary citizens may be complicit.
While there are few obvious signs of promise with respect to good governance, there are several reasons why
pessimism is not fully justified. These points deserve to be underlined. Weighing in on the positive side are the
following:
Reasonably rapid progress is being registered in human development, poverty reduction and economic
development; this suggests either that governance failures are not so extreme as to paralyse development,
or that ways around bad governance have been devised to deliver services and make policies
Political parties have extended their operations to the local level, and now have greater scope for
responsiveness (as well as to capture local resources). This means that under the right conditions, political
competition can create effective pressures on local officials or representatives to deliver better, or more
responsive services
There are signs that ordinary citizens are increasingly finding their voice and other means of exerting
informal pressures for accountability, with help from the media and civil society. This is likely to be one of
the positive pay-offs from increased participation in politics
Our knowledge of governance lacks the degree of independence that would enable a more sober,
balanced assessment of governance. The NGO and donor dominance of governance literature means
there is almost no incentive to identify or document positive reforms or achievements generated from within
the state or politics. In some areas, for example, such as corruption, there are strong imperatives to
emphasise the worst evidence against more moderate findings. Yet, as the Report finds, reforms are taking
place (although small and disparate) particularly in the high priority service delivery line ministries.
1.6 Conclusion: causes for cautious optimism

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Political governance:
the politicisation of public life
Since the return to multiparty rule in 1991, concerns have mounted about the politicisation of public institutions,
the increasing overlap between business and politics, and the lack of internal democracy within political parties.
In order to provide an empirically-grounded perspective on the state of political governance in Bangladesh, the
chapter focuses on new evidence relating to the incentives of political actors and parties, including the role of
wealth in shaping party nominations processes and the institutionalisation of party politics at the local level. The
chapter reviews developments in party politics, the changing composition and power base of the political class,
and the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, concluding with a discussion of the factors behind the
failure to consolidate democracy to date. The chapter is based on a review of the existing literature, key
informant interviews with national political figures; and extensive original research into local party politics at the
upazila level and below, conducted in 2006.
Results of the parliamentary elections of 1991, 1996 and 2001 indicated that electoral politics in Bangladesh
was moving towards a de facto two-party system. Recent trends, however, point towards an evolution of a
broader coalitional form of electoral politics dominated by the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP). The overwhelming domination of these two parties suggests this coalitional structure is
likely to remain stable for some time.
2.1 Political structure and ideology in the democratic period
A stable and vibrant multiparty system
Table 1. Vibrant political society in Bangladesh
Source: Hakim (1993); Gain (2001)
* Elections held under authoritarian regimes
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Parliamentary Elections
1973 1979* 1986* 1988* 1991 1996 2001
Number of contesting candidates 1211 2547 1124 1191 2787 2574 1935
Number of candidates nominated by the
political parties
1091 2125 671 977 2363 2289 1451
Number of political parties 24 29 12 8 75 81 52
Number of independent candidates 120 422 453 214 424 285 484
The party system is also characterized by its vibrancy, as defined by a high number of political parties and
independent candidates contesting elections. The vibrancy of political society may be the outcome of the
historical evolution of the political culture of Bangladesh. During the authoritarian era, military rulers had strong
imperatives to 'civilianize' military regimes, which entailed forcing elections on political society and allowing
maximum freedom for the establishment of political parties. Thus, restricting the growth of political parties or
curtailing the freedom of independent candidates to run for elections has never been part of the political culture
in Bangladesh, with the exception of the one-party rule by the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League
(BAKSAL) in 1975. Vibrant political society has flourished throughout the last three decades, through
authoritarian and post-authoritarian illiberal regimes alike (see Table 1 above).
Despite the active presence of many parties, the 'catchall' parties alone dominate electoral politics. Stability of
the system is also indicated by very low fragmentation of political parties: although there are more than 50
parties at present, fewer than a dozen are effective political organizations.
As the political manifestos of the four major parties (AL, BNP, Jatiya Party and Jamaat-e-Islami) clearly indicate,
there are hardly any ideological differences among them in terms of economic and development policy issues.
All subscribe to a free market economy as their development strategy. For BNP and Jatiya, this represents
continuity. AL, however, has only supported free market policies since 1996, in order to win over domestic
business and increase its political credibility with the Western donor community after its 1991 debacle at the
polls left its leadership desperate to rid the party of its 'socialist' past.
By the mid-1990s, a consensus had emerged among the three major parties on key ideological and social
questions to do with religion and national identity. AL effectively abandoned its earlier position of secularism,
with the aim of appealing to a wider constituency. BNP had abolished the fundamental principle of secularism in
the constitution in 1976, while under Jatiya, Islam was introduced as the state religion in 1988. However, it is
only Jamaat which seriously espouses the policy of establishing an Islamic state. For the rest, Islam as a
political discourse has only rhetorical and strategic value. These are essentially secular parties. The 'nationalist
ideologies' of AL (secular nationalism) and BNP ('Islamic' nationalism) appear to have
lost their functional value in the electoral political discourse to the extent that they are now hardly used as
serious electoral issues by the major parties. While anti-Indianism is not an ideology, its importance continues
for BNP, JI and Islamic groups, though its value in terms of mobilizing votes is questionable.
The secular ideological landscape of politics is currently being challenged by Jamaat-e-Islami. The politics of
expediency have meant the major secularist parties (AL, BNP, Jatiya) have provided various Islamic parties and
groups, especially Jamaat, with substantial political capital, enabling it to emerge as a major political broker and
shareholder of state power. These strategies of accommodation were adopted during the present, post-
authoritarian phase, and included appeasing, co-opting, integrating political Islamic forces and also
appropriating their rhetoric and symbols to gain legitimacy and popular support (Riaz 2004). During the
authoritarian phase, AL and BNP used these strategies to isolate and oust the authoritarian rulers. Jatiya had
adopted similar strategies to gain legitimacy, using orthodox, hitherto unknown (Muslim spiritual leaders)
1
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Ideological consensus
Bangalee Bangladeshi
Pirs
1 According to Mainwaring (1999:18-19), catchall “…parties attempt to cast their appeals for votes in sufficiently broad terms that they can
capture the sympathies of broad segments of the population, rather than concentrating on winning the support of a particular class…. They
eschew polarizing ideological positions and seek access to a variety of interest groups rather than relying heavily on one”.
2 Parties representing narrower constituencies (left parties, parties representing the peasantry) never emerged as viable in Bangladesh, perhaps
because of the atomized nature of society, weak collective political representation by different groups, or the contingent nature of the evolution
of major parties (see Khan 1998; Kochanek 2003; see Moore 2003).
3 Fragmentation implies the presence of many effective parties competing with each other (Haggard 1997).
12 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
and smaller Islamic groups. During the post-authoritarian phase, both AL and BNP continued with their
strategies of accommodation. The upshot is that political Islamists have grown in influence and prestige,
emerging as kingmakers in elections. It also enabled them to push towards the de-secularization of state social
policy, through upgrading the status of madrassah qualifications, moving towards official recognition of
or unregistered , and making changes to state policy on gender. So while ideological polarization is
insignificant in the domain of economic development, it may be increasing within the state's social policies.
As Chapters Four and Five discuss, there has been a rapid politicisation of the bureaucracy, the police force
and the judiciary, particularly since the return to multiparty democracy in 1991. One implication of this is that
recruitment, promotions, transfers and retirement policies tend to be influenced by political decisions, rather
than strictly guided by formal civil service rules and regulations. This is partly because partisan officials are
considered important political assets to be mobilised and promoted by the government - regardless of ruling
party - for strategic uses during elections. Attractive posts and transfers may also be allocated as rewards to
political supporters. The civil bureaucracy lacks corporate coherence, and is divided by factions based on the
nature of cadre services (generalist versus specialist), by regionalism, and along entry batch loyalties. Large
numbers of associations and groups exist within the bureaucracy in violation of the service rules. These function
effectively as trade unions, with loyalties to political parties.
Investigative reports by the press and different national and international human rights monitoring agencies
such as those by Ain-O-Shalish Kendra, Human Rights Watch and the US State Department indicate systematic
political influences on the enforcement of law, including selective prosecutions to favour political allies, police
complicity with political armed cadres of the ruling party, harassment of opposition parliament members by the
police and other security forces, and politically motivated uses of lower judiciary (false prosecutions, selective
bail) to intimidate opposition political activists. These are covered in Chapter Five.
It is alleged that High Court Judges are now increasingly recruited on the basis of systematic political
calculation. The law regarding the selection of the head of the Caretaker Government created incentives for
political scrutiny of judges, especially for nominating senior judges for the Appellate Division. According to the
law, based on the 13 amendment of the Constitution, the immediate past Chief Justice will be the head of the
interim Caretaker Government. This has created strong incentives for the Government to nominate judges to the
Appellate Division who were perceived to be loyal to the government, since Chief Justices are selected from
among Appellate Division judges. The political strategy of the ruling party, whichever is in power, seems to be to
attempt to ensure that:
The High Court remains loyal to it even after the party loses power
The Government is able to influence the decisions of the lower court despite formal separation of the
judiciary from the Executive
In the near future successive Chief Justices will remain loyal to the ruling/appointing party.
This politicisation of the higher judiciary has deeper consequences for rule-based governance: it minimises
judicial accountability of the state, may lead to a decline in the quality of judicial activism may decline, and
public interest litigation (PIL) may lose its effectiveness. Rather than the reform of the law enforcement agencies,
their politicisation has also taken the form of the use of extra-legal militaristic (Operation Clean Heart) and quasi-
militaristic (Rapid Action Battalion or RAB) means of addressing the law and order situation (see also Chapter
Five).
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Year Business Lawyer Farmer Politician Other Total
1970 27 30 13 5 26 101
1973 24 27 15 13 23 102
1991 61 18 6 10 5 100
1996 49 19 10 7 15 100
2001 60 12 7 3 18 100
What explains the mutual attraction between business and politics in Bangladesh? Which features of party
nomination processes make this possible? In an attempt to answer this question at the central level, a small
number of key informant interviews with leading political figures on the business-politics relationship were
conducted in August 2006. The information from interviews was supplemented by newspaper accounts. On the
supply side, there are two factors making politics a choice for businessmen. In addition, evidence suggests that
political parties actively seek out wealthy businessmen for party nominations.
The first, and the explanation preferred by those who combine business and politics, is that there is a natural
affinity between the two. Successful entrepreneurs are understood to blend the managerial skills needed to
manage the country with the financial resources required to compete electorally:
There are two kinds of politicians: those who have come from the bottom up and those who
have entered laterally. Businessmen come to the government to join politics but the
government also approaches businessmen to join their party. The political parties prefer
successful businessmen to join their party because they do not have to fund their election
expenses ... (interview with a former Cabinet Minister, August 2006).
In this view, politics requires the management skills of business to 'optimize the country's potential' in the words
of the ex-Minister. The pursuit of political office might even be taken as evidence of virtue:
There are a lot of rich businessmen who are not in politics because they have something to
hide. People who are in the business of drugs and guns do not join politics because they will
be exposed … (interview with former Cabinet Minister, August 2006).
This latter point would be more convincing were it not the case that politicians are not known for their financial
transparency. In fact, the regulations specify a spending limit of a mere Tk 500,000 per candidate per election, a
sum hardly likely to require major business success. Candidates are also required to submit financial5
Money politics and party nomination processes
The last two decades saw the growing presence of a business elite in the major political parties and in
parliament. Table 2 shows that the proportion of members of parliament (MPs) listing business as their primary
or main profession has hovered between half and 60 per cent of the total in the democratic period. Further, MPs
defining themselves as businessmen have overwhelmingly dominated Parliament since the 1990s. While the
trend was most obvious in the recent past BNP-led government, AL is also reportedly embracing big business.4
4 See issues of Probe News Magazine, 'Beleaguered Leadership of Awami League', 25 August 2006; 'Kazi Zafrullah: Bane or Boon of Awami
League?' 7 July 2006.
5 According to the Representation of the People Order (RPO) 1972.
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Table 2. Professions in Parliament, 1970-2001 (%)
Sources: Jahan 2005a; 1991-2001: Bangladesh Parliament MP Profiles
Figures may not add up to 100% because of rounding
statements in advance and to account for each election expense payment exceeding Tk 100 to the Election
Commission within fifteen days of the election results. This has not, however, been closely implemented to date:
in the 2001 elections, out of the 1939 parliamentary candidates, 1587 filed their sources of income and asset
statements, and 1473 filed details of their actual election expenses. Cases were only filed against 40 of the
defaulters, and no action was taken against the rest. In addition, it appears that most of the credentials
submitted to the Election Commission consist of false statements and documents.
While there may be some public benefits from the presence of entrepreneur-MPs in parliament, there are less
savoury dimensions to the close relationship between money and politics. The second factor explaining the
entry of business into politics is that for some individuals, entering politics is a business investment. It assures
access to state resources, gives a competitive edge over business rivals and establishes influence over the
policy process (for example, policies made against loan defaulters). Businessmen involved in big infrastructure
contracts may also choose to affiliate with an incoming ruling party to protect against the fallout from
involvement in corrupt deals with the past regime. The treatment of politics as a business investment has been
discussed openly during the ongoing civil society campaign led by the Centre for Policy Dialogue to 'cleanse'
the electoral process:
[P]articipants from a wide cross-section of people were quick to identify that exorbitant levels
of election financing are in fact investments on the part of the prospective Member of
Parliaments to secure control over disbursement of public resources and influence public
procurements.
A growing nexus between business and politics works in reverse as well. Politicians can and do succeed in
business, thanks to the preferential licenses and other advantages that accrue to members of a ruling party. In
addition, political parties actively seek rich individuals and invite them to accept party nominations because they
can contribute to party coffers: insiders suggest a price between Tk 5 and 10 crore (crore = ten million) for a
parliamentary nomination, higher for a cabinet position. A further advantage is that rich party members can
cover their own campaign expenses. In the last three elections, the AL and the BNP are reported to have
nominated donors who lacked political backgrounds and experience. Both have parliamentary boards chaired
by the party chief to nominate candidates for the parliamentary elections, but these do not meet regularly. Thus,
the final nomination selections are usually up to the party chairman and close advisors. This may make it easier
for wealthy businessmen to buy their candidacy.
Our interviews suggested that in some cases businessmen may be invited to compete for seats for which other
'competent' candidates are not available, or may be allocated ''weak seats" - as they are "easily winnable''
(interview with former Cabinet Minister, August 2006). But it is not a straightforward matter of buying a winnable
seat: not all big businessmen who have contested elections have won. In some cases, the nominations for
weak, more winnable seats are given to wealthy businessmen so that they can win despite their political
inexperience, although money does not guarantee an election win. At the same time, political parties may still
give nominations to businessmen as their large 'donations' are often distributed amongst other candidates who
have local popularity but are unable to fund their campaign expenditure.
A factor that may mitigate against the growth of business-politics is the need to appeal to voters: the bottom line
for all parties is the need to win elections. The ability to win is still a primary determinant in whether or not a
6
7
8
9
6 Daily Star 'Political Reforms: Which Way?', 4 February 2005; New Age, 'Clean Finance for Competent Candidates, Credible Elections', 4
September 2006. The BNP Secretary General Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan has declared the need for electoral reform to prevent 'black money
holders' from contesting elections (Daily Star 'Laws Needed to Stop Nomination of Black Money in Polls', 8 May 2006).
7 New Age, 'Clean Finance for Competent Candidates, Credible Elections', 4 September 2006
8 Daily Star, 'Fair Elections are Not Enough', 11 March 2006
9 Daily Star, 'Party Nomination for Sale?', 31 January 2004
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candidate will get a party nomination. Political loyalty, family legacy in the constituency, local popularity and
personal wealth are considered, but both major parties now conduct countrywide surveys and polls in all the
constituencies to get feedback on the candidates' popularity in the area and their potential to win. In making
decisions on nominations, party leaders are likely to perceive a trade-off between the need to have wealthy
candidates and the need to have candidates with the potential to win.
Another recent development revealed by research into local party politics, described in detail below, is that both
major parties have recently started holding regular talks with local committees or leaders. This is viewed as a
positive development by local political leaders. Nevertheless, party central committees maintain control over
decisions on who receives nominations. Parties at the local level lack the power to veto nominations, a matter
which fuels some resentment, particularly where the imposed candidates are seen by local party activists as
greedy Dhaka-based outsiders, well-connected at the centre. However, recent incidents of resistance to
imposed candidates suggest an emergent veto power at the local level.
Research into local party politics also found a growing nexus between local politics and the business
community, particularly with regards to contracts. Political leaders tend to get contracts for development work
while their party is in power. Consequently, businessmen who wish to receive a contract or to conduct business
without harassment tend to affiliate with the ruling party. This means that the growing relationship between
business and politics at the centre is being mimicked at the local level.
The major political parties are characterised by a lack of internal democracy and a highly centralised and
personalised internal governance structure (Ahmed 1996; Hossain 1991). The political cost of internal dissent
can be high. There are formal party constitutions and laws but they include special provisions - frequently
invoked - which vest near absolute power in the chairperson. Party leaders are not usually elected through a
transparent democratic process, but selected by the chairperson and a small group of senior leaders. As was
seen above, decisions to nominate candidates for general elections are also most frequently taken by a small
group of central party leaders. The top position of the party - President or Chairperson - has never been
contested in either AL or BNP. Internecine conflicts at the national level are generally solved by the chairperson,
for which she is usually given formal power (invoking constitutional provisions) or through her informal authority.
Similar conflicts at the local levels are managed by the interventions of central leaders. The intra-party
relationships are essentially characterised by patron-clientelism and sychophantic conformity.
At the local level, three main selection practices are followed: ordinary election, selection ( , in which
local leaders and sometimes district or national leaders influence the process) and (avoiding
election, a process by which a consensus candidate is expected to emerge). Internal democracy is not a major
feature of upazila level parties. However, there have been recent democratic developments in the leader
selection processes at union and ward branches, in which party elections are evidently increasingly competitive
and fought like Union Parishad elections with canvassing, 'miking', and mass communication activities.
2.2 Party politics
Internal democracy
10
11
kontho vote
shomjhota
10 See also Daily Star, 'Scope of dissent within our political parties', 16 June 1999
11 As described in chapter six of this report, the 'upazila parishad' constitutes the sub-district tier of local government.
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The institutionalisation of local party structures
The findings of recent research in two upazilas (22 unions) strongly suggest that local party politics has
become more institutionalised since 1991. This is a significant development. In practice, it means that party
structures (branches and committees) are more rooted in society and feature more formalized, regular
processes as well as increased stability over time.
Some evidence of the extent to which the two parties now reach into rural society is given in Tables 3 and 4. In
both upazilas, both parties have had a presence at least since the 1970s, although mainly at the upazila level in
the form of local 'big men' with links to the central party. Political competition between the two parties, and the
experience of the movement to oust General Ershad's military regime have been formative: since 1991 both
parties have worked to establish formal party structures linking central command down through the system to
local levels.
Activities by both parties at the local level involve efforts to communicate with the public including meetings,
processions, national and party day celebrations, sports tournaments, and through posters and leaflets
advertising the virtues of their own, and the crimes and failings of the opposing party. The local branches of the
ruling party also tend to control and distribute local and public resources for members of their own party
networks, supporters and friends. This appears to be the case regardless of the party in power, and dates back
to the mid-1990s in the two upazilas studied.
12
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12 Original qualitative research involving a detailed exploration of local party politics was conducted. This included 136 key informant interviews
with political leaders and members of all committees of each ward, union and upazila branch of the AL and BNP in two upazilas. The presidents,
secretaries and member responsible for the information and research department were interviewed, among others. In addition, 56 local
residents (24 elites and 32 non-elites) without involvement in any political parties were also interviewed. Two non-urban electoral constituencies
were selected to minimize the region specific political and societal variations. The two adjacent upazilas referred to here as P and B, are located
in a central district about four hours north of Dhaka. In constituency P the Member of Parliament was AL, while in constituency B the Member of
Parliament was BNP. AL and BNP dominate the politics in both constituencies while Jamaat has moderate influence in both. The field study took
place between July and August 2006. The research explored three main issues: a) the extent and nature of party institutionalization at upazila
levels; b) the role of the local party in development activities; and c) the local nominations process. The findings from that research will be
presented in full in Ashraf and Hassan (forthcoming, 2007).
Table 3. Formal party structures of BNP in P and B upazilas in 2006
Source: Ashraf and Hassan (forthcoming 2007)
* In one union only
Upazila P Upazila B
BNP Main Party and its branches
Upazila Union Ward Upazila Union Ward
BNP Mul Dal (Main party)
Chatra Dal (BNP Student branch)
Jubo Dal (youth)
Mohila Dal (women)
Sromik Dal (labourers or workers)
Shechchashebok Dal (volunteers)
Krishok Dal (farmers)
Olama Dal (religious leaders)
Jatiotabadi Shanskriti Dal
(cultural activists)
Zia Parishad
Torun Shangha Club youth club *
k
The growing institutionalisation of party politics at the local level appears to have driven a growing politicization
of public institutions and everyday life. The impact of parties can be felt throughout local life, including the
growing involvement by ordinary people in party politics. The interviews revealed some reasons for attraction to
political parties: among the unemployed young people and businessmen these appear to be the illicit income
possibilities. Research further showed local perceptions of increased local crime, sexual harassment and drug
abuse to be linked to the rise in party politics. The operations of formal and informal justice institutions such as
the police, lower courts, and and were reported to be influenced by the ruling party, as were the
control and distribution of public resources.
In the two upazilas, the local branches of the ruling party (at the time when the research was conducted, the
BNP) apparently retained close and organised control over the local distribution of public resources, particularly
through the Upazila Development Committee. It should be borne in mind that most public investment decisions
take place centrally. The influence of local ruling parties is confined to decisions about those limited resources
that are distributed through the upazila and union levels. The research found the following trends of local party
control over public life:
The ruling party takes control over resources regardless of the party affiliation of the local MP; at the same
time, although the post of (District) Minister has been removed, there is informal influence exerted over
the distribution of resources in the district
The Upazila Development Committee is a critical point of control. The Committee is attended by Union
Parishad chairmen with the MP acting as advisor. The Committee coordinates all development work in the
upazila, including the allocation of resources and projects to unions
Ward and union level party activists support implementation of development activities, and control
preparation of recipient lists for the distribution of relief (VGF, VGD)
Ruling party leaders, principally of the main BNP party and , currently hold government contracts
for construction and repair of public infrastructure, including schools, culverts and roads
Parties retain formal and informal relationships with the administration and elected local government, in
effect creating structures that parallel the official system
All 22 Union Parishad Chairmen were aligned to parties in the two upazilas.
shalish bichar
Zila
Chatra Dal
Local party control over public institutions and resources





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Table 4. Formal party structures of AL in P and B upazilas in 2006
Source: Ashraf and Hassan (forthcoming 2007)
* In one union only; ** Yet to be formed.
Upazila P Upazila B
Bangladesh AL and its branches
Upazila Union UnionWard Upazila Ward
Bangladesh AL (Main party)
Bangladesh Chatra League
(Student branch)
Awami Jubo League (youth)
Mohila League (women) *
Sromik League (labourers or workers)
Shechchashebok League (volunteers)
Krishok League (farmers)
Awami Torun League (youth)
Sheikh Rasel Smriti Sangsad
Bongabondhu Parishad
Olama League** (religious figures)
Although the overall goal of local party control is to capture power, the research identified two additional goals.
First, that parties capture material gains for the benefit of party leaders and supporters; and second, that parties
deliver resources to increase popularity of the party locally. It is not clear to what extent these objectives are in
conflict, and there may be the occasional trade-off between the two that benefits the public. It is worth noting
that non-partisan local people, particularly the poor, felt that the development process has become overly
skewed towards rewarding party supporters. At the same time however, the overall level of development activity
has unquestionably risen in both upazilas studied. This includes the provision of public goods that benefit all
parties and the poor.
Since the fall of General Ershad in 1990, the military has played virtually no active role in political governance
enabling Bangladesh to follow a route of 'constitution of democracy' rather than 'extrication from authoritarian
regime' in its democratic transition. The reasons for the formal retreat of the military form politics have been
explained with reference to various domestic and international factors (see Hakim 1998; Bhattacharya 1998;
Chowdhury 1999). At home, these include popular legitimacy of governments elected through largely free and
fair elections; the entrance of a new generation of officer corps, and the continuing high privileges and perks
associated with a military career. Perhaps more important are the external factors: international pressures and
support for the continuation and deepening of existing electoral democracy, and the apprehension of the
military that by interfering in politics they might risk losing lucrative opportunities abroad, such as UN peace
keeping missions.
Even as the military formally retreated from politics, the fear of past military interventions appears to still
influence the behaviour of political actors. For example, neither BNP nor AL have made efforts to make military
budgets more transparent (Sobhan 1998). For all major parties, an important political strategy has been to co-
opt high ranking retired military officers into the party.
The power and status of the civil bureaucracy have eroded considerably during the post-authoritarian period.
( There are various institutional and political reasons
behind this:
By the early 1990s most of the elite CSP bureaucrats who had manned the upper echelons of the civil
service had been gradually replaced by reportedly less able bureaucrats recruited during the early 1970s.
The current administration is possibly less able to defend its autonomy against its political masters
The political executive has by now learnt how the administration operates, and may feel less dependent on
the senior bureaucrats to manage public affairs than was the case in the 1980s. This has greatly reduced
the political power of the bureaucracy
2.3 Who governs?
Retreat of the military
The decline of the bureaucracy
13
These issues are looked at in more detail in Chapter Four.)


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13 The concepts 'extrication from authoritarian regime' and 'constitution of democracy' are from Przeworski (1991). If the autocratic force, which
has just left the scene, has remained intact and powerful enough to pull the string from behind, then the agenda of the democratic transition
typically takes the form of gradual extrication from the authoritarian system. Democracy treads a fragile and slippery path under the hegemony
of the authoritarian force. This was the case in Chile and Poland. In the South Asian context, Pakistan has tried to follow the strategy of
extrication but with little success. In the other route to democratic transition (i.e., constitution of democracy), the authoritarian force has either
been totally defeated (due to war, as in Argentina) or has been forced to retreat from the political scene due to a massive popular movement (as
in Bangladesh in 1990). Here the political actors are able to engage in the process of 'constitution of democracy', being largely independent of
an authoritarian force.

Largely through the use of political appointment, both at the policy level as well as at the lower levels of the
administration, the political leadership has established a high degree of control over the bureaucracy. The
previously autonomous bureaucracy has now been subsumed into a patron-client system in which
promotion and postings are increasingly based on the favours of a patron (politician) to a client
(bureaucrat)
With the shifts in power between the ruling parties and drastic bureaucratic transfers and reshuffles by the
Caretaker Government, three successive elections have weakened the bureaucracy and reduced its
coherence and independence as a site of political power.
In the Bangladeshi system where the winning party enjoys the monopoly of power for the duration of their
electoral term, along with the retreat of the military as an active player in politics and the effective subordination
of the bureaucracy, the ruling party and its innermost circle have emerged as the unrivalled centre of political
power. This innermost circle has de facto command over the entire party, legislature, parliamentary committees,
procurement policies, development allocations, bureaucracy and law and order enforcement agencies. Its
unbridled power is only limited, to a certain extent, by the occasional interventions of the higher judiciary and
public scrutiny of its actions by the private media and other civil society organisations.
Political decision-making has been centred around the Prime Minister's Office (the Prime Minister herself and
her closest political advisers). When the ruling party was the BNP, the Chairperson's office (known as
), was a parallel centre of power. Both centres appear to exercise a veto power whether over
government (procurement, personnel administration) or party business. Important decisions, such as choosing
ministers and nominating candidates for election, are made within these settings. Senior ministers are consulted
when required but do not appear to have final decision-making authority. The government makes many
important and politically sensitive decisions without consulting a broader group of senior party leaders. For
example, the decision to involve the military to restore law and order in 2003 (Operation Clean Heart) and the
subsequent enactment of the Joint Drive Indemnity Ordinance of 2003 which indemnified those involved in
Clean Heart, were made by the Prime Minister with the participation of only a few most trusted senior ministers
and an inner circle of political advisors.
The control by politicians over the polity has been greatly enhanced by the way the two major political parties
relate to the larger society. In Bangladesh, party-society relations are essentially structured by 'partyarchy', that
is, a democratic political system in which "political parties monopolise the formal political process and politicise
society along party lines" (Coppedge 1994: 18). Both AL and BNP made attempts at penetration of civil society
organizations. While the primarily rights-based, advocacy and service delivery NGOs thrive outside the partisan
realm and are a powerful voice for creating demand for accountability and more open political space (see below
and Chapter Seven), some civil society organizations have not escaped partisan capture. The partisanship is
manifested most visibly among the professional associations of doctors, engineers, lawyers, business and
NGOs and other organised groups of 'intelligentsia' such as associations of university teachers and cultural
activists (Kochanek 2000). The historical process through which the two parties were formed and
consolidated combined 'incorporative clientelistic' and 'incorporative populistic' modes of political mobilization;
as a consequence, the 'integrative mode' of political inclusion was marginalised. Studies by Sobhan (1993),
The rise of the 'partyarchy'
Hawa
Bhaban
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14 See also, Daily Star, 'Towards a Non-partisan Civil Society', 3 March 1999.
15 According to Mouzelis (1998: 64, 1986), the 'integrative mode' of mobilisation is characterised by a “relatively autonomous horizontal
inclusion of the people in the national political arena”. In contrast, 'incorporative-clientelistic mode' mobilises citizens through inserting them into
personalistic and highly particularistic patron-client networks which cut across and undermine “more horizontal forms of political organization”.
The 'incorporative populistic mode' mobilises citizens into politics “via the masses' attachment to a leader whose charisma becomes the major
source of legitimation”. In Bangladesh, the charismatic role of Sheikh Mujib during the late sixties and General Ziaur Rahman during the late
seventies are classic examples of such populistic mobilisation of citizens.
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Kochanek (1993) and Westergaard (1985) provide rich empirical accounts of how such clientelistic and
populistic modes played a critical role in the evolution of both AL and BNP.
Clientelistic incorporation remains a major feature of party-society relations, indicating that democratisation and
economic liberalisation do not necessarily weaken the clientelistic basis of party-society or state-society
relations. A relevant example is the nature of the political links between the apex association of the business
community, the Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) and the two dominant
parties AL and BNP. During the earlier part of the 1990s, the elections of the FBCCI manifested intense partisan
competition between business leaders supported by AL and BNP respectively (Kochanek 1996, 2000). The
executive committees tended to represent a balance of business leaders aligned to both parties. This allowed
the leadership a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis these two dominant parties. But after 1996, the ruling
party (AL), by taking advantage of the business leaders' clientelistic dependence on the state, successfully
monopolised the leadership of the association by ensuring that the FBCCI's elections reflected pre-determined
outcomes. It is ironic that after a decade and a half of democratic transition and more than two of market
liberalisation, the peak association of the business community, representing economically powerful non-state
actors, has been transformed into a de facto front organisation of a political party.
On the other hand, Bangladesh Garments Manufacture and Exporter Association (BGMEA) has largely escaped
such clientelistic dependency on the government/ruling party. On a few occasions it has successfully resisted
government's attempts to 'capture' the organisation through political pressures and direct administrative
interventions. This political autonomy is perhaps a reflection of BGMEA's relative economic independence from
the state as its members are engaged in business with the foreign buyers, not with the state.
Transitional democracies require a governance process in which state actors are not only vertically accountable
to the citizens - through, for example, periodic elections - but are also subject to restraint and oversight by other
agencies, both elected and non-elected. The state must subject itself to multiple forms of credible self-restraint
by institutionalising complex and interdependent mechanisms of horizontal accountability (Schedler 1999). A
number of reasons have ensured reluctance by post-authoritarian regimes to institutionalise self-restraining
mechanisms within the state.
Members of Parliament are potential agents of effective horizontal accountability, but over the last fifteen years
MPs have yet to realise this potential in terms of demanding the accountability of the Executive branch of
government. Some important institutional reforms were initiated within Parliament in the 1990s to redefine and
strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Executive. These reforms included the establishment of an independent
Parliament Secretariat in 1994, the 'democratisation' of the Oversight Committee system in 1997, and the
introduction of Prime Minister's Question Time in 1997.
16
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Horizontal accountability of the state
Elective agencies of horizontal accountability
a) The Legislature
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16 For a general analysis of clientelistic mode of patronage distribution in Bangladesh, see the important study by Sobhan and Ahmad (1980).
For analysis specific to rural society, see Westergaard (1985, 1998) and Wood (1984). For a useful empirical account of systemic corruption in
Bangladesh as a strategy of patronage distribution (through privatisation, procurement policies, allocations of licenses etc), see World Bank
(2000a). The clientelistic basis of the party formation and consolidation in Bangladesh over the last three decades seems to confirm
Huntington's (1968) observation that corruption may promote the institutionalisation of party in some cases. But he also suggested that further
institutionalisation might contribute to the demise of the corrupt system. Referring to the evolution of political parties in the West, he argues,
parties which were in the beginning “leeches on the bureaucracy in the end become the bark protecting it from more destructive locusts of
clique and family” (Ibid:70-71). Bangladesh's experiences, so far, do not support this part of his observation.
Executive dominance of the legislature continues, however. One reason is that the office of the Prime Minister
retained centralised power similar to the former Presidential system, partly because of constitutional provisions
which have endowed the position of Prime Minister with substantial power (see Choudhury 1995). The
Executive's overwhelming control over legislature is also evident (Ahmed and Ahmed 1996; Hasanuzzaman
1998; Ahmed 1998a, 2001; World Bank 2002a).
Most laws enacted and bills passed by the Parliament are initiated by the Executive
Most legislative measures proposed by the Executive are passed by the majority controlled legislature. The
legislature has never amended government legislation nor rejected any legislative proposals advanced by
the Executive. Bills are usually not sent to the Select or Standing Committees
Debate on policy and legislation is generally limited. Critical policy issues, such as Privatisation Board and
a financial sector reform project were not even debated.
The Prime Minister also enjoys near dictatorial power vis-à-vis the legislature. This is partly a constitutional
matter. Constitutional provisions restrict floor crossing and do not allow for the formation of parliamentary
groups. Such provisions help ensure backbencher loyalty. The domination of the Executive and the Prime
Minister is also due to informal power dynamics within the political parties which are centralised, with
personalistic oriented leadership, and clientelistic nature of leader-party member relationship. Such informal
power dynamics create strong disincentives for inter-party collaboration between the backbenchers and the
opposition against parliamentary leadership (Ahmed 2001).
The introduction of the potentially important accountability device of Prime Minister's Question Time has proved
disappointing to date. Question Time was first introduced in 1997 during the Seventh (1996-
2001) under the AL tenure. One of the purposes of introducing Question Time was to underscore the AL leader
Sheikh Hasina's regular attendance in Parliament. In comparison, her successor, Begum Khaleda Zia's
attendance during the Eighth (2001-2006) was irregular; even when present, Zia's participation
was limited.
Prime Minister's Question Time appears to have been used somewhat more effectively by AL in Government.
Throughout the five-year AL rule (1996-2001) some 1500 questions were addressed to the Prime Minister
(Ahmed 2002a: 112). In contrast, only 448 questions were posed to the BNP for the duration of their rule (2001-
2006) (TIB 2005). The effectiveness of Question Time as an accountability mechanism depends on demand for
accountability, and the opposition leader, Begum Khaleda Zia, did not once pose a question to the Prime
Minister during the Seventh (Ahmed 2002a: 122). By contrast, during the Eighth ,
both the main AL opposition and other parties made use of the opportunity to question the Prime Minister (TIB
2005).
A formal weakness of Question Time is the Prime Minister's authority to select questions. This leaves the
opposition with only rare opportunity to ask questions. In addition, ruling party backbenchers have failed to use
the opportunity provided by Question Time to make the executive accountable to the legislature. Consequently,
although supposed to be an accountability mechanism, Question Time quickly turned into an instrument for
government propaganda within Parliament (Khan 1997a; Menon 1997).
Jatiya Sangsad
Jatiya Sangsad
Jatiya Sangsad Jatiya Sangsad
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17 As Choudhury observes: “Bangladesh's Constitution sought to ensure the prime minister's dominance by providing constitutional measures
which would not allow party members to vote against the prime minister in parliament by statutory provision… Even if the members were to
revolt against the prime minister in their party meeting or outside parliament that would have no effect on the tenure of the prime minister as
long as they did not vote formally in the legislature. And the present Constitution provides adequate provisions against [such] voting in
parliament itself” (Choudhury 1995: 89-90).
18 See Choudhury (1995) for discussion on the various related constitutional provisions.
b) Oversight Committees
Non-elective agencies of horizontal accountability
a) Anti-Corruption Commission
Parliamentary Oversight Committees are supposed to provide backbenchers with a collective platform to ensure
accountability of the Executive. The late 1990s saw a number of changes to Committee rules and practices
which enhanced their formal power and status within Parliament: backbenchers replaced ministers as
Committee heads and the Speaker was empowered to convene meetings if the Chair fails to hold the
mandatory monthly Committee meeting. Ahmed identifies cross-party agreement on the need to widen the role
of MPs and donor pressure to create more accountability within Parliament as having driven the Committee
reforms (Ahmed 2001). By the late 1990s there were some signs that the Prime Minister and Ministers were
taking Committee recommendations seriously, and under the AL Government (1996-2001), Departmental
Parliamentary Committees were reasonably effective in scrutinising legislative proposals and overseeing
departmental activities (Ahmed 2001).
Evidence suggests, however, that Oversight Committees are limited in what they can achieve (Ahmed 1998a
and 2001; Sahgal 1999; Khalequzzaman 1997; World Bank 2002a). Weaknesses and constraints faced by
Parliamentary Oversight Committees include:
Weak incentives for the Ministry officials to pay attention to recommendations and reports produced by
Committees; most recommendations remain unimplemented
Given the hierarchical and patron-client nature of political relationships, the presence of ministers as
Committee members is a weakness because it enables them to influence the agenda and to manipulate
reports and recommendations
Committees lack formal authority to take punitive actions against ministers or department officials if they
ignore the directives or recommendations of a Committee. They can report inaction to the House but this
rarely happens as the Committee members are predominantly from the ruling party
Bureaucrats frequently do not cooperate with Committees in terms of supplying information; non-
cooperation is easily justified with reference to rules such as Rule 203
MPs are generally not interested in seriously considering Committee recommendations and reports, which
are rarely debated in the House. Individual MPs have no strong incentives to probe into administrative
malfeasance, and are unwilling to antagonize the bureaucracy
The strongly partisan political climate weakens the effectiveness of Committees. Further, formal rules make
it difficult, if not impossible, for MPs to create alliances across the party divide in order to seek
accountability of Parliamentary leaders
Parties are not internally democratic and backbenchers are heavily dependent on the patronage of top
leaders. Patronage politics creates limited incentives for all Parliamentarians to expose misconduct of state
officials. Instead, their incentives are to side with or turn a blind eye to the diversion or mismanagement of
public resources.
Under pressure from the international community, the government agreed to set up an independent Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) in November 2004. This constituted a dramatic development in governance

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19 According to the third report of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC): “the committee has noticed with great regret that no ministry has
complied with its directives to regularize excess expenditure”. This not only shows that the clear directives of the committee are violated, but
also reveals the extent of indifference of ministers to check financial irregularities in government.” (PAC, Third Report, July 1993: 8; cited in
Ahmed 1998a).
20 Rule 203 of the 'Rules of Procedure of Parliament of the People's of Bangladesh' says: “a committee shall have power to send for persons,
papers and records; provided that if any question arises whether the evidence of a persons or the production of a document is relevant for the
purposes of the Committee, the question shall be referred to the Speaker whose decision shall be final; provided further that Government may
decline to produce a document on the ground that its disclosure would be prejudicial to the safety or interest of the state” (cited in
Khalequzzaman 1997: 39).
reform in Bangladesh. However, establishing a working ACC is proving difficult, and concerns have been raised
about whether the ACC will ever function independently as, for example, the Chief Commissioner of the ACC is
appointed by the President and the ACC's organisational structure and budget are decided at the discretion of
the government. Already there are accusations that selection of Commissioners has been partisan and, due to
various bureaucratic interventions, the ACC is yet to be functional. There are over 6,000 petitions - most of them
filed right after the ACC was set up - pending and not being addressed due to the absence of rules and
procedures for the operation of the ACC.
The constitution of Bangladesh provides the necessary legal framework (Article 77) to establish the office of
Ombudsman. The BNP government in 1980 passed the necessary act for the establishment of this
administrative watchdog. Since then, despite strong pressures from the donor community, no government has
made any serious effort to establish such an office. Bangladesh is the only country in South Asia which does not
have an Ombudsman.
Societal accountability is a non-electoral, vertical mechanism of control. It depends on citizens, who through an
array of citizens' associations and movements exert pressure on government. The media can also take actions
that aim to expose governmental wrongdoing, bring issues onto the public agenda, or trigger investigation by
the horizontal accountability agencies. It employs both institutional approaches - for example, Public Interest
Litigation (PIL) as well as non-institutional means, such as social mobilization and media exposés.
As was seen above, Parliamentary Committees are largely docile entities due to the number of formal and
informal controls exerted by the Executive over backbench Committee members. The late 1990s saw some
initial signs of assertiveness, to some degree supported by growing print media scrutiny. Parliamentary
Committees in Bangladesh do not subscribe to the 'publicity principle', that is, they do not generally publish
their reports for public scrutiny (Sahgal 1999). During the 1990s however, a section of the print media started
reporting on Committees activities. This has created pressure on the Executive to respond to Committee
queries.
Two important examples are controversies surrounding the issues related to import contracts (the CNG issue
during the BNP regime) and defence purchases (MIG 29 and Frigate cases during the AL regime, recent cases
of Chinese arms purchases during the BNP regime). The print media picked up these stories and several
reports were published on the alleged kickbacks involving higher level political authorities (see Box 1). Although
Committee members were in no position to stop these deals, the discussion they generated showed some
progress towards ensuring the Executive's accountability to Parliament. For instance, although the
Parliamentary Committee on Defence is formally empowered to scrutinise military spending, procurement plans
and organisational restructuring, these issues were previously considered taboo, and the Committee's
discussions were mainly restricted to innocuous issues such as welfare schemes, rehabilitation projects and
such (Chowdhury 1999).
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21 New Age, 'ACC still dysfunctional after third birthday', 22 November 2006
Box 1. Media coverage improves accountability of Parliamentary Committees: two examples
The (CNG) auto-rickshaw purchase probe
The Ministry of Defence and the Standing Committee
Converted Natural Gas (CNG) auto-rickshaws were introduced to reduce pollution from 2-stroke petrol driven
auto rickshaws. Initially, the Ministry of Communications (MoC) planned to import the CNG auto rickshaws
through the Government's Bangladesh Road Traffic Corporation (BRTC), but this fell through as BRTC was
unable to secure the necessary bank loans. A company called Uttara Motors, however, successfully arranged
financing and was awarded the license to import CNG auto rickshaws from India, thus enjoying a highly
lucrative monopoly.
In January 2004, the Parliamentary Standing Committee for the MoC set up a sub-committee to probe the
process by which Uttara Motors gained this monopoly. The Parliamentary Standing Committee estimated the
price of CNG auto rickshaws had been inflated to Tk 367,000 from a market price of approximately Tk 167,000.
The Minister in charge of awarding the contract denied any wrongdoing, and at one point admitted being
absent on medical grounds when the deal was finalised. However, the Sub-Committee was unable to submit its
report as the Ministry repeatedly failed to provide relevant documentation. Parliament warned the Ministry not to
miss the fifth deadline but gave it a further extension to 29 March 2005. Meanwhile, the Standing Committee
failed to hold its regular monthly meetings as obliged under the Parliamentary Rules & Procedures (their last
meeting was held in October 2004). The Standing Committee to-date has yet to publish its report.
The CNG story illustrates some of the weaknesses of Parliamentary Committees. First, ministries can ignore
Parliamentary demands for information and account for their activities with impunity. Second, Ministerial
responsibility is weak: the Minister has continually denied personal wrongdoing, which may indeed be correct.
But more importantly, he has not been required to shoulder responsibility for problems within his Ministry. And
third, even under intense fire from civil society (TIB's surveys repeatedly and publicly identify the MoC as among
the 'most corrupt'), the Committee has not been able to effectively investigate the Ministry of Communication for
the lack of evidence required.
The defence budget is traditionally a mysterious, opaque matter, well beyond the public gaze. Efforts to
institutionalise scrutiny of defence spending through Parliamentary Committees since the 1990s have faltered in
the face of partisan conflict and bureaucratic obstruction. But recent media attention to the Ministry of Defence
Standing Committee investigation of the purchase of F-7 fighter jets by the Air Force in 2005 suggests that there
is some scope for public scrutiny on defence spending matters. The purchase of military hardware is conducted
through either state-to-state agreements or through international tendering; unless the products purchased are
part of foreign aid package there needs to be a tender. When the Government decided to replace a section of
the Air force fleet due to normal wear and tear, jet fighters were bought from China at a cost of US$ 117.9
million. No international tender was offered, although a comparable offer-rejected on the grounds of cost- had
been made by the Russians to purchase F2-27 fighter jets.
The media brought the issue to public attention and a debate over the purchase began once the Chief of Air
Forces apologised to the Ministry of Defence Standing Committee for providing inconsistent information about
the procurement procedure and attempted to clarify the inconsistencies. The Bangladesh Air Force provided
incorrect prices for aircraft technical support units which had inflated the total costs. Further questions were
raised by the Committee about the transparency of a state-to-state agreement on the purchase, and allegations
made about the opportunities to receive commissions from both the Bangladesh and Chinese party for
brokering the deal. The F-7 jet fighter case and its predecessor scandal - the Frigate Purchase case under the
AL Government (1996-2001) together appear to have helped to peak into the black box of military spending. A
sign of change in attitudes came during the Committee investigation and suggest that there is at least a
beginning of respect shown for this institution of formal accountability. More significantly, the Standing
Committee disclosed, in mid-2006, information about the composition of spending within the armed forces
budget.
Sources:
Sources:
Daily Star, 'Huda admits irregularity in licensing', 14 October 2004; 'Probe Committees on CNG scam miss fifth deadline', 6 March
2005; 'JS body to probe TIB report basis after Huda heat', 3 October 2005
Daily Star, 'Air Chief says sorry for giving wrong information to JS body', 16 May 2006; New Age, 'Gov[ernment] accused of corruption
in F-7 procurement deal', 16 May 2006
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As the military purchase and other large scale business contract issues suggest, backbench Committee
members have been able to hold the Executive and armed forces Chiefs to account by requiring them to explain
and justify major defence spending. Such changes in the balance of power can almost certainly be explained by
the wider publicity that these issues received in the print media. These developments also indicate that electoral
accountability is not just an empty match enacted by Parliamentarians. Civil society and print media are
increasingly demonstrating their potential to enter the debate and to demand improved accountability (see also
Chapter Seven).
As Chapter Seven documents, civil society groups such as NGOs have been pro-actively involved in attempts to
ensure state accountability. The brief discussion below focuses on the work of the Fair Election Monitoring
Alliance (FEMA) and Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) in bringing about positive changes to the
domain of good governance, particularly in terms of transparency, accountability and responsiveness of state
institutions, and on the work of Ain-O-Shalish Kendra (ASK) and Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust
(BLAST), in forcing state compliance with constitutionally guaranteed laws and universal principles of human
rights.
TIB and FEMA have been conducting proactive advocacy for substantive policy and behavioural changes
among the political forces of the state. FEMA has been advocating for changes in electoral laws and regulations
in the following categories: amendments to the constitution, amendments to the Representation of People
Order, election expenses, code of conduct, election campaign, administration and conduct during election
period, election disputes, delimitation of constituencies, number of seats in parliament, electoral rolls, reserved
seats for women, state funding of political parties, and registration of political parties. Some of FEMA's
achievements are tabulated in Table 5 below.
FEMA managed to push through certain reforms through the interim caretaker governments of 1996 and 2001.
The caretaker government implemented reforms nullifying results for fraudulent candidates; however, these
reforms were rescinded due to pressure from the major political parties.
NGOs and societal accountability
Table 5. Impacts of FEMA's advocacy for electoral reforms
Source: Ali and Hassan 2004
Proposed Reform Implemented Reform
Poll observers and monitors should be allowed in polling
booths
Implemented in full
Security money for candidate should be raised to Tk
1,000,000.
Implemented in full
Political parties should be registered Implemented partially political parties
should be registered but it is not mandatory
Retired high court judges should be empowered to settle
election disputes, instead of district magistrates
Implemented partially existing high court
judges empowered
Election Commission should be empowered to stop
polling in a constituency
Implemented partially election commission
can stop polling in a single booth
Election Commission should be given the powers of the
Returning Officers
Not implemented
Results should be nullified for fraudulent candidates and
they should be debarred from contesting elections for six
years
Not implemented
Observers should be allowed to monitor polls in their
own thanas
Not implemented
TIB has been advocating for increased state responsiveness, accountability and transparency with mixed results
in bringing about increased responsiveness from certain organs of the state. TIB research reports into
corruption in various state organs have drawn varied levels of response from state actors. The LGRD Ministry,
the Ministries of Shipping and Communication and the judiciary have responded angrily. However, recently, TIB
has been drawing more positive responses. A report on corruption in the Chittagong Port was noted by a
Parliamentary Standing Committee and influenced the Chittagong Port Authority in forming an internal
investigative committee on corruption. Similarly, the police have been cooperating with TIB, assisting them in
monitoring the governance process of selected police (stations) and are using TIB research in reforms of
governance. Further, the government has decided to take TIB on board in the formation of an
independent anti-corruption unit. Also, TIB's study on the parliament (TIB 2005) has led to tangible
improvements in attendance in the National Parliament.
The major advocacy tactic used by ASK and BLAST is public interest litigation (PIL). PIL cases have primarily
focused on civil liberties issues (for more details see Chapter Five). PIL has sought to establish the state's
responsibility for positive actions as well as inactions, especially the failure to prevent rights violations by non-
state actors. PIL cases have been brought against many branches of the state - the Ministries of Home Affairs,
Environment and Forestry, Foreign Affairs, and Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs as well as police and
prison authorities. Public interest litigation is essentially a protective advocacy tool individual civil liberties are
being protected through advocacy. However, sustained and extensive PIL can result in proactive outcomes, i.e.,
the government changes laws and regulations that are being contested through PIL.
A serious limitation of PIL in the Bangladesh context, however, is that the state may choose to ignore court
verdicts. PIL may be a good means of ensuring that the state does not act in a non-transparent way, but it is not
an effective means of ensuring state accountability. BLAST conducted a PIL against the proposed Gram Sarkar
Act in 1997 on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and contrary to the principals of democracy and
accountability (see Chapter 6). The court issued an interim 'show cause' ruling, but the Act was pushed through
in 2003, in disregard of the ruling (BLAST 2004).
After a decade and a half electoral democracy in Bangladesh has not been adequately consolidated. The main
reason is that the incumbent political actors have failed to accept electoral loss and to cope with the uncertainty
of outcomes inherent in electoral democracy. This has prevented the establishment of credible 'rules of the
game'. In their absence, the rational response of the opposition has been to behave like a bad loser, which
provokes the inevitable violent and extra-parliamentary resistance, including the ubiquitous (strike), or
(siege).
Explaining the problem requires a closer look at the incentives facing rational political actors. In a consolidated
parliamentary democracy, the rules of the game provide present winners and losers with equal opportunities to
build up political assets in the long run. The rules are sufficiently transparent and credible to the current loser to
formulate their political game with a view of a long-term horizon. The losers also recognise that current
democratic competition might enable them to further their political interests in the future. In Bangladesh, by
contrast, the incentive structures tend to induce rational non-compliance among the opposition.
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22 Working paper on the diagnostic study on Chittagong Port, 2004, Transparency International Bangladesh (available in Bangla only)
23 TIB's Parliament Watch provides a detailed commentary of Parliamentary processes and proceedings during the Eight (2001-
2006).
24 Disincentives arise from key characteristics of the political process: i) the lack of transparent, credible Parliamentary rules; ii) Executive
interference in by-elections; and iii) the illiberal mode of rule.
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In their attempts to establish credible 'rules of the game' in electoral politics, opposition political actors have
demanded reforms of some institutions, such as the Non-partisan Caretaker Government, the Election
Commission and the Legislature. The opposition argues that the Chief of the Caretaker Government should be
selected through consensus, that the Election Commission should be made independent, and that there should
be a 'level playing field' in the functioning of the Legislature. By contrast, opposition political actors have never
lobbied for the institutions through which the state enforces its illiberal mode of rule. Even to protect its party
activists from harassment by law enforcement agencies, the opposition has not asked for depoliticisation of the
police administration or the independence of the lower judiciary. Instead, the strategy has been to bargain
politically (for example, as part of the negotiation to end the boycott of Parliament) for the unconditional releases
of opposition party activists. Thus the 'rule of law' has become a subject for short-term political bargaining.
Similarly, in the case of electronic media, the opposition has sought equal access rather than the media's
autonomy from the state.
There seems to be an informal consensus between the major political parties to preserve the institutions of
illiberal mode of rule. These refer to the politicisation of civil and police administrations, the Executive's control
over the lower judiciary and attempts to politicize higher judiciary. There is also a de facto consensus among the
political elites to avoid the establishment of the office of the Ombudsman and the autonomous effective ACC.
The evolution of good political governance in Bangladesh will require moving away from the shared consensus.
So far, attempted reform efforts have failed to generate self-enforcing outcomes due to a classic incentive
problem: demanding a level playing field while in opposition but resisting such demands while in power. The
winner-take-all logic of Bangladeshi politics makes it difficult to imagine the self-restraint initiatives to come from
an incumbent political actor. It is possible but unlikely that a shift from the current phase of 'transition',
characterised by mutual suspicion and conflicts among elite actors (confrontational politics), to a 'habituation
phase', characterised by generalised respect for democratic values, will occur by itself only through repeated
participation in the government by the dominant parties.
The transition to a consolidated democracy Bangladesh has been characterized by its political vibrancy and
competition. The major political parties have strong incentives to promote and preserve all formal attributes of
polyarchy. This may explain the resilience of competitive electoral democracy in Bangladesh. However, such
political competitiveness exists only in the domain of inter-party relations. As the discussions in the chapter
indicate, a serious weakness of the polity is the lack of intra-party democracy both at the central and local
levels, with an exception of wards and unions where democratic practices are starting to evolve. Taking into
account the lack of internal party democracy, it is reasonable to argue that political competition is insufficient to
produce pluralistic, responsive parties capable of exercising self-restraint within more positive democratic rules
of the game.
Under the current consensus, the political costs of depriving citizens from enjoying good political governance
are perceived to be low by both major parties. These costs, however, may be rising as there is a more
awareness and open debate about the ills of Bangladeshi political governance. In the absence of will to change
the rules of the game by the political actors who cyclically capture the state, the role of the agent of change falls
onto the society. In a functioning democracy it is ultimately a responsibility of citizens to assure, through as well
as between elections, that the state is accountable to them and is servicing their demands. External pressure for
changes can also be considered but there are limitations to what international actors and donors can do;
donors can facilitate and support reform but it is up to the citizens to decide which direction they choose for the
polity to develop.
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25 The 'charter of demands' of the opposition typically include: release of party leaders and workers detained by the police and cancellation of
'false cases' filed against them, providing adequate time to the opposition MPs in the Parliament floor, ensuring neutral role of the Speaker and
ensuring impartial coverage of the Parliamentary proceedings in the electronic media.
Macroeconomic governance and
the investment climate
The relationship between the state of governance and the condition of the economy is complex and unclear in
the Bangladesh context, as elsewhere. Chapter Three does not attempt to address all aspects of the economy
as these are, or might be, affected by the state of governance. Instead, it focuses on two aspects of the
economy in which the quality of governance has been clearly identified as a determinant. Partly in order to
illustrate the uneven impacts of governance on the economy, and partly on the basis of the availability of
literature and evidence, the chapter focuses on macroeconomic governance and the investment climate.
Macroeconomic governance is generally considered to have been successfully addressed, unlike the
investment climate in which governance failures are widely acknowledged to have been a major constraint. The
chapter is based primarily on a review of the published literature, including 'grey' literature and newspaper
reports. It also features findings from a case study of the Bangladesh Bank. The section on the investment
climate is supplemented by key informant interviews with owners of successful Bangladeshi businesses, and
with officials and staff of Government agencies.
Since 1991 the Bangladesh economy has improved on most macroeconomic indicators. Growth has been
impressive, averaging 4.8 per cent over the 1990s, higher by a full percentage point annually than during the
1980s (3.8 per cent; Bhattacharya 2005). By 2004, the growth rate had reached 6.3 per cent, declining to 6 per
cent the following year. ADB estimates that 2006 will see growth again rise above 6 per cent. Growth momentum
was higher during the second half of the decade compared to the first half, rising from an average 4.4 per cent
(1991-1995) to 5.2 per cent (1996-2000) (ADB 2006; CPD 2002a).
3.1 Macroeconomic governance
The policy context
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Growth in the recent past has been underpinned by improving performance in agriculture and manufacturing,
supported by a fast-growing service sector. The small current account surplus results from robust growth in
exports and workers' remittances, coupled with a sustainable import growth rate (ADB 2006). Underlying these
broad growth trends, there is considerable variation across sectors: trends suggest a declining share of
agriculture and an increasing contribution from services and periodically from the manufacturing sector. The
growing importance of the service sector indicates that Bangladesh's economic growth remains biased against
industrial development; the gradual decline in the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP growth is a concern
(Bhattacharya 2005, 2006).
Other trends in the macroeconomic context between 1991 and 2005 were as follows:
The level of gross domestic savings was low even among low income countries and compared to others in
the region, and appears to be stagnant
Gross domestic investment is increasing and dominated by private sector investment; however, public
sector investment has remained more or less stagnant
Inflation has been kept low for two decades, although the prices of foodstuffs fluctuate considerably.
Recent trends indicate increasing inflation, mainly due to supply-side fluctuations and increasing fuel prices
Domestic resource mobilization remains a major structural constraint for the economy. Government
revenue as a percentage of GDP increased from 8.5 per cent in 2000 to 10.6 per cent in 2005 (see Table 1).
While the introduction of VAT in 1999 significantly improved revenue receipts, Bangladesh has one of the
lowest tax-GDP ratios in the region (see Table 2)
The budget deficit has been successfully maintained within the 4-5 per cent of GDP range, despite the
declining share of aid
1
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Indicators 1995 2000 2005
Real GDP Growth (%) 4.9 5.9 6
Consumer Price Index (average
inflation)
8.9 2.79 6.5
Savings (as % of GDP) 19.1 23.1 25.8
Investment (as % of GDP) 19.1 23 24.5
Total Revenue (as % of GDP) 9.8 8.5 10.6
Total Expenditure (as % of GDP) 14.4 14.5 15
Budget Deficit (as % of GDP) 4.6 6.1 4.5
Broad Money (% change) 27.7 31.5 40.9
Total Domestic Credit (growth in %) 32.65 13.27 17.5
Exports (% change) 37.1 8.03 13.83
O
million USD
verseas Development Assistance
1612 1475 1552
47% (2.2) 49%(1.4) 78%(2.4)
53%(2.3) 41%(1.5) 22%(0.7)
39.2 4.6 20.6
Loan (% of GDP)
Grants ( % of GDP)
Imports (% change)
Remittances (% change) 10 14.24 14.2
Table 1. Key macroeconomic indicators, 1995-2000-2005
Sources: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2004-2005; Bangladesh Economic Review 2005, Ministry of Finance, GoB
1 This section is based on Bhattacharya 2005 and ADB 2006.
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Domestic credit has grown since the early 1990s, in both the public and private sectors. Public sector
borrowing from the bank and non-bank sector has also risen steadily from 2 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 6.2
per cent in 2000
Imports grew at an average 11 per cent per annum during the 1990s
Exports grew at an average more than 14 per cent per annum throughout the 1990s. Remittances remain a
major and rising source of foreign exchange
The official reserve has shown signs of improvement. Foreign exchange reserves were higher in the early
parts of the 1990s, and deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s, only to improve again more recently.
The current, broadly pro-market policy context is the outcome of a series of wide-ranging economic reforms in
the early 1990s designed to liberalise, deregulate and promote private enterprise (Mujeri 2006, Osmani
2003). The return to democratic rule in 1991 saw the new BNP government legislate a series of reforms: tariff
rates were slashed, commitments made to privatizing state owned enterprises, the financial sector was
liberalized, and incentives were created to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and encourage domestic
private investment (Mujeri 2006, UNESCAP 1997, Quadir 2000; see Humphrey 1990 for an account of economic
reform efforts before 1991; CPD 1995 for an assessment of economic reforms in the first half of the 1990s).
Donors played a vital role in bringing about reform, particularly at key moments when economic crisis made
governments more receptive to such pressures (Franda 1982 on the 1970s; Quadir 2000 on the later period).
Initial opposition by protectionist local trade interests was reversed by the growth of organized business
interests representing manufacturing and domestic investors: reforms in the 1980s and 1990s earned support
from these groups, benefiting particularly from the growing closeness between politics and business (see
Chapter Two on the rise of business interests in parliament; also Kochanek 1993, 1996; Quadir 2000).
Not all reforms have been implemented effectively, particularly in privatization and the financial sector. Although
on paper, the Government is committed to privatization, the pace of progress is slow, with Governments of both
parties privatizing only 22 SOEs between 1991 and 2001 (Uddin 2005). Government is believed to lack the
political will to oppose powerful public sector bureaucratic and trade union groups which depend on the rents
from uneconomical state enterprises (Akram 1999; Uddin 2005). This may change as the balance of power
shifts in favour of the political classes (see Chapter 4). And there are already signs that the privatization agenda
is gathering pace, notably with the closure of Adamjee Jute Mills and movement on privatization of Rupali Bank.
Regulation of the liberalized financial sector has been similarly unimpressive. On paper, the financial system
meets international standards, but in practice does not because of "political interference and a lack of political
will to enforce regulations" (Chowdhury 2002: 980). The reform process itself was flawed, with market
liberalization rushed through without strengthening the state's regulatory capacity (Bhattacharya and
Chowdhury 2003). As will be seen below, there are signs of improvement in financial sector regulation,
particularly with respect to the role of the Bangladesh Bank.
The reforms of the 1990s were 'first generation' reforms - often carried out at the 'stroke of a pen' and usually at
little political cost (Hassan 2001). The reforms that remain to be tackled involve regulation and implementation
and more complex intervention into institutional and administrative arrangements; they are also likely to involve
confronting powerful groups with entrenched interests in resisting reform. That these 'second generation'
institutional reforms are slower in coming reflects the fact that they are likely to be costly politically. The reforms
of the 1990s have created a policy context that is oriented towards the market, but weakly regulated and with
ineffective institutional structures through which to implement policy reforms.
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Fiscal policy
Budgetary process
The annual budget includes government policies for generating revenue and allocating public expenditures,
which include recurrent spending (the revenue budget) as well as funding for projects through the Annual
Development Programme (ADP or development budget). In absolute terms, both revenue and expenditure have
been rising over the past 10 years. The composition of revenue has changed as Value Added Tax (VAT) has
increased as a proportion of public revenue; the composition of public expenditure has, by contrast, remained
more or less consistent. The dominant trend in the budget, particularly with respect to expenditure, is of
incremental changes in sectoral allocations rather than dramatic changes in the composition of public
expenditure (World Bank/ADB 2003a; Mahmud 2002; budget statements from 1995-1996 onwards are available
on the Ministry of Finance website: www.mof.gov.bd).
The introduction of VAT in 1991 has successfully raised domestic revenue (Bhattacharya 2005), and public
spending allocations are comparatively high to the social sectors and low to defense compared to other
countries at comparable levels of development (World Bank/ADB 2003a). But there are key weaknesses in fiscal
policy, including:
Weak revenue effort. Since VAT was introduced, no effective attempts have been made to widen the tax
base, which remains narrow. 13 per cent of tax-payers pay 73 per cent of total personal income tax, and 25
per cent of companies pay 84 per cent of total corporate tax (Sarkar 2004). Revenue collection is weak,
even compared to neighbouring developing countries (Bhattacharya 2005)
Uneconomic energy subsidies. In the current context of rising oil prices globally, energy subsidies are
increasingly unaffordable. However, the budget does not factor in the cost of these subsidies: they are
borne by the Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC) - an autonomous government agency. These
subsidies result in huge losses by BPC, but the budget includes no provisions for financing these losses,
thereby underestimating the actual size of the fiscal deficit
Tariff policies. Tariff policies are not designed to promote national economic interests so much as to favour
particular business interests. For example, in some cases tariffs favour importers over local manufacturers,
and in others low value-addition industries (Sobhan 2002)
Unrealistic goals. The budget sets unrealistic goals in revenue generation and public expenditure (Mahmud
2002). In the recent budget, the Finance Minister recognized this, arguing that high revenue goals motivate
tax authorities to perform better
Fiscal deficit. Authorities disagree on whether the fiscal deficit is sustainable. The World Bank/ADB Public
Expenditure Review and the Centre for Policy Dialogue have both articulated concerns that it is
unsustainably high (World Bank/ADB 2003a; Bhattacharya 2005, 2006; CPD 2002b). Others disagree,
arguing that the deficit is sustainable and that a loose fiscal policy is vital in a developing country to
promote growth (Osmani, Mahmud, 2005).
Budget formulation is highly centralized within the bureaucracy (Kochanek 2003; Mahmud 2002). Bureaucrats
within the Planning Commission receive expenditure forecasts from line ministries, prepare projects for approval
by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), and prepare budgetary allocations
accordingly. Some business groups and academic authorities are consulted during the process, but groups that
lack formal organization are not (Kochanek 2003). Parliamentary Working Committees have no opportunity to
comment on the budget until it is presented in full before Parliament. The centralized and bureaucracy-
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2 Daily Star, 'Are our fiscal policies favourable to small industries?', 6 June 2006
dominated process results in routine increments to sectoral allocations (Kochanek 2003; Mahmud 2002; World
Bank/ADB 2003a). Donors have historically played an important background role in the budget process,
although the declining share of foreign aid (see Table 1) appears to have contributed to a decline in donor
influence (Mahmud 2002).
While there is no formal mechanism for ensuring citizen participation in the budget process or for mechanisms
of accountability to citizens, particularly the poor, the budget has been moderately responsive to citizens'
expectations during the 1990s. The state of the economy is itself a political variable, with the legitimacy of a
government hinging on economic stability, particularly food prices (Alamgir 2004). And the more populist
features of the budget, such as an unwillingness to widen the tax base or reduce energy subsidies probably
also reflect sensitivity to popular expectations (Mahmud 2002; see also Mahmud 1998).
Growing civil society activism around the budget has created additional pressure on the Government to be
responsive. While media scrutiny of the budget can only begin in earnest after it has been presented to
Parliament and made public, the run-up to the budget sees considerable media coverage. Public intellectuals
are interviewed by newspapers and on television, and particular attention is paid to how ordinary citizens,
including the poor are to be affected by the budget. The presentation of the budget is treated as a public
performance where Government can perform as 'social guardian', playing up the more populist policies (e.g.,
agricultural subsidies), juggling figures to make education spending appear larger than defense allocations, and
demonstrating progress on revenue and spending (Mahmud 2002).
Once the Finance Minister has presented the proposed budget to Parliament, MPs discuss it, although as Article
70 prevents MPs from disagreeing with their own party, the quality of the discussion tends to be low. Ruling
party MPs praise the budget, the opposition criticize it, and then - unless there are substantial criticisms - it
passes into law. Media coverage is most vigorous after the budget has been made public, and it is at this point
that the Finance Minister faces the most serious questions and critiques.
Once the budget has been adopted, the implementing agencies go to work. The National Board of Revenue
(NBR) collects taxes and customs duties, according to the revenue policies spelt out in the budget. The line
ministries pay their staff and bear administrative expenses and implement public projects using funds allocated
to them through the budget. Implementation is generally understood to be the weakest point. First, NBR is
rarely able to meet budgetary revenue targets, largely because of corruption (Bhattacharya 2005). Second, line
ministries tend to have poor absorption capacity and are rarely able to spend the funds allocated, in addition to
which the quality of those public projects actually implemented tends to be poor and subject to leakages and
corruption (Bhattacharya 2005; Mahmud 2002).
The National Board of Revenue (NBR) collects the bulk of Government revenue under three streams: income
tax, customs duties, and VAT. The NBR's performance has improved considerably over time, partly as a result of
successful reform (Bhattacharya 2005; Chowdhury 2005). However, the revenue collection effort remains weak
in comparative perspective (see Table 2). Only a quarter of a million individuals, less than 0.2 per cent of the
population, submitted tax returns showing taxable income in 1997-1998; of these only 49,000, or less than 0.04
per cent of the population, showed income above Tk 100,000 for that financial year.
et al
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3 Only annual income above Tk. 100,000 (less than $2,000 at current exchange rates) was taxable in FY 2001-2002 according to the National Board of
Revenue (www.nbr-bd.org). Figures for tax returns for 1997-1998 are from Akkas and Maola (1999). When Akkas and Maola conducted their research
in the late 1990s, the income tax threshold seems to have been Tk 60,000 (Ibid.:111).
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Table 2. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, Bangladesh compared to other developing regions 1985-2004
Note:
Source:
Figures are average per annum
Global figures are from World Development Indicators 2000 (CDROM version) and World Development Indicators 2006 (2000 and
2004); figures for Bangladesh 1991-1998 are from Government of Bangladesh 2001
One factor widely believed to impede NBR performance is corruption. In the early 1990s it was estimated that
evaded tax amounted to anything between Tk 20 million (1990 estimates by the Bangladesh Taxation Inquiry
Commission) and Tk 230 million (1992 estimates, about 32 per cent of GDP; Akkas and Maola 1999). A survey
in 2003 found that over 50 per cent of respondents had been approached by NBR officials for a bribe, and over
75 per cent felt that the NBR was "definitely not" an honest organization (RIRA 2003: 18). Staff capacity and
quality at NBR are also considered to be weak. NBR recruits directly through the competitive Tax and Customs
cadre examinations in the BCS. However, corruption and political influence feature in this process, with negative
impacts on the quality of staff intake.
Inefficiency in the court system is another barrier to better tax collection. There are numerous cases and writ
petitions filed by taxpayers against their tax assessment. According to one former NBR Chairman, "revenue
worth billions of dollars is now stuck against the litigations filed by traders. The disposals of these are also
painstakingly slow due to cumbersome legal and administrative [procedures]" (Chowdhury 2005: 5). Recent
efforts to improve NBR's capacity to deal with legal bottlenecks have been undertaken through the
establishment of the Tax Ombudsman. This development is too recent to be evaluated, but merits close
attention. NBR has also been permitted to appoint its own lawyers at market rates, rather than relying on the
Public Prosecutor's office.
It is also the case that tax collection is not easy in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh state has always kept taxes low,
possible mainly because of the cushion provided by foreign aid. The culture of tax compliance is weak, and
fiscal incentives further erode tax compliant behaviour: under tax holiday programmes, for example, taxes do
not have to be paid for a predetermined period, and tax returns do not even have to be filed (Sarkar 2005). VAT
collection is difficult in the large informal service sector, as most retail outlets rely at best on hand-written sales
ledgers. Computerisation may not be the perfect solution, either: software developed for sales tills reportedly
features a 'kill switch' that brings up a fake sales ledger with under-reported sales, should the taxman pay an
unexpected visit.
A series of donor-led and -financed reform programmes have been put in place since the mid-1990s. These
have focused on modernizing and computerizing systems, building staff capacity and restructuring and
reorganizing the NBR, all with improved performance and reduced corruption as their main aims. While primarily
donor-driven, these reforms appear to be acceptable to the Finance Ministry because they are critical to the
Government's plan to raise revenue without significantly expanding the tax base. As the Finance Minister, M.
Saifur Rahman, put it in his 2006 budget speech:
4
5
4 An interview with a former NBR executive revealed that some staff enter the NBR not through direct recruitment, but through the Surplus
Employee Cell and the quotas, primarily through corrupt means and the use of political influence. Money invested in getting an
NBR post is then expected to be recovered through corruption.
5 Daily Star, 'NBR to hire lawyers to fight its cases', 6 December 2004
Muktijoddha
1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1998 2000 2004
Sub-Saharan African countries 17.5 17.6 19.9 .. ..
Low income countries including
Bangladesh
18.2 13.1 14.1 10.0 10.5
South Asia including Bangladesh 10.7 11.1 10.9 9.3 10.1
Bangladesh 5.7 7.6 7.5 7.6 8.1
I do not believe in the enhancement of tax incidence for increased resource mobilization. I
have always laid great emphasis on the improvement of management, increasing efficiency
and on the modernization of revenue administration. I have always put emphasis on the
reforms of laws and procedures.
To date reforms in revenue collection include the following:
Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) for income tax, formed in 2003 with 1,000 large taxpayers, later expanded to
2,000. A separate LTU for the collection of VAT was also formed
Central Intelligence Cell, also formed in 2003 to investigate and unearth cases of tax evasion. The Cell has
had some impressive successes in uncovering tax-dodgers, but this has not been matched by effective
punishment (Chowdhury 2005; IMF 2004)
Reforms in income tax collection include the introduction of simplified self-assessed income tax returns;
compulsory submission of income tax returns by government officials; mandatory submission of
information pertaining to lifestyle and assets along with tax returns; and expanding the coverage of tax
withheld at source. These measures are thought to have increased income tax returns by (1) making it
difficult for taxpayers to under-report earnings and (2) reducing the discretionary powers of tax officials
(Chowdhury 2005)
Reforms in customs collections, starting with the computerization of customs collection in 1993 under the
ASCYUDA system developed by UNCTAD (updated twice since). The computerized system reduces the
discretionary powers of individual customs officials. Private sector pre-shipment inspectors (PSIs) were also
appointed to ensure accuracy in the value and commercial description of imports. Anecdotal evidence
suggests it has become more difficult to cheat customs duties through under-invoicing, but a recent study
argues that the privatisation of customs collection merely privatized corruption with the support of the
multilateral agencies (Chowdhury 2006)
Appointment of Tax Ombudsman, after legislation in Parliament in 2005. This development is intended to
improve accountability of the tax service, but reports suggest that in practice this occurred because the
World Bank threatened to suspend the third tranche of its Development Support Credit amounting to US$
200 million unless this reform was made (Bala and Biswas 2005).
If tax administration reforms are effective, it is worth noting that this is likely to have good governance impacts in
the longer term. A growing body of research indicates that there are 'strong, direct connections between the
ways in which governments raise revenue and the quality of governance that they practice' mainly because the
payment of tax sets up the conditions for a 'social contract' between government and taxpayer, over which
bargaining occurs. This negotiation is vital to the creation of legitimate public authority (IDS 2005).
The quality of the implementation of public projects funded under the ADP is frequently poor, and project
completion rates are low. One factor has been the weakness of public procurement practices. A World Bank-
supported programme in the 2000s was designed to improve public procurement practices, primarily by
creating a new, unified framework for procurement practices across the public sector. It is too early to comment
on its achievements, but progress so far on the procurement reform programme appears to be promising.
A major factor behind implementation problems has been the lack of strategic planning within line ministries:
expenditures have typically been estimated on an annual basis, and budgetary allocations requested





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6 A 2002 report by the Implementing, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry of Planning found that the average project
completion rate over a four year period was only 56 per cent; a further 15 per cent of projects had made no progress at all (quoted in the PRSP,
GoB 2005a: 42). See Ahmad 1997 for a detailed account of the factors behind poor quality public investment.et al
accordingly. Lacking a medium-term strategic plan, there has been no accepted rationale for project approval,
leading to the inclusion of too many projects and, resources including human resources being spread too
thinly across too many projects (World Bank/ADB 2003a; Mahmud 2002). The World Bank and other donors
have been promoting medium term strategies and medium term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) on which to
base budgetary allocations, although there are significant doubts about line ministries' capacities to make
MTEFs possible. Reforms designed to improve capacity at the line ministry level to improve implementation
include the Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control (RIBEC) programme, funded by DFID, an important
achievement of which was improvements in the availability of public financial information, and which also set up
Financial Management Units (FMUs) in seven line ministries with large ADP allocations. Further reforms in
public financial management are being addressed through the Financial Management Reform Programme
(FMRP), the ongoing successor to RIBEC. One activity under FMRP has been support to the Government to
establish Medium Term Budgetary Frameworks (MTBF; another term for MTEF), in line with its PRSP
commitments. These are now in 10 line ministries, and involve three-year budgets, a single ceiling for
development and non-development budget, and performance indicators.
Mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of public spending are widely acknowledged to be in need of
strengthening. The Comptroller and Auditor General's (CAG) Office is meant to audit public expenditures, but in
practice lacks the autonomy that this requires. Instead it is treated as part of the Executive, seeking approval
from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Establishment for financing and staffing decisions (World Bank/ADB
2003a). One aim of FMRP is to strengthen audit practices to enable stronger parliamentary oversight of public
finances. A series of interventions target weaknesses in CAG including by introducing new approaches and
tools and raising performance standards among CAG staff. Previous donor programmes to address CAG's
weaknesses have focused on automation and computerization, apparently with some success (World
Bank/ADB 2003a).
Parliament has also been ineffective in overseeing public expenditure. CAG sends notices identifying
irregularities to the Parliamentary Accounts Committee, and other Parliamentary committees oversee budget
implementation, such as the Public Estimates and Public Undertakings Committees, and the 35 committees
relevant to line ministries. However, these committees are dominated by ruling party MPs, and the role of
opposition parties is undefined. In addition, committee meetings are closed to the media and the public, and
committees do not prepare reports of their proceedings (World Bank/ADB 2003a; see also Chapter Seven).
The section briefly reviews ongoing efforts to reform the Bangladesh Bank, focusing in particular on its
autonomy and credibility as a provider of monetary policy and financial sector regulation. It draws on a case
study of the Bangladesh Bank conducted in 2006, using semi-structured interviews with past and present
central bankers and experts and a review of the literature.
As the central bank, the Bangladesh Bank is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy and
regulating and supervising the commercial banking sector. In the early post-independence era, Bangladesh
Bank used monetary policy tools directly to achieve the policy objectives of the planned economy. This included
setting interest rates, regulating the flow and volume of credit to priority sectors, and adopting a fixed exchange
rate regime, as a nominal anchor for prices. The transition from a planned economy to the market started in the
early 1980s, at which point the monetary sector began to change through commercialization and privatization of
the financial market, followed by gradual interest rate liberalization. The Bank's control on credit flow was also
reduced over time.
The role of the Bangladesh Bank: reform, autonomy and credibility
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7 A more detailed presentation of the case of the Bangladesh Bank is in Ahmed (2006).
The momentum of reform picked up in the 1990s, when under the donor-initiated Financial Sector Reform
Programme, Bangladesh Bank begun to move away from directly dictating the tools of monetary policy
(Bhattacharya and Chowdhury 2003). This was followed by the creation of a separate Monetary Policy
Department within the Bangladesh Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy in 2003. Also in 2003, the
Bank adopted a flexible exchange rate regime; since January 2006, it has published half-yearly monetary policy
statements. Further significant reforms included that in 2003, the Bank was granted greater independence in the
formulation and implementation of monetary policy as well as with its own operations through the amendment
of the Bangladesh Bank Order (the Central Bank charter) in parliament. This amendment makes the Bangladesh
Bank accountable to the Parliamentary Standing Committee for the Ministry of Finance, rather than to the
Ministry of Finance, as was the case previously.
Reforms of the Bangladesh Bank designed to strengthen its position and role in the economy are ongoing, in
particular through the joint Central Bank Strengthening Project (CBSP) funded by the Government of
Bangladesh and the World Bank. Among other activities, the CBSP has recently started the process of
automating the Bangladesh Bank. The CBSP is also oriented towards strengthening the legal framework for
regulation of the financial sector (World Bank 1998a, 2005). Recent developments in this regard include that
Bangladesh Bank has developed and introduced new rules and procedures to supervise and regulate the
commercial banking sector, including with respect to corporate governance of the commercial banks. New rules
and procedures have also been introduced to regulate loan classification, credit rating, and money laundering,
and the Credit Information Bureau has been established to oversee the loan-making (Bangladesh Bank Annual
Report, 2004-2005).
Interviews with past and present Bangladesh Bank staff highlighted human resource constraints as a major
concern: the Bank is experiencing a shortage of professional, skilled and efficient staff. To amend the situation,
the Bank is recruiting for positions starting at the Assistant Director level. New management approaches have
been introduced: a Performance Management System has replaced the Annual Confidential Report for
employee performance appraisal, and part of the recruitment process has been outsourced to Dhaka University
and the Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management. In addition, new training procedures have been put in place
for incoming staff.
While generally promising, these reforms and developments have been subject to some criticism: for example,
the recent stance of tightening monetary policy has been criticized on the grounds that the policy has not been
credible enough to fulfill the objectives as set out in the Central Bank Charter and monetary policy statements.
Other concerns that emerged from the interviews with current and past Bangladesh Bank staff include that
donor and government influence continues to constrain the monetary policy formulation process.
The autonomy of the Bangladesh Bank remains a concern. Using Lybek's definition, the Central Bank Charter of
the Bangladesh Bank suggests the Bank has 'target autonomy', which is the broadest form of central bank
autonomy (Lybek 2004). Using the Grilli-Maschiandro-Tabellini (1991) index to assess the operational aspects of
autonomy, Bangladesh Bank places below average for developing countries (see Arnone 2005). These
autonomy scores have not improved since the reform period of 2003, suggesting that the reform has not
significantly increased the Bank's autonomy to date. The lack of functional autonomy can be attributed to
indirect Government control: the Governor, Deputy Governors and members of the Board of Directors are all
appointed by the Government. Government borrowing from the banking sector to finance fiscal deficit is another
area of concern.
Autonomy is also affected by partisan affiliation among central bank employees. Past and present Bank staff
noted this as a problem in particular when partisan employee unions influence the day-to-day operations of the
Bank and oppose reforms that are seen as threats to job security and entitlements. An additional concern has
8
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8 Daily Star, 'Effective TCB needed to control Price hike', 27 August 2006; Daily Star, 'Power and Price', 23 September 2006
9 See for example, Daily Star, 'CBA men besiege Bangladesh Bank Governor', 29 October 2003
been that the close relationship between business and politics has resulted in inappropriate influence on the
Bank's regulatory activities.
The constraints outlined in this section coupled with a more general concern over the political-business nexus
influence exerted on the Bank, to some extent call into question the credibility of the institution in its decisions
and actions. Monetary policy formulated by the central bank has somewhat limited influence on the monetary
aggregates because of the limited financial sector deepening (Bangladesh Bank 2005: Policy Note Series). On
the supervision and regulation of the banking sector, despite having some improved and well-designed policy
tools, more could be done: for example, the non-performing asset (NPA) issue needs immediate attention. A
number of the experts and banking sector insiders interviewed stated that the new rules and procedures
introduced through the reforms have limited influence on the nationalised commercial banks, which to date
constitute a large share of the country's banking sector. At the same time, the transparency of the Bangladesh
Bank and flows of information about its activities have improved, including through a website containing
relevant information, an increasingly open organizational culture, and increasing scrutiny by the print media on
issues relating to the banking sector and monetary policy.
Private sector investment in Bangladesh increased steadily over the last 15 years, from an average 11 per cent
of GDP between 1991 and 1995 to an average of nearly 17 per cent of GDP between 2001 and 2004
(Bhattacharya 2005). Does this increase reflect improvements in governance vis-à-vis the investment climate?
Or has this growth taken place despite governance failures? One recent study estimates that Bangladesh's
global competitiveness and economic growth rate would benefit greatly from improvements in the governance
of public institutions, particularly the independence of the judiciary (Roy 2006). This section addresses
questions about the links between the context for private sector growth and governance through a review of the
literature on the constraints in the business environment, and of the impact of the policies and institutions
designed to address these constraints, followed by a brief examination of the 'coping mechanisms' deployed by
successful entrepreneurs in what is widely acknowledged to be a difficult business environment (see Box 2).
The Industrial Policy of 1991, updated in 1999 and 2005, signals the Government's commitment to promote the
private sector and to act as a 'facilitator' of private sector growth (GoB 2005b). The Government also proposes
to focus on privatization, SMEs, agro-based industries, high value-addition industries, women entrepreneurs,
and the 'proper utilization' of natural resources. Proposed strategies include developing infrastructure, enabling
technology transfers and technological upgrading, promoting research and development, ensuring capital
availability, promoting private investment in economic zones for planned industrial development, and promoting
foreign direct investment. This policy agenda is echoed in the PRSP. Government policy is also export-oriented,
including fiscal incentives for exporters and special incentives for 'priority' or 'special' sectors, as well as an
active effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), including liberal tax holidays and subsidies, and no
restrictions on foreign ownership or the repatriation of profits. In practice, this policy agenda has not been
achieved in full. As we see next, the investment climate suffers from a number of constraints, many of which are
directly related the weaknesses in governance.
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3.2. The state of governance and the investment climate
Government policies promoting private sector investment
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10 This issue has been widely documented in the media. See for example, New Age, B[angladesh] B[ank] slaps taka 1 lakh fine on Islami Bank',
6 April 2006; Daily Star, 'Jubok asked to return money to depositers', 7 July 2006; Prothom Alo, 'Shirsho bish rinkhelapir egaroti protisthan
dirghodin dhore bondho'(Eleven firms owned by the top twenty defaulters are out of operation for years), 13 August 2006, 'Voter agey khelapi rin
puno:topshil korte netara besto'(Politicians busy in rescheduling their default loans before the election), 23 August 2006, 'BPCr karone banking
khate khelapi rine boro obonoti-khelapi riner poriman share 23 hajar koti taka o mot riner 16.59%'(NPA situation deteriorates because of BPC
borrowings), 31 August 2006, 'Bangladesh Banker shongey MD [banijjik bank gulor] der boithok' (Bangladesh Bank's meeting with MDs [of
commercial banks]), 6 September 2006, 'Oriental Bank kelenkari'(Oriental Bank scandal), 6 October 2006
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Box 1. The failures of public financing: the case of Bangladesh Shilpa Bank
The PRSP argues for a new investment finance company on the grounds that existing state-owned development
finance institutions (DFIs) are 'virtually defunct.'
Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB) is probably the most prominent of these defunct DFIs. By the late 1990s, BSB
had racked up a rate of default that was high even by the poor standards of the Bangladeshi financial sector,
managing to collect only about a fifth of the loan amount that fell due by 1996.
The loan portfolio of BSB makes for depressing reading: as of September 1996, only around half of the
industrial concerns financed by BSB were in operation. Of these, more than one-third were in litigation. Some
were still listed as 'under implementation', that is, had yet to start production. This was despite the fact that their
loans had been sanctioned in the 1970s.
State interference and the protection of political interests are the primary causes of BSB's abysmal performance.
Government appoints the Chairman of the BSB, and each Chairman since 1975 has been appointed on the
basis of political affiliations, rather than knowledge and experience of development banking. A large proportion
of BSB's non-performing loans were made to individuals with political connections, many of them sitting
Members of Parliament. In some cases, Government put pressure on the BSB so that it would not pursue
recovery of the non-performing loans of its members or supporters.
Sources: Hoque 2004
Constraints in the investment climate
Infrastructure and utilities
The inefficiency of the
Chittagong Port
A series of surveys designed to assess the investment climate and the costs of doing business in Bangladesh
have been conducted in the 2000s. These include World Bank/BEI (2004) on large enterprises in textiles,
garments, food and food processing, leather and leather products, electronics, and chemicals and
pharmaceuticals in Dhaka and Chittagong; Daniels (2003), a survey of a nationally representative sample of
Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises (MSMEs); The Asia Foundation's (2003) study of SMEs in Mymensingh;
and the Katalyst/Data International (2004) study of SMEs in Faridpur. Most recently, the World Bank's Doing
Business series published its annual report (World Bank/IFC 2006). These surveys, together with the findings
from other recent reports and reviews (Alamgir 2004; BEI 2004) constitute a rich source of evidence on the
state of the investment climate in Bangladesh. Table 3 summarises key findings from the firm-level surveys.
The major constraints in the investment climate are as follows:
. Business executives ranked Bangladesh 74th out of 75 countries in terms of
overall infrastructure quality (in World Bank/BEI 2004: 14); electricity supplies are inadequate and
unpredictable and unlikely to improve soon, as demand continues to outstrip supply. Delays in utility
connections are also a problem, as are 'speed payments' (World Bank/BEI 2003).
presents a major obstacle to export (Alamgir 2004). Turnaround time for container
vessels is 6-9 days compared to 1-2 in Colombo, Bangkok, and Singapore. Loading waits take 20 days in
Chittagong Port, compared to 3-5 days in most modern ports (BEI 2004)
et al
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11 According to reports during the tenure of the most recent BNP Government, only 80 megawatts of generation capacity was added, while
demand grew by 2,500 megawatts ( Daily Star, 3 2006).see, for example March
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Access to finance
The regulatory burden
Corruption
Law and order
Political uncertainty
Secure access to adequate land
is a problem for entrepreneurs of all sizes (see Box 1 and Table 3)
is not especially heavy in terms of the number of regulations, but inefficient and
corrupt institutions are a problem. In many cases, regulation appears to be an excuse for rent-seeking, as
tax and customs inspectors are the regulators most likely to visit firms, and they are most likely to visit big
rather than small firms. Labour, health and safety and environmental regulations are effectively not
implemented, sending a strong signal that compliance with these regulations is not a priority
is a more significant problem for large than for small firms. Sixty per cent of big firms viewed
corruption as a top constraint, second only to electricity, while business executives in 75 countries ranked
Bangladesh 75 out of 75 countries in terms of the "extent of irregular payments" (in World Bank/BEI 2003:
13). This may reflect the centralization of Government: the regulatory machinery does not effectively exist
beyond the metropolitan areas. But while larger firms make larger payments, these represent a greater
proportion of revenue for smaller firms (The Asia Foundation 2003)
is perceived by observers to be a major problem (Alamgir 2004; BEI 2004), but this
perception may have been fed by improved newspaper coverage. Firm-level surveys did not suggest crime,
theft or disorder was a serious issue for most big or small firms (see Table 3)
, including . A recent estimate was that 3-4 per cent of GDP per year is lost from
, while the RMG sector estimates annual losses of US$18 million (UNDP 2005a). Many businesses
have developed strategies for coping with , so estimates may be overstated. What is unlikely to be
overstated is the cost to Bangladesh's image as a place in which to do business and the extent to which
this deters foreign investors (UNDP 2005a; UNCTAD/ICC 2000). The perception that policies approved
under one Government may be overturned by its successor also creates uncertainty for potential
investors
is a problem, particularly for bigger firms. Land available for industrial
use is frequently too fragmented to be adequate for industrial purposes, and land registration and
ownership procedures are complex, uncertain and tend to be highly corrupt.
th
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12 The ongoing confrontations between RMG workers and law enforcers that erupted in 2006 may change this perception. In the absence of
effective formal means to express discontent over low wages and bad working conditions, workers took to the streets, with the result of loss of
life, physical injury and damage to factories and other property. While this confrontation may have positive outcomes in terms of overdue
attention to labour regulation and workers' rights, global confidence in security of the sector has been shaken. Domestically, factory owners
have good reasons to question the willingness of Government to protect their investments against demonstrating workers. And workers still lack
good reasons to trust Government to enforce new regulations regarding minimum wages and working conditions.
13 This appears to have been the case with the Korean EPZ in Chittagong, approved in the late 1990s but languishing since. Another example is
the Summit Group, awarded power contracts under the Awami League government which were withdrawn by its BNP successor.
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Table 3. Different size firms' experiences of the investment climate in the 2000s
Table 4. Bangladesh's investment climate in comparative perspective
Source: World Bank/IFC 2006; data available on http://www.doingbusiness.org
Indicator Bangladesh Region OECD
Number of procedures 8 7.9 6.2Starting a
business Time in days 37 32.5 16.6
Number of procedures 8 5.8 4.7
Time in days 425 118.6 31.8
Registering
property
Cost as % of property value 10.5 5.3 4.3
Number of payments 17 30.1 15.3
Time in hours 400 304.6 202.9
Paying
taxes
Total tax rate as % of profit 40.3 45.1 47.8
Number of procedures 50 38.7 22.2
Time in days 1,442 968.9 351.2
Enforcing
contracts
Cost as % of debt 45.7 26.4 11.2
Infrastructure
and utilities
Electricity was the top
constraint for 80%
Average 160 days for
telephone connections, 90
for gas and 80 for electricity
Unofficial payments for
utility connections averaged
over Tk 30,000 in year prior
to survey
Electricity was a
serious problem for
36%
Road conditions a
problem for 33%
Electricity a
serious
problem for
42%
Road conditions
a problem for
32%
Access to
finance
50% identify costs of
financing and 40% access
to financing as serious
constraints
32% considered
financing a serious
constraint
71%
considered
financing a
serious
constraint
53% identified
access to finance
as a serious
constraint
Visits from
regulators
Average of 17 visits a year,
7.5 from customs and 2.7
from tax officials
No visits
Regulatory
burden
Tax administration a major
constraint for 60% and
customs and trade a major
constraint for more than
40%
Regulations, tax and
customs no problem
for more than 90%
Regulatory
burden not a
serious
constraint
Regulatory
burden not a
serious constraint
Corruption Unofficial payments
averaging Tk 75,000 in year
prior to survey
Corruption a top constraint
for 60%
Corruption in the
form of speed money
not a problem for
94%
Unofficial
payments by
15%, averaging
Tk 1,290
Law and
order
Law and order situation not
a serious problem for 60%
Law and order
situation not a
serious problem for
66%
Law and order
situation a
severe
obstacle for
29%
Vast majority felt
law and order
situation was
good
Sources: 1 World Bank/BEI (2003); 2 Daniels (2003); 3 Katalyst/Data International (2004); 4 The Asia Foundation (2003)
Large firms in Dhaka
and Chittagong1
MSMEs across
Bangladesh2
SMEs in
Faridpur3
SMEs in
Mymensingh4
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As Table 4 suggests, Bangladesh is not the easiest place in the region in which to do business, but nor is it the
toughest. It ranked 88 out of 175 countries across the world in terms of the ease of doing business in 2007; this
was higher than India (134) and Nepal (100) and just above Sri Lanka (89). It was ranked lower than Pakistan
(74), however, and has slipped in the rankings from 81 position in 2006. This ranking raises valid questions
about the extent to which indicators of the ease of doing business are relevant to democratic governance.
These are, however, beyond the scope of the present chapter. We turn now to a brief discussion of how
constraints in the investment climate are being addressed in the public sector.
There is at least a formal understanding that the investment climate must be improved. 'One-stop' service
centres reflect this understanding. The three Government agencies detailed below have been designed to
enable potential investors to complete regulatory requirements and access utilities (and in some cases, land)
without having to shuttle between different agencies.
The Board of Investment (BOI) is directly under the Prime Minister's Office and boasts a correspondingly high-
powered Governing Board. The purpose of BOI is to provide one-stop regulatory services to investors, relevant
information and other services to support private sector investment, but it is widely recognised to have become
a bureaucratic organisation offering poor quality services. Investors accuse BOI of delays in processing
applications; inability to coordinate activities of utility providers and regulatory authorities or to arrange freehold
industrial land for potential investors, and of providing misleading information about investment in Bangladesh
(BEI 2004).
The Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) was intended to develop, operate and control
Export Processing Zones, that is, industrial enclaves where export industries are given special facilities and
incentives. BEPZA is also directly under the Prime Minister's Office. Observers and investors widely view BEPZA
as effective and efficient (Alamgir 2004).
Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC) is under the Ministry of Industries. Its prime
responsibility is to build and operate industrial parks, in which industrial plots to build factories can be obtained.
There are currently 64 industrial parks in Bangladesh, one for each district. BSCIC is not considered to be a
good performer: investors complain of poor quality infrastructure and services and of an overly bureaucratic
attitude towards service users needs.
BEPZA performs considerably better than BOI or BSCIC. The reasons include that:
BEPZA's management structure is highly decentralized. Each EPZ is headed by a General Manager
authorized to take regular management decisions without approval from Dhaka, and who reports directly to
the Executive Chairman of BEPZA
Organisational culture: entrepreneurs who use these services note that BEPZA has a 'service provision
mentality' and is responsive to users' needs, while BOI and BSCIC have a 'bureaucratic mentality', and are
committed to bureaucratic process and civil service hierarchies
Organisational origins: BEPZA was created in 1980, with the initial wave of Governmental enthusiasm for
foreign investment and private enterprise. Its sole purpose was to assist investors. By contrast, BSCIC is a
leftover from the early 1970s' experiment with state socialism. BOI replaced the Department of Industries
(DOI), and inherited some of its staff. In its 17 years it has yet to update the organizational structure and
practices it inherited from its bureaucratic parent (Alamgir 2004; BEI 2004)
st
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14 This section draws on interviews conducted with staff from the three organisations in 2006.
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Proximity to power: this has mixed effects. In BEPZA's case, good connections with the Prime Minister's
Office are used to exert authority over relevant line ministries (Alamgir 2004). By contrast, BOI staff
claim this position is harmful because as one of many organizations in the Prime Minister's Office they are
neglected and passed over for recruitment rounds and administrative reforms. BSCIC's connections to the
Ministry of Industry afford no authority vis-à-vis any other organizations
Finally, BEPZA benefits from a degree of financial autonomy from central Government in operating EPZs, as
it enjoys the authority to charge rents and fees from investors, which can then be spent on maintaining
facilities. BSCIC and BOI are comparatively limited in their ability to mobilize resources, even for regular
operations, and must continually look to the central government for allocations of funds.
Progress appears to have been made in addressing the weaknesses of the BOI and BSCIC. The most recent
Executive Chairman of BOI is the first with a private sector background to hold this post, and there were high
hopes that this would encourage a more commercial, service-oriented approach. BSCIC is also moving in a
new direction with the development of sector-specific industrial parks in leather and RMG. These will feature
public-private management boards for facility maintenance and regular operations, common effluence treatment
plants, and on-site power generators.
The autonomy of these organizations remains a concern, however. BSCIC and BOI lack an operational level of
autonomy, and all three lack policy-making autonomy. EPZs and industrial parks are approved by the ECNEC,
not by BEPZA and BSCIC, and incentive packages are designed by Government, rather than being tailored by
BOI to the needs of individual investors.
The most significant governance challenge, however, is the transition of these agencies from regulator or
service provider to that of facilitator. In the Industrial Policy of 2005, the government committed itself to
promoting private sector investment into economic zones. In that case, one of these organizations will have to
emerge as a pure facilitator, providing one-stop services to private sector zones without actually owning,
developing, operating or managing them. The concern among donors supporting private sector economic
zones seems to be that BEPZA may be most capable, but may be unwilling to give up its current powers. The
current Executive Chairman of BOI is a political appointment, and there is no guarantee that a new government
will appoint someone of the same caliber, while BSCIC remains too firmly in the grasp of the Ministry of
Industries to be amenable to any effective reform.
et al
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15 There may be some truth to the view expressed by BSCIC staff that BEPZA is the favoured child of Government while BSCIC is its stepchild: BEPZA
was recently given the Adamjee Jute Mills, near Dhaka, and the Karnaphuli Steel Mills estate, near Chittagong, to develop EPZs. BSCIC was handed
an estate in Khulna, a region with comparatively lower investor interest and considerably less rosy prospects.
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Box 2. How successful businessmen cope with governance failures in Bangladesh
How do entrepreneurs cope with the challenging investment climate? In an attempt to gain insights into how
business insiders manage to work within the system, we asked 15 successful entrepreneurs involved in
manufacturing textiles, ceramics, agro-products and retail what they do to overcome the impact of bad
governance on their businesses.
One characteristic many shared was a family background in business. This enables access to finance - using
earnings from other businesses, access to collateral for loans, or through long-standing relations with
commercial banks. It also makes it possible to draw on experience when dealing with regulations or public
service providers. One young entrepreneur who does not come from a business background spent two months
and Tk 40,000 trying to obtain a gas connection, going in person and later by trying a series of crooked
or agents. More established businesses have sections and staff to deal with Government departments. One
conglomerate has a dedicated staff of five whose sole responsibility is to obtain licenses and permits and deal
with the staff of regulatory authorities. Another conglomerate operates a 'tendering process' through which they
appoint : if they need something done by a Government agency, they call up the and ask for quotes
on price and length of time and then choose the best bid.
The successful entrepreneurs interviewed relied on corruption in dealing with some Government authorities. For
most services, the process is formalized, with fixed rates and reasonable assurance of getting the service you
need. The cost of bribes is factored into the regular expenses of running some firms, in some cases accounted
for under expense statements that include a separate category for 'bribes', broken down into amount, agency,
and purpose.
Where the business intends to cheat, however, the rates and the process are more variable. Even in those
instances, long-term collusive relations sometimes develop between employees of the relevant department and
the business authority. Among our 15 successful interviewees, longer-term collusion was most common with
employees in the Customs department. It seems there is a process by which customs employees compete for
'company accounts' - an informal contract as the exclusive 'agent' for business firms seeking to cheat on their
Customs duties.
A vital asset for entrepreneurs is political connections. Some of our successful entrepreneurs were also
prominent politicians. All felt that entering politics or establishing firm political connections can operate as a
form of security, protecting them from political harassment. Some said that political connections can secure
access to certain Government resources: such as, in one instance, a plot in an EPZ. Political connections can
also ensure better access to Government contracts and public projects; although none of our 15 entrepreneurs
had used their access in this way.
Political connections may be a double-edged sword. Several entrepreneurs claimed they shied away from
potentially lucrative public projects because these invite harassment in case of regime change. One
entrepreneur, also an MP in the current ruling party, said his firm had debated whether or not to bid for power
projects. They decided against, because it might invite reprisals in case his party lost the next election, and
because it might affect his political career.
One coping strategy that came up in several interviews was that of "not attracting attention". Several
entrepreneurs argued that they "play safe" - steering clear of high profile projects and public promotion. In the
words of one, "just do the normal things to run a good business, no need to go shouting your name from the
rooftops." Some believe formal entry into politics is a tactical error in business: instead, it is advisable to cultivate
politicians of all stripes.
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Source: Interviews with 15 successful businessmen, Dhaka 2006
16 Fifteen successful entrepreneurs across different sectors were interviewed in 2006. Four operated diversified conglomerates involved in
manufacturing textiles, ceramics, agro-products etc.; eight were involved in garments and textiles; two were in agro- and food processing; and
one was in retail. We asked sensitive questions that sometimes covered unethical practices, and so to ensure frankness, we relied on our social
networks to identify respondents. For the same reason, the identities of these entrepreneurs will remain anonymous.
Energy and Infrastructure
Far more serious underlying constraints in the investment climate that not even an effective 'one-stop shop'
could hope to address are to do with power generation and infrastructure provision. These are complicated
cases of extreme failures of governance, which, generally speaking, the research-based evidence and analytical
work has not adequately addressed to date. In part this reflects the difficulties of undertaking credible research
into complicated and sensitive subjects which are likely to involve uncovering 'grand corruption'. Another factor
is that reform initiatives in these sectors are ongoing, with impacts yet to fully unfold. And the published
literature and research-based evidence has not been able to keep pace with recent events, such as the 'energy
riots' that took place across the country in 2006. A decision was taken to forego a discussion of energy and
infrastructure issues in the present report, and to give these issues the close attention they merit in the 2007
Report.
This chapter has taken a selective look at the impact of governance on the economy, focusing on
macroeconomic management - generally understood to have been competently handled - and the investment
climate, widely acknowledged as negatively influenced by the state of governance. A number of aspects of
macroeconomic management show signs of improving governance conditions. Some of this improvement can
be attributed to donor-initiated reform efforts. There are indications of improved transparency in relation to
macroeconomic management as a result of growing public scrutiny, particularly through the media, and more
open organizational cultures within the Ministry of Finance and the Bangladesh Bank. In relation to the
investment climate, by contrast, progress has been limited and uneven, as shown in the comparison of the
performance of key public sector agencies mandated to address constraints within the investment climate. A
notable feature of the chapter was its presentation of findings about how successful businesses navigate
through the difficult governance terrain in Bangladesh. The adaptation of entrepreneurial skill towards coping
with investment climate constraints may help to explain why bad governance does not appear to present a total
obstacle to economic activity in Bangladesh.
3.3 Conclusion
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Public administration: citizen
orientation, rising politicisation
and declining status
The quality and incentives of public administration personnel are at the core of all debates about governance of
the state. On the basis that recruitment is the point at which many problems within the administration start in
Bangladesh, Chapter Four takes a close look at processes and experiences of recruitment, and proceeds to
analyse how the changing public perception of the civil service affects the quality and incentives of civil
servants. The chapter also describes the structure of the civil service and the scope for citizen orientation and
administrative reform. Based on original research with current and former civil servants and recent graduates,
including those considering civil service careers, Chapter Four raises issues of politicisation, problems within
the recruitment process, and the changing status of the civil service.
The colonial hangover from which the Bangladeshi public administration is widely acknowledged to suffer
combines a Raj-era emphasis on the bureaucracy as a tool for mass rule with the Pakistani tradition of political
involvement (Haque 1995). In its turbulent 35 year history, the polity has seen many changes, resulting in its
current form: a multiparty, aggressively competitive democracy. Yet the essential character of the bureaucracy
has altered little over that time, except to increase in size (Ahmed 2002c).
Some disagree that no change has occurred: they see a vital change in the declining quality of service intake,
particularly at the upper levels. Such a claim unites three perspectives on the civil service. One perspective
holds that politically motivated rounds of civil service recruitment dating back to the 1970s have resulted in
'bulge' cohorts of less-than-able civil servants at different levels of the civil service. Secondly, this 'political'
recruitment has resulted in politically-affiliated groups within the service. The third perspective holds that the
senior civil service should be drawn from the academic and social elite of Bangladesh. This thinking identifies
that a model similar to the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) model is most appropriate for Bangladesh. As this
chapter discusses, the elite status of the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) has certainly declined. The BCS no
longer attracts those from wealthy and highly educated families, instead drawing from a second tier of public
university graduates, mostly with regional or rural backgrounds. Whether or not this is a negative change for the
BCS is, however, another matter.
4.1 From ruling the masses to serving the people? changing context, shifting
expectations
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Regardless of changes within the bureaucracy itself, the context in which the BCS operates has unquestionably
been transformed. Efforts to politicise the bureaucracy by successive regimes has had the most direct impact
on the service, particularly after the crucial movement against the ruling Government in 1996
initiated by civil servants. Subsequent political parties in power have worked hard to prevent a recurrence of
this, primarily by installing party supporters in key positions. The greater legitimacy of the democratically
elected executive compared to authoritarian predecessors has also had the effect of making the bureaucracy
relatively less powerful in comparison to the more powerful political class.
The military bureaucracy is a less valuable ally for the civil bureaucracy than it once was, with its peacekeeping
activities keeping it occupied elsewhere. The population is more educated and demanding, and the mass
media and civil society are increasingly assertive and outspoken. These factors have contributed to a decline in
the status of the civil service, in the context of improving private sector opportunities and rising public
awareness of public sector corruption and mismanagement. The global context is also increasingly important:
the pressures and opportunities of globalization strain weak civil service capacities, while the global spread of
New Public Management means civil servants are faced with new reform agendas seeking to introduce
unfamiliar practices of flexibility, responsiveness and performance-oriented management into their workplace
(on the impact of the global context on civil services, see Welch and Wong 2001; McCourt 2002).
Another change has been that of expectations. In an era of PRSPs, the need for citizen-oriented - and more
specifically, pro-poor - civil servants becomes paramount. The Bangladeshi civil service is by no means the only
example of a civil service in which orientation towards poor citizens is a distant promise: the "bureaucratic
experience" contributes to inertia and apathy in many contexts (Alkadry 2003). The situation is exacerbated in
Bangladesh where inadequate and biased recruitment procedures may result in unqualified people in key
positions, and where political loyalties often supersede professional imperatives to perform.
Disappointments with public administrative reform efforts in Bangladesh as elsewhere have stimulated a rethink:
signs are emerging that a more incremental, realistic approach to reform is being developed within international
development agencies. In part, this reflects recognition that the organisational reforms necessary to achieve
'second generation' reforms, such as improvement in the quality of services in the social sector, will be tougher
than the economic reforms of previous decades, in part because civil servants are both the objects and the
primary agents of change (see Batley 2004). The importance of both the social and political context in creating
the incentives for reform is plain.
Within this context, the present chapter explores current conditions within the BCS with a particular emphasis
on understanding the status of the service and how this affects its patterns of recruitment. With the recruitment
procedure offering a potential entry point for an incrementalist reform agenda, this entails developing an
understanding of the motivations of those currently seeking to enter the service. With this in mind, a literature
review was complemented with substantive qualitative primary research undertaken in 2006. Interviews with 40
former or current Class I civil servants who occupy administrative professional positions analysed their views
about recruitment, the citizen-orientation of the service, and the impact of politicisation on the bureaucracy. In
an attempt to capture a sense of the motivations and incentives guiding current applicants to the BCS, an
additional 50 interviews were undertaken with recent graduates and prospective BCS candidates.
Around one million civil servants are employed in the civil service's 37 ministries, 11 divisions, 254 departments
and 173 statutory bodies within the BCS (ADB 2005a). The system has two tiers. At the national level, the central
Janatar Mancha1
2
4.2 The structure of the Bangladesh Civil Service
1 In 1996 AL created the movement as a platform for citizens and civil society to oppose the incumbent Government's decisions.Janatar Mancha
2 For a more detailed account of the primary research, see Jahan 2006.
48 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
secretariat consists of ministries and divisions that perform policy-making and clearinghouse functions. Line
departments and directorates attached to ministries and divisions are responsible for general administration,
service delivery and the implementation of development programmes at the sub-national level (Ahmed 2002c).
As illustrated in Figure 1, each ministry, consisting of at least one division, is organised in the following manner.
A minister is in charge as the political head. A secretary acts as the administrative head of the ministry,
responsible for conducting and supervising routine operations and organisational processes, and advising the
minister on policy and administrative issues. A division may have a number of wings, each headed by a joint
secretary, who is authorised to go directly to the minister for decisions. In practice, the secretary or additional
secretary is generally consulted before the minister. A wing is composed of a number of branches, each
supervised by the joint secretary. Each branch is headed by a deputy secretary, below which is the section,
each of which is headed by a senior assistant secretary or assistant secretary. Sections are the basic working
units of a division. An assistant secretary disposes of all cases based on precedent (see Zafarullah 1998 for a
detailed description). Below the assistant secretary, there are subordinate office personnel, including the
Members of the Lower Subordinate Services (MLSSs), who are in practice important people as they provide
physical access to senior staff and files.
49The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
3 The terminology of 'gazetted' officers refers to the publication of their appointment in the official gazette. This allows them to enjoy certain
official privileges such as being mentioned in the 'order of priority', the ability to authenticate signatures, and the ability to recommend persons
for obtaining official documents. The remaining officers are considered 'non-gazetted' officers.
A number of departments are attached to each ministry or division. These determine the blueprints for
implementing various decisions taken by the ministry or division and provide technical information and advice.
The head of these departments or directorates depends on their importance. In some cases, an officer enjoying
the pay grades and benefits of a secretary heads a department. In other cases, they are headed by officials with
the pay grade and benefits of a deputy, joint or additional secretary (Ahmed 2002c).
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Source: Zafarullah 2005
Figure 1. Formal structure of the national administration
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4 The Bangla rendering of the Public Administration Training Centre (inherited from the colonial period) is
which suggests training to administer the people, rather than the English sense, which is training for public service.
Lok Proshashon Proshikkhon Kendro
Besides the central Secretariat at the national level, there are numerous local government authorities across
Bangladesh. The Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRD&C) is
responsible for regulating local administration and development activities across the country. There are six
territorial divisions, which provide the first major level below Central Government. Headed by a senior generalist
civil servant, the division plays a coordinating role with regards to government activities and supervising district
administration.
There are 64 districts in the six divisions, each headed by a Deputy Commissioner who belongs to the
administrative cadre of BCS. Traditionally this has been the focal point of local administration. The Deputy
Commissioner enjoys an indirect control over activities at the upazila through his/her Upazila Nirbahi Officers
(UNO). Below the district level, there are further rural and urban subdivisions of local government. In urban
areas, six of the major cities are City Corporations, each headed by a democratically-elected Mayor. Besides
these six major city corporations, there are 271 pourashavas. In rural areas, 463 upazilas (or sub-districts) are
further subdivided into 4490 unions. These contain around 68,000 villages (Zafarullah and Khan 2005; Ahmed
2002). Chapter Six contains more detail on local government.
There are four classes of officer in the Bangladesh Civil Service. Class I and part of Class II officers are 'gazetted'
officers, and the remaining are 'non-gazetted' officers (Ahmed 2002). Around 70 per cent of the 40,000 Class I
officers are recruited within the 29 cadres, while the rest work in functional or technical areas. The Ministry of
Establishment is responsible for personnel policy within the civil service and human resources function,
particularly in the Administrative cadre.
There is little doubt that the BCS does not fulfil its potential for serving poor rural citizens or for providing
efficient service delivery. There are several reasons for this. The culture of the civil service itself is focused on
administrative procedure and the demands of internal organisational politics. Within this ethos, the people are
seen as needing to be administered rather than served, and "treated as children" (Khan 1998: 41). Field
administration is considerably less desirable than a position within the Secretariat at the heart of administrative
power and BCS cadre politics (see Morshed 1997). In part, this reflects strong resistance to being subordinate
to local government representatives, and helps to explain civil service opposition to decentralisation (Siddiqui
2006a).
3
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4.3 Citizen orientation
In addition, a socioeconomic dimension contributes to a lack of citizen orientation. One study showed that 72
per cent of officials were unwilling to work under Union Parishad Chairmen (Morshed: 1997). Unwillingness to
join the field service is fuelled by the concept of class and status, including a lack of "modern facilities and
amenities" in rural areas and the embarrassment envisioned from taking orders from "uneducated and less
qualified chairmen" (Morshed 1997: 175). The educated elite civil servants prefer to view the rural poor at some
distance as worthy recipients of charity. In short, this perspective behaves in line with the culture of patronage
(Hossain 2005a; see also Siddiqui 1996 on 'Developing One's Own Village').
Findings from the qualitative research support review of the literature. On the role of the public administration in
poverty reduction, current civil servants displayed the belief that poverty and service delivery to the poor were a
matter separate to their duties, rather than intrinsic to the way they go about their business. It proved difficult to
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generate a substantive discussion regarding whether the civil service could be or should be oriented towards
the poor. Pro-poor orientation appeared to be an unfamiliar notion, which may reflect the belief that the civil
service should be oriented towards serving the public in general, rather than one group in particular. This
perception fails to recognise that extra efforts and different approaches are required to reach and meet the
needs of the poor, and that a neutral bureaucratic orientation is therefore unlikely to result in good services for
the poor.
There are some indications of change in the attitudes of civil servants. One newly-recruited civil servant
commented that:
It is the digital age. People get more information and are more conscious. Their
consciousness and the pressure of globalization have actually forced the civil service to be
more citizen-oriented.
A more widely-expressed view was that the civil service has lost its elitist character, helping it to become more
oriented towards the ordinary people. As identified below, it is certainly true that the BCS is increasingly
attracting candidates from the lower strata of the social hierarchy.
Citizens do not conceal their criticisms of the services they receive from public servants. A summary of various
surveys indicates that citizens consider the public service to be “over centralized, unaccountable, inefficient,
overpaid, coercive, unethical and rent seeking” (Khan 1997: 18). Consequently, the country's bureaucratic
efficiency is rated at 4.7 on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is the best possible score (Mukherjee 2001). Of
those cadres with whom citizens have direct interaction, the police, customs, health, education, postal and
taxation cadres were acknowledged as the subject of major complaint. Individual encounters with officials
identified “unnecessary harassment, procrastination in deciding simple problems, discourteous and arrogant
behaviour, keeping customers waiting for hours before attending to their needs, frequent absence from office,
not maintaining appointments, ignoring pleas for reconsideration of a problem, unwilling(ness) to correct
mistakes, and making unabashed approaches for pecuniary benefits” (Khan 1997: 18). A series of surveys
from TIB has confirmed that the population of Bangladesh experience a large number of obstacles in accessing
the most basic of public services. Those least able to pay, the poor, suffer the most from 'unofficial' charges that
are routinely paid for public services.
While the history of civil service reform efforts is as dismal in Bangladesh as in other developing countries, the
2000s saw slight but promising signs of internally-driven change. To date, there have been fifteen administrative
reform commissions and committees. Each has attempted to introduce changes within the administrative
system geared towards dynamism, efficiency and representation. However, most recommendations of reform
committees have never been implemented, or in some cases have been implemented in a modified form
(Ahmed 2002c). The current or former bureaucrats who have constituted these commissions have in large part,
shown little capacity for developing an innovative or dynamic reform agenda, or little interest in promoting
radical changes to the civil service (World Bank 1996a; Morshed 1997).
The lack of success in administrative reform reflects a lack of political commitment by successive Governments,
as well as strong resistance from the civil servants themselves. In addition, reform efforts have typically tried to
provide technical solutions but neglected the socio-political dimensions of the problems (World Bank 2002a; for
a recent analysis applied to the case of privatization, see Monem 2006). The most recent commission, the
Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC), which reported in 2000, represented something of a
departure. Clearly influenced by New Public Management thinking, it provided some innovative ideas, treating
citizens as customers and including the introduction of performance monitoring (see Box 1). Critically, it
et al
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4.4 Administrative reform: a chink in the armour?
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recommended a series of reforms designed to improve senior management, including the introduction of merit-
based criteria for appointment and promotion and provision for lateral entry to bring in able managers from
outside the sector (GoB 2000). However, the successes of these innovations have not been matched by
implementation; only a limited number of recommendations that did not provide a threat to bureaucrats were
implemented.
Although PARC did not achieve its optimum impact, its rationale appears to have influenced some within
Government. While the 1996-2001 AL Government initiated the PARC process, the successive 2001-2006 BNP
Government reflected some of PARC's innovative rationale within policy making. In its 2005 PRSP, for example,
the official position on improving service delivery and enhancing implementation capacity was explained as
follows:
Implementation has proved to be the bane of policy and programme initiatives on poverty reduction. A
sharper engagement with implementation challenges is a critical necessity for accelerated poverty
reduction. Four challenges merit priority attention: freeing the annual development programme (ADP)
from the consistent burden of under-completed and underfunded projects; addressing the 'incentives
and motivation' issue pertaining to the civil service; a mind-set change to ensure a focus on the 'little
decisions' as much as on the 'big decisions'; and, better information flows (GoB 2005: 22).
With the influence of PARC apparent in the fact that reform is now conceived as starting on a small scale with
'little decisions', an incremental approach to improving civil service performance has been reflected in recent
interventions for civil service reform efforts. One example is the DFID-funded MATT2 programme, started in
2006. This follows the original Managing at the Top (MATT) programme (1999-2002), which approached civil
service reform by training top ranking administrative cadre civil servants to enable good practice and encourage
change from within the civil service. While the initial reception of the MATT programme had been lukewarm,
later feedback identified a positive impact on the personal performance of top ranking civil servants, who valued
the programme's impacts. Participants also noted however, a lack of understanding amongst their colleagues
on return to the workplace. Consequently, there was little evidence of a systemic impact from the MATT1
intervention, which prompted a request to DFID for a follow-up programme with expanded coverage that was
also linked to reforms in human resource management.
These events offer an interesting example of how reform efforts can stimulate internal demand for further reform
from those who benefited from the original reform process (see Grindle 2003; Batley 2004). The initial MATT
programme has spurred further progress. Impatient with the pace at which DFID were implementing MATT2,
and keen to disseminate its benefits and improvements to a wider group, senior civil servants approached
BRAC University to introduce a Masters Programme in Governance and Development for mid-level civil
servants, which started in 2005. Furthermore, Centre for Governance Studies, the institution set up to establish
the Masters programme with funding from the Royal Netherlands Embassy, has initiated the State of
Governance in Bangladesh project, of which this document is the first report.
5
5 Information from the Project Memorandum for MATT2, accessed on the DFID website (28 07 05); Helm website (http://www.helm-
c o r p . c o m / h e l m a s i a . a s p ) a n d c o n s u l t a n c y p r o j e c t i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m w e b s i t e
(http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/consultancy/projects/matt_bangladesh.htm).
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Box 1. Innovations in public administration
Some developments over the last decade suggest the beginnings of service-orientation within the public
service:
One reform proposed by PARC was provisions to enable customers to pay all of their bills at one place and one
time. Previously, customers faced the inconvenience of making several payments at different times and places;
bills for four utility services - telephone, power, gas and water - had to be paid to separate banks on particular
days of the month. This entailed a great deal of hassle for users, who had to run between branches and queue
for hours. The 'One Stop Utility Bill Payment System' was established in 2003 to remove these problems. In the
present system, a subscriber can pay bills of all utility services in one bank, greatly reducing costs of time and
travel.
The introduction of e-governance was another PARC recommendation. While there is still some way to go, the
process of computerizing systems, including information systems, has started. Websites for different ministries
are now online, some containing useful information. The Ministry of Finance has developed software for budget
planning, sensitivity and impact analysis. The Ministry of Communication has created a database containing
information about contractors and tenders. It has also created a project monitoring system for tracking progress
of projects. The Bangladesh Planning Commission has developed an internal network, capability for video-
conferencing, a digital library, and has created software for interfacing between the development and revenue
budgets.
Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) adopted a participatory approach in designing its local
public works projects. In order to decide the location of rural road works and to establish local markets, the
LGED actively solicited the input of local groups. It turns out that in many cases the LGED engineers were
persuaded to change plans and priorities based on local consultations (Mukherjee ., 2001). This
participatory reform was originally proposed by the World Bank. Other agencies are also beginning to bring
local voices into public planning processes. For example, a project at the Ministry of Water Resources, the
Bangladesh Water Development Board, uses integrated planning for sustainable water management.
One stop utility bill payment system
E-governance
Participatory approaches to public works
et al
Sources: Daily Star, 'One stop utility bill payment in wings', 13 September, 2003; Chowdhury and Taifur 2003; Mukherjee , 2001.et al.
4.5 Politicisation
A major contemporary concern is that the bureaucracy has become overly politicized. The threat of politicisation
has always been present, proceeding in waves over the history of Bangladesh, rising on the back of successive
periods of military rule and reform efforts. At times, proximity to political forces has increased the autonomy and
power of the bureaucracy, while at others, including the present day, it has left the bureaucracy weakened and
dependent on its political masters. The return to democracy in 1991 was a period of vulnerability for the
bureaucracy, during which political patronage and favouritism began to chip away at its cohesiveness and unity.
The bureaucratic response was to abandon its traditional values of public service neutrality and embrace
partisan alignment (Haque and Rahman 2003).
Politicisation is not unique to the Bangladesh bureaucracy. A moderate degree of politicisation in the
recruitment of the upper levels of the civil service may help a government to implement its policy (as was
argued in Thatcher's Britain; Ali 2004). Some degree of politicisation is present in the administrations of many
developed countries - 10 per cent of posts in the higher levels of the United States administration are for political
appointees who are not career civil servants. In the UK, too, ministers depend on political or special advisors for
better understanding of policy or general support. In France, ministerial cabinet members represent both
political and administrative officials. There are, however, differences between these politicized bureaucracies
and the current situation in Bangladesh:
Outside Bangladesh, these positions are open political appointments and subject to public scrutiny. This
process ensures there is no need to conceal appointments by bending service rules. This avoids the
current situation in Bangladesh, whereby incentives to perform within the service are distorted in favour of
demonstrating political support over professional performance
Outside Bangladesh, these appointments are made on the basis of high professional ability. Critical here is
that appointments are not made to reward supporters, nor to prevent against a situation in which
individuals attached to opposition parties are in a position to block Government policy.
The assumption that politicisation of the administration is always motivated by partisan concerns has given it
strongly negative overtones. It is also plausible that motivations may have included appointing more committed
and able individuals to expedite priority policies. Similarly, reshuffles, transfers and promotions cannot be seen
simply as a system of partisan punishment and reward. The level of contractual appointments may be a better
and more neutral way of measuring the extent of politicisation. There is an extremely limited scope for
contractual appointments within the BCS, with all officers required to begin their civil service career at the entry
level. Thus, usually a contractual appointment is used as a political appointment.
What are the consequences of the politicisation of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh? Politicisation has served to
distort the professional incentives of bureaucrats. The major problem surrounds the imposition of political
affiliation upon permanent members of the bureaucracy who have been recruited and formally operate under an
entirely different set of rules. Good performance of the public institutions depends on the bureaucratic
personnel facing a set of stable incentives which are shaped by the assumption of political neutrality in
personnel management decisions, such as transfer and promotion. Instead there is uncertainty, and incentives
are oriented towards pleasing political masters rather than professional performance (see also Mukherjee
2001).
The democratic era in Bangladesh has witnessed a massive push towards greater politicisation. As civil servants
commonly complain, this has primarily involved greater interference by politicians in their everyday work,
frequently having to divert resources or to use influence for corrupt purposes. The major thrust in the
politicisation of the bureaucracy since 1991 has involved recruiting 'party men bureaucrats'. The first five years
of democracy (1991-1996) under the first BNP Government was a period of politicisation in various forms: party
loyalists were placed in important civil service positions and attempts were made to manipulate the recruitment
process, including by appointing student party leaders (Zafarullah 1997). For example, in 1992, 654 allegedly
partisan officials were promoted, and in 1996, civil servants were compelled to retire prematurely without a
specific reason (Karim 1996).
After coming to power in 1996, the Awami League continued the process of politicisation. A number of senior
civil servants had been directly involved in the movement which forced the BNP to hold a re-
election under a constitutionally guaranteed Caretaker Government in 1996. On winning the election that
followed, the Awami League rewarded those civil servants with promotions (Haque and Rahman 2003).
According to a press report, the promotion of 355 officials and the failure to promote others who were eligible

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was a decision based on political loyalties. Contractual recruitment, which is used to secure political
appointments, increased significantly up to 174 civil servants by 2000. The promotion trend is further illustrated
in Box 2.
The return to power of the BNP-led coalition in 2001 continued to strengthen political control over the
bureaucracy. A record 978 officials have been appointed to 'Officer on Special Duty'. This is a position that is
used as a punishment; in essence it means being a civil servant without a post. Within the civil service,
decisions regarding promotions are no longer believed to be made according to seniority or merit. Rather,
importance is given to party loyalty. Such a system is hugely damaging to civil service morale. The rising
number of contractual appointments and contractual extensions at the upper levels of the service are also seen
to be made on the basis of political allegiance.
Reports suggest that a new, more sinister process of politicisation has been initiated. Apparently with the
consent of the Prime Minister's Office, an unofficial cell has been created to ensure that none of the civil
servants who were or are sympathetic to the Awami League are being promoted (Khan 2003). The Superior
Selection Board is now dysfunctional, and decisions are made by the Prime Ministers Office, and merely
approved by the Superior Selection Board.
7
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7 Prothom Alo, 'Jugmo Shochib O Uposhochib Pode 355 Jon Podonnoti Pacchen- Banchitora Sharoklipi Diechen, 26 Cadre Khubdho', (355
officers are getting promotion to joint secretary and deputy secretary positions: Deprived officers have submitted a memorandum, 26 cadres are
agitated.),
8 Daily Sangbad, Cholti shoptahei Tin Shochib Aboshore Jacchen: Chuktibhittik Niyog Hocchena, (Three secretaries are going to retire this
week: Contractual appointments have not taken place), 8 August 2000
9 Daily Janakantha, Shorbokaler Record OSD: Bigoto Share Tin Bochore OSD 978 Kormokarta, Proshashon Cadrer Shongkha Shaat
Shotadhik, (OSD reaches all-time high record: 978 officers have become OSD in last three and half years, the number of OSD is more than
hundred in administration cadre), 21 May 2006
10 Daily Star, 'By the numbers, civil service shame', 17 July 2006
11 Daily Janakantha, SSB Thuto Jaggernaut: PMOr Jonno Talika Toiriie Prodhan Kaaj, (SSB is ineffective: It's main job is to make lists for the
Prime Minister), 5 May 2006
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Box 2. Unmerited promotions in the civil service?
The below account from a national newspaper illustrates these trends. The mode of promotion should be
according to a seniority scale. However, in recent years, seniority scales have been circumvented for political
purposes, thus 'depriving' civil servants of their due promotions.
'On June 13, 2002, 170 were promoted to the post of Joint Secretary depriving 200. On February 10 & 16, 2003,
493 were promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary depriving 322. On August 27, 2003, 97 were promoted to
the post of Additional Secretary depriving 104. On August 27, 2003, 49 were promoted to the post of Joint
Secretary depriving 277. On June 15, 2004, 84 were promoted to the post of Joint Secretary depriving 78. On
February 15, 2005, 18 were promoted to the post of Secretary depriving 5. On March 5, 2005, 61 were
promoted to the post of depriving 31. On April 21, 2005, 327 were promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary
depriving 50. On January 26, 2006, 378 Senior Assistant Secretaries were promoted to the post of Deputy
Secretary depriving around 200 others. Interestingly enough, 39 Additional Secretaries were reported to have
been promoted to the highest rank of Secretary. Seniority was alleged to have been violated in the cases of 14
civil servants and 30 civil servants were alleged to have been promoted to the highest rank of Secretary in only
3 years. As far as promotion is concerned, the current government has promoted 153 Deputy Secretaries to the
post of Joint Secretary as lately as 13 July, 2006 depriving around 100 eligible officers along with 5 Additional
Secretaries promoted to the post of Secretary.'
Source: Bangladesh Observer, 'Government's Institution-Destruction Spree', 22 July 2006
Apart from the impact on morale, performance and human resource management, particularly at the senior
levels, the introduction of political considerations into bureaucratic procedure has severely undermined the
credibility of the rules and regulations that govern the civil service, in particular the Government Servants
(Conduct) Rules, 1979 which regulates the terms and conditions of service and clearly rules against partisan
affiliation or support. The situation is further complicated by the involvement of contractual appointees in active
politics, including as candidates for public office. Rules forbid civil servants from involvement in politics, but in
recent years, the increasing number of contractual appointments is superseding these rules. An increasing
number of contractual appointments are being given to partisan people, who play an active role in politics.
There are three processes of recruitment to the BCS:
Direct recruitment through open competitive examinations
Recruitment through promotion and transfer
Direct lateral recruitment (Report of Bangladesh Public Service Commission 2004: 12)
Class I Officers (roughly 8 per cent of all civil servants and the key decision makers) are recruited directly by the
Public Service Commission (PSC) through an open competitive examination into 29 cadres and other
Government services. The Ministry of Establishment gathers requirements for recruitment from ministries and
Government bodies to determine the number of new officers to be recruited. It then advises the PSC to conduct
the competitive examination and finalise the list of potential recruits. Finally, the Ministry of Establishment
appoints officers from the list supplied by the PSC. Recruitment follows the Bangladesh Civil Service
Recruitment Rules of 1981.
While largely a closed entry system, there is provision for 10 per cent lateral entry into more senior grades. The
quota system reserves appointment of Class I posts for specified groups:
30 per cent for freedom fighters or the children of freedom fighters
10 per cent for women
5 per cent for tribal groups
10 per cent for different districts (based on population density).
This leaves only 45 per cent of the total available posts for recruitment to be filled following a merit-based open
competitive system. Although there were some modifications in 1997, the PSC has been recommending more
substantial changes since 1987 (Ali 2004), while PARC, the World Bank and ADB have recommended the
abolition of the current recruitment system. A recent decision has been that if suitable candidates are not found
to fill the 30 per cent for children of freedom fighters, the posts will be filled through merit-based recruitment
(PSC 2004: 13-14).
Since 1984, the open competitive BCS recruitment process involved an examination of 1000 marks: 500 for
compulsory subjects (Bangla, English, Bangladesh Affairs, International Affairs and General Mathematics and
Science), 100 each for three optional subjects and 200 marks for a viva. Starting in 1998, the PSC took steps to
reform the BCS written examination system to provide a better fit with the contemporary needs of the civil
service. The new system, introduced in 2006, involves all examinees sitting a written examination in five subjects
of 900 marks, followed by a viva for 100 marks. For the first time, a uniform system has been introduced in
12
4.6 Recruitment
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12 Bangladesh Observer, 'The Participation in political Activities, HC Issues Injunctions on Div SpI Judge Chunnu', 14 February 2006;
Bangladesh Observer, 'HC rule upon govt. Why job of Cabinet Secy should not be declared illegal', 24 May 2006
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which all examinees have to sit for exams in the same subjects (except for examinees sitting for
technical/professional cadre). Students can no longer choose optional subjects whereas in the past, each
student could choose 3 subjects out of 64, alleged to give an extra facility to the students having a science
background. Moreover, there is also a reduction of 100 marks in viva voce.
One problem with the recruitment system was the inability of the examination to select the most able and
informed candidates, according to one study in 1988. At that time, the examination structure was aimed at
obtaining university graduates, irrespective of their subject of study, rather than favouring the more capable or
intelligent among them (Zafarullah 1988). The new question patterns in the written examination introduced in
2006 appear to be increasing the rigorousness of the competitive process, and thereby starting to address
these problems.
A review of the literature and the media highlights the existence of corruption and the inclusion of political
considerations in the recruitment system. Allegations of leaked question papers forced the PSC to cancel the
24th BCS preliminary test. This does not appear to have stopped problems, however, as such allegations
continue. Problems in the recruitment system have led to incompetent and unqualified candidates being
recruited, with donors and the PSC itself questioning the capacity of incumbent bureaucrats.
The majority of prospective candidates and entry-level civil servants interviewed as part of the background
research for this chapter perceived the recruitment process to be corrupt. One prospective candidate admitted
he had actually bribed a viva board member. Others felt leaked question papers were common. One candidate
said, “I actually got a suggestion before the preliminary test, consisting of only 90 questions. When I saw the
question paper, I realized about 95 per cent of them had come from that so-called 'suggestion'”. By contrast, the
incumbent mid-level civil servants tended to believe that the recruitment process was either fair or that the
scope of corruption was negligible.
Civil servants tend to view the politicisation of the PSC as the root cause of corruption in the recruitment
process. A retired CSP officer felt that:
As long as the senior bureaucrats headed the PSC, the recruitment process was fair. They
knew what they were doing. But you tell me, how [can] a university professor from a pure
science discipline understand who we need to recruit for civil service?
Political appointments to the chair and membership of the PSC means that these appointees lack the capacity
to play an adequate role, and at worst join the party in power by using their influence for corrupt purposes.
“They are greedy”, one entry-level civil servant remarked. "Besides, as they are politically appointed they know
they can get away with it." Experiences of recruitment describe a number of irregularities and corrupt practices.
One prospective candidate said:
When I was in the exam hall scanning through the question during the preliminary exam, I
looked around and realised that almost everybody had got the question earlier. It was so
frustrating. Then I decided even if I passed the preliminary test, I would not sit for the written
test … I passed the preliminary test and that is the end. I will never sit for BCS again.
Problems in the recruitment system
13
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13 Daily Star, 'PSC to defend charges as protests continue', 11 August 2003
14 Daily Star, 'By the numbers, civil service shame', 7 July 2006; Financial Express, 'Program to increase efficiency of bureaucrats by next year',
29 October 2005.
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Another prospective candidate actually enjoyed the experience of the preliminary test and written exam.
However:
The real horror started when I faced the viva board. All sort of political questions were asked
and when they found out that my political view was different from theirs, I realized that that
was the end of journey for me. Later, I came to know that I was rather lucky. One of my friends
was asked why she did not use a scarf to cover her head and whether she knew the of
prayers. That was too much for her. She got herself out of the room and now we both are
private sector employees.
Most prospective candidates felt the procedure was too long, but there were many positive views on the
revamped examination structure itself. As one put it, it is a “cost effective way to select the best”. An entry-level
civil servant suggested that it was the best Bangladesh could come up with.
In an attempt to understand what attracts applicants to the civil service, and which features act as a disincentive,
the research (Jahan 2006) explored the attitudes of respondents towards the BCS. Discussions suggested that
three factors tend to act as disincentives to joining the BCS: inadequate salary, faulty exam procedure and the
(negatively perceived) bureaucratic culture. Interestingly, prospective candidates see the faulty exam procedure
as the major deterrent, whereas mid and entry-level civil servants consider inadequate salary and the job
environment to be the major deterrent for potential BCS candidates. The inadequate salary benefit constitutes a
deterrent for all three categories of respondents. It is clear that the more competitive end of the private sector, in
particular multinational companies, offers a more competitive salary than the public sector. Others noted that
the working environment in the public sector was rigid: "taking initiative and coming up with creative ideas is not
well appreciated," commented one entry-level civil servant.
Even then, more than half of the 40 students from public universities interviewed expected to sit for the BCS
examination, and considered civil service jobs to be prestigious and attractive. “Whatever happens, civil service
is civil service”, remarked one graduate. Interestingly, the small group of ten private university students
interviewed were considerably less interested, and most did not have a clear sense of what civil service
employment would involve in terms of the structure of the service or its salary or benefits (see Table 1).
Niyot
Attitudes towards the civil service
15
15 According to the Sixth National Pay Scale (NPC VI), an entry level Class I officer gets only Tk 6,800 a month - whereas in private sector, a
person has a possibility to start at Tk 18,000-25,000. The maximum basic pay, according to NPC VI is Tk 24,000 only (Daily Star, 'How helpful is
the new payscale?', May 2005).20
Table 1. Would you consider sitting for the BCS exam?
Respondents Yes or Maybe No Total
Public University Students 29 11 40
Private University students 4 6 10
Total (%) 33 (66 %) 17 (34 %) 50 (100%)
Student from urban background 12 17 29
Student from rural background 21 0 21
Total (%) 33 (66 %) 17 (34 %) 50 (100%)
Source: Jahan 2006
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While all students from rural areas were considering the civil service, fewer than half of those from urban
backgrounds were (see Table 1). This may have some positive implications in the longer-term, including the
creation of a more representative and less elitist civil service. It may also enable a stronger pro-poor orientation,
as people from rural backgrounds are less likely than their urban counterparts to present strong resistance to
working in rural areas, and may have a greater understanding of the problems of the rural population.
The most significant factor in attracting candidates to the BCS appears to be job security (see Table 2). Even a
prospective candidate with work experience in the private sector pointed out that “job security is the main thing;
if certain things were changed we would definitely go for public sector” (see also Mukherjee 2001).
While job security is the biggest draw, status and power continue to be attractive features of the civil service.
What do those who are considering career options think about the civil service?
et al
Source: Jahan 2006
Table 3 shows the results: both prospective candidates and serving civil servants perceive an overwhelmingly
negative change in how society views the civil service. Current civil servants give less of an emphasis on
society's negative perception of the civil service, suggesting that at least some hold on to an unrealistic picture
of how their profession is regarded. At a stage in their lives when career options have to be considered,
university students and graduates are most likely to be acutely aware of how the civil service is viewed within
the wider society. One job seeker disgustedly described the civil service as “worthless”, noting that the scope
for corruption was an attraction for many.
Entry-level civil servants agreed that people show less respect to civil servants than before. Some respondents
however, believed that public opinion was changing in positive directions because the civil service was trying to
reform itself to become more citizen-focused. Older civil servants were the least likely to recognise negative
changes, no doubt reflecting their higher status within the service and a lesser likelihood to hear criticism
personally.
In part, the declining social status of the civil service seems to reflect the perception that the power civil service
is declining. During the colonial period, the civil service was mainly staffed by men from the educated upper
classes. But the research suggested the bureaucracy has lost its position of dominance, toppled off the top
position by politicians. A retired CSP explained that it was not always the case:
Table 2. Why do people want to join the civil service?
Source: Jahan 2006
*Multiple answers allowed; % figures may add to more than 100
Job
security
Status/power Salary
benefits
To serve the
nation
Family
pressure know
Total
Frequency
of response
35 23 0 10
Don't
6 92
% of total
responses
38 25 0 11 7
18
20 100
Table 3. Changing attitudes towards the civil service
Respondents Positive Change Negative Change No Change Total
Prospective Candidates 5 43 2 50
Civil servants 10 18 7 35
Total (%) 15 (18) 61 (72) 9 (11) 85 (100)
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the truth is that the present day civil servants are not courageous enough to take a stand. For
instance, during my time as the secretary for [a Ministry], I had to take certain measures that
made the politicians quite unhappy. They complained to the Prime Minister and at the end of
the day I came out being a successful civil servant.
Mid-career and entry-level civil servants did not deny that their status is declining. One entry-level civil servant
commented that:
Yes, that is true [that civil service status is declining]. A lot of heroic stories are heard about
our predecessors but the fact is they did not have to work under so much political pressure.
To some mid-level civil servants, this situation is quite natural: the government is a democratic one. “Let's face
it”, one said, “it is a democracy and they (politicians) are the people's representative”.
This chapter has situated the challenge of civil service reform within a changing national and global context,
identifying inadequate orientation towards citizens' needs, politicisation, and declining professional status and
power as key influences on civil service performance. The chapter looked closely at the recruitment process
within the civil service as a potential point for intervention. Recruitment is the first point at which corruption and
unfair means feature in the professional experience of civil servants and is a key determinant of the character
and quality of recruits to the service.
The prospects for civil service reform do not currently seem bright, despite signs that even the bureaucracy has
felt the pressure of change that have accompanied democratisation, reducing its power with respect to the
political classes and its insulation from the society. However, the civil service appears to be attracting an
increasingly rural and middle class group, which may well prove to be better placed to be responsive to citizens
than the highly educated ultra-elite members of the erstwhile CSP, which to date many still view as the model for
civil service quality in Bangladesh.
4.7 Conclusion
The weak adherence to the rule of law is widely acknowledged as a core governance failure in Bangladesh. The
justice sector stands out as one sector where the signs of deterioration outweigh any improvements. There is a
decline in authority and independence of the judiciary, and a persistent failure to address the inaccessibility,
corruption and capacity weaknesses of law enforcement agencies. A full account of the complex and varied
problems of the justice sector is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Instead, the chapter addresses three
issues. First, it outlines some of the key problems in the justice sector. Second, it examines the prospects and
incentives for police reform. Finally, it provides an overview of attempted reforms and areas of relative success
in the justice sector, namely the work of NGOs on empowerment of women and the poor through improving
access to local level justice institutions. The chapter is based primarily on a review of the development literature
on law and access to justice, as well as qualitative research into the incentives and professional experiences of
police officers conducted in 2006, and an assessment of the legal empowerment activities of four NGOs, based
on informant interviews and a review of programme and research literature, also in 2006. Initial findings from
ongoing research into the prospects for justice sector reform are also discussed.
The rule of the rule of law is not a single, unified good but is composed of separate, socially desirable goods, or
ends: (1) a government bound by law, and subject to restraints in the exercise of its power; (2) equality before
the law; (3) maintenance of public order, and enforcement of norms embodied in the law; (4) predictable,
effective and efficient rulings; and (5) protection of human rights and the dignity of the individual. These ends
are distinct, likely to meet different types of support and resistance, and are often in tension with one another in
practice. In Bangladesh these tensions run deep and increasingly contribute to the failure of governance. Some
of the problems that account for the growing crisis of rule of law are embedded in the system dating back to the
colonial period: for example, the inaccessibility of police, and the emphasis on protection of property rather than
persons. The lack of efficiency of the justice sector is not a new development. However, the politicisation, low
accountability and corruption, all of apparently growing proportions provide disturbing evidence of deterioration
in governance conditions over the 2000s.
The key issue is increasing politicisation of the sector. The institutional decline in the independence of the
judiciary results in the failure to hold other organs of Government into account. A functioning, independent
5.1 Rule of law problems
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The poverty of justice:
implications for governance
judiciary that applies the law impartially is fundamental to rule-based governance, and sustaining a culture of
accountability rather than one of impunity. As important is that the norms embodied in various laws in a society
are internalized by various state actors. In Bangladesh impunity, rather than accountability and norm
compliance, appears to be ascendant. Even where the courts have delivered judgements (e.g., rulings on
voters' lists, High Court rulings on asset disclosure and other disclosures for politicians, and the
judgement on separation of the judiciary - the magistracy in particular - from the Executive), weak enforcement
has undermined accountability. The problem is exacerbated by the use of judicial tools, such as stay orders to
delay cases.
Weaknesses in the justice sector have a range of other serious negative impacts on human security, economic
development and more fundamentally on the accountability of the state institutions and actors. But while these
are obvious on a case-by-case basis, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the national costs of
failures to maintain the rule of law, in economic or in social terms. There is, however, mounting evidence that
governance failures in the justice sector affect the poor and the marginal, particularly women,
disproportionately. These failures are most direct when they take the form of high crime rates and lack of
redress through the formal system because of costs, lack of legal knowledge, and an inadequate and corrupt
police force.
The indirect consequences of justice sector failures are less obvious but no less real: economic activity is
hampered by uncertainty and the need to protect against crime or The fact that contracts can only be
enforced with relative difficulty is one reason why it is comparatively expensive to do business in Bangladesh
(see Table 1). The livelihoods of the poor and the very poor are also negatively affected by the prevalence of
risk, insecurity and uncertainty, which mitigate against longer-term investments and planning behaviour.
Masdar Hossain
hartal.
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The wide range and severity of the different problems faced by the justice sector, and their widely different
consequences makes it difficult to prioritise issues for discussion in the present report. This mirrors the
difficulties posed by a potential reform agenda. Ongoing preliminary research into the prospects for justice
sector reform highlights two initial obstacles to sectoral reform. One is the sheer burden of the problems faced.
A former Law Minister flatly explained: ''It will take two days to talk about the problems of judiciary''. The second
is the absence of any clarity or consensus about where and how reform might occur. Interviews with more than
30 key central stakeholders have failed to identify a clear set of priorities for reform of the sector. No doubt an
obstacle in developing a reform agenda is the bifurcated nature of the system: those who dispense and receive
formal justice are physically and socially distanced from the rural masses who receive informal, traditional
justice from customary authorities ( ).
2
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1 See survey evidence reported in World Bank 2002c and UNDP 2002. See Keevil Harrold and Hassan (2006) for a recent assessment of gender
related conflict.
2 Ongoing qualitative research into justice sector reform is designed to assess the priorities and demand for reform within the justice sector,
through semi-structured interviews with 80 stakeholders and key actors, in addition to focus group discussions with users of justice sector
services, including the informal system. The primary research and preliminary analysis of the findings are scheduled to be completed by the end
of 2006 by members of the research team of the present report. The findings are intended to support the design of a national survey to explore
issues within the justice sector, to be undertaken by the World Bank in 2007.
*
The cost of enforcing contracts is determined by 'following the evolution of a payment dispute and tracking the time, cost, and number of
procedures involved from the moment a plaintiff files the lawsuit until actual payment'.
World Bank/IFC 2006; data available on http://www.doingbusiness.orgSource:
Table 1. The cost of formal contract enforcement*
Indicator Bangladesh Region OECD
Procedures 50 38.7 22.2
Time (days) 1,442 968.9 351.2
Cost (% of debt) 45.7 26.4 11.2
Judicial independence
Accountability of the justice sector
Possibly the most serious of the core governance failures in Bangladesh is the lack of independence of the
lower judiciary, the magistracy in particular. In the existing dual system of appointments of the lower judiciary,
assistant to district judges are appointed by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; the
magistrates are appointed directly from within the administrative service by the Ministry of Establishment. Thus
magistrates are functionally dependent upon the Executive, and personnel and spending decisions allow for the
politicisation of key personnel. Although there is recognition of the necessity of separation of the magistracy
from the Executive, the situation is not likely to change as quickly as it could. The lack of progress towards
implementation of the judgement, the Supreme Court ruling that would enforce the separation
of the judiciary in line with the Constitution, continues.
The influence of politics on the judiciary appears to have accelerated in recent years and has led to a decline in
the formal basis for Governmental accountability. Whereas the High Court and the Appellate Divisions of the
Supreme Court were held up as 'the strongest link in the accountability chain' by the World Bank only a few
years earlier (2002a), their strength and credibility have eroded. A decision taken by Chief Justice of
Bangladesh in December 2006 regarding three writ petitions challenging the President's assumption of the
office of the Head of the Caretaker Government and subsequent violence within the Supreme Court premises
can be cited as unnecessary entanglement of the judiciary in political controversy. The change in the retirement
age and bypassing seniority as a dominant factor for appointment of a judge to the Supreme Court have also
been questioned as these open the door for politically motivated appointments.
Formal accountability mechanisms within the judicial system are weak to nonexistent. Judges are not
accountable for the efficiency or lack thereof of their performance. Capacity constraints form another major
obstacle to wider access to formal justice. The administration of justice is under-funded, painfully slow and
inefficient which results in excessive delays. There are also concerns about the quality, the level of qualifications
and training of the judiciary (ADB 2003). The scope for public scrutiny is limited, in part because of fears of
contempt due to strict contempt laws (ADB 2003). Some pressure for accountability is coming from legal aid
schemes dispensed by both governmental and nongovernmental actors partly through the growth of NGO legal
service provision.
Corruption in key justice institutions, most notably the lower courts and the police force, is a serious problem.
Practices of requiring informal payments for basic services effectively blocks access to the criminal justice
system by the poor, who can rarely afford to pay for initial access through filing complaints or reports with the
relevant authorities, nor the bribes required higher up the system. The complicated nature of the system also
engenders corruption, as the entire system lacks transparency in relation to the laws and the processes and
procedures. These are particularly important obstacles for people who are illiterate.
The justice system is effectively divided into informal traditional institutions through which the rural poor typically
attempt to resolve their conflicts, and the costly, inaccessible formal courts. The literature is ambivalent on the
informal justice institutions: on the one hand, they provide dispute resolution and render judgements
comparatively efficiently (in terms of time, cost and proximity to poor people); on the other hand, the
judgements are often inequitable and unenforceable. Financial, time and travel costs, lack of knowledge of legal
rights and processes, and fear of interaction with the police limit formal system access to a small percentage of
the population.
3
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3 These points are drawn from a number of valuable recent contributions to the non-specialist literature on the rule of law. For the most
comprehensive account of the judiciary and the justice sector, see ADB (2003). UNDP (2002b) and World Bank (2002c) both provide detailed
empirical evidence on people's experiences of formal and informal justice institutions, including the police. UNDP (2003, 2005) provide further
evidence on policing.
4 See Chapter Seven, this volume, for an account of a corruption scandal that forced a senior judge to retire.
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Official police statistics indicate a rise in the total number of reported crimes of nearly 36 per cent between
1993 and 2004. Violent crimes such as murder rose most rapidly, about 13 per cent in the five years between
2000 and 2004 (see Table 2). In 2004, official crime figures declined by around 5 per cent, almost certainly the
result of the introduction of RAB to control crime (on which more below). It should be noted that these figures
are more than likely to understate the overall incidence of crime, particularly as it affects the poor and rural
areas, as it is widely reported that the police frequently do not accept crime reports from complainants without
payment or other inducements (see UNDP 2002b; World Bank 2002c).
5
Another factor that impedes access to the formal institutions is the conventional view of the criminal justice
system in Bangladesh is not as a service to the people but as a mechanism for maintaining public order and
protection of property. Initial findings from ongoing qualitative primary research into the prospects for justice
sector reform support the argument that justice has to date been viewed as a matter, ''isolated from the society
… not thought [of] in an integrated manner'', as one judge put it. This distance and separation of formal justice
from the people and their needs helps to foster the lack of confidence in the judiciary, and widespread faith that
justice is something to be purchased. Surveys by TIB regularly show that people have very little faith in either
the police or the lower courts, the central institutions for criminal and civil justice.
Citizens expect the state to maintain public order. The inability or unwillingness of the designated state organs
to assure security, or, worse, to use extra-judicial means to maintain order indicates serious governance failures.
Enabling political violence and human right abuses further suggest disregard for norms and signals the state's
weakening reverence for the rule of law.
Crime and human rights abuses
5 Official police statistics are known to be poor quality and to be incomplete. However, in the absence of independent crime statistics (such as a
national crime victim survey) official figures provide the only national data that shows crime trends over time.
Source: Data collected from Police Headquarters, Dhaka, September 2006
Table 2. Incidence of reported crimes (official statistics)
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Political violence has grown dramatically since the mid-1990s. A Human Rights Watch report from 1996 states
that the political violence in that election year was of such severity that ''the BNP, the security forces and the
opposition parties all violated their obligations under domestic and international law'', using armed youth wings
to perpetrate violence against opponents, conduct gun battles, attack newspaper offices, journalists and news
photographers, engaging in mob violence that destroyed millions of dollars worth of property and endangered
lives in Chittagong. The response by the police and other security forces was ''both disproportionate to the
threat and partisan'' (Human Rights Watch 1996). Evidence from the 2000s does not suggest the situation has
changed for the better and has probably deteriorated. A grenade attack in 2004 cost the AL two prominent
leaders, leaving many others injured, the investigation into which has so far been far from adequate.
Based on data collated from human rights organisations, the US State Department calculates that there were
2,297 victims of torture and 15 deaths due to torture by security forces in 2005 (US State Department 2006). By
December 2004, 53 'terrorists' had been killed 'in encounters' with RAB, while press reports suggest that as7
There is evidence to suggest that in remote rural areas, many forms of crime are tackled by local authorities or
vigilante groups without involving the police. Little, however, is known about the extent or character of rural as
compared to urban crime. One in-depth study of rural crime based on interviews with 250 community members
in four villages in northern districts found that reasonably effective local arrangements ensured serious crimes
by outsiders were rare; although petty theft was common, particularly among those least able to protect their
property. The police were not seen as important actors in the dispensation of criminal justice, which was dealt
with locally. Local justice focused on retribution and reform of local criminals, sometimes through gruesome
punitive means (Ali 2004).
Violence against women appears to have risen dramatically (see Tables 2 and 3), with figures generated by the
Women Support Program showing that between 1990 and 1997, violent crimes against women increased by
254 per cent. However, at least part of the apparent rise reflects increased reporting of incidences, and that
reliance on reported incidents underestimates total prevalence (UNDP 2002b). Reports of rape by police of
women and children in 'safe custody' also continue (see UNDP 2002b).
6
6 In July 1995, the government launched Women Support Program with a view to raise moral values, and create awareness of legal rights,
better employment and income for poor, helpless and oppressed women (women abused by husbands). The program has four
components: i) The Cell for Prevention of Oppression of Women ii) Center for Shelter and Rehabilitation of Oppressed Women and
Children, iii) Information Center for Employment Exchange, iv) Sales and Exhibition Center. The Cell for Prevention of Oppression of Women
provides support to the victims of oppression. Women abused by husbands are the primary target group of the Cell. The major functions of
the Cell include legal advice, counselling, realization of dower maintenance, and conducting cases in courts (Directorate of Women Affairs
1997).
7 As reported by RAB on its home page: www.mha.gov.bd/RAB.php.
Source: Women Support Program, Project Report 1997
Table 3. Incidences of violence against women, 1990s
Type of
violence
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 % change
(compared to
1990)
Rape 407 982 749 526 285 651 1415 2224 546
Acid-throwing 21 20 29 39 19 51 83 117 557
Murder 1904 1500 1879 2269 806 1787 1839 2426 127
Physical
Torture
258 300 217 350 469 808 1664 2029 786
Abduction 30 28 18 17 19 49 138 245 816
Trafficking 12 18 32 23 28 55 85 72 600
Total 2714 2927 3025 3358 1748 3668 5818 7901 254
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Box 1. A dangerous job: violence against journalists
Reporting on bad governance is an increasingly risky business in Bangladesh. On May, a peaceful
demonstration by journalists in Kushtia who were protesting against threats by a ruling party MP was attacked,
reportedly by supporters of the MP. Four journalists had reportedly received threats in recent months and fled
Kushtia after publishing reports about the MP's alleged involvement in corruption. The MP had in turn filed
charges against the journalists, accusing them of extortion. Nineteen people were injured on May, including
the chief editor of a national newspaper, also a journalists' union leader. The police apparently made no effort to
intervene, although the State Minister for Home Affairs, Lutfozzaman Babar, later condemned the attack, an
investigation was called for and full details of the attack were reported in the press. However, the next day, the
offices of a local newspaper were also attacked, and on May, eight more journalists were reported to have
been injured when police broke up a silent procession of journalists in Satkira who were protesting against the
events in Kushtia. The Kushtia incidents are by no means isolated events. According to the Bangladesh Federal
Union of Journalists, 12 Bangladeshi journalists were killed in the period 2001-2005. And the human rights
organization Odhikar said in early June that 43 journalists had been injured in attacks in May 2006 alone.
29
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Source: Human Rights Watch: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/07/bangla13518.htm
5.2 The police: problems and prospects for reform
The previous section outlines multiple rule of law challenges that have implications for governance in
Bangladesh. A focus of justice sector reform is the police force. Diagnostic and institutional assessments of the
police force and studies designed to gauge citizen satisfaction indicate that the public has little confidence in
the force. The police suffer from weaknesses that prevent the poor and marginal from gaining full access to
formal justice institutions, and which contribute to delays, inefficiencies and corruption in the court systems.
This section briefly reviews the findings of a recent study exploring the incentives and constraints of the police
force.9
many as 396 people were killed by RAB in 2005. The Home Ministry assesses that RAB has killed 283 persons
as of September 2006, but according to press reports and various Human Rights Organizations the number of
deaths in 'crossfire' is much higher.
Reported cases of human rights abuses against minority groups also appear to have risen over the 2000s, with
the persecution of the community the most widely reported instance in recent years (see Human
Rights Watch 2005). Again, it is possible that apparent increases in abuses against minority groups reflect
greater information and public attention to these issues because of a stronger and more effective media
generally more committed to raising such awareness, including an increasingly engaged expatriate community
(see Chapter Seven). Reporting on governance failures can come at a high cost, however (see Box 1).
Ahmadiyya
8
8 The documentary 'Muslims or Heretics?' by an expatriate Bangladeshi appears to have been successful in directing global attention to official
protection for the persecutors of the community. Only a tiny minority of Muslims within Bangladesh are members of the
community, which represents one small branch, or sect, of Islam.
9 The study of the police conducted in 2006 involved semi-structured interviews with 50 police personnel sampled from three levels of the
services which covered topics such as experiences of recruitment and other human resource management issues; sources of accountability,
including the impact of the media, and disciplinary methods in the service; community relations; quality of life and operational issues; and views
on corruption and politicisation within the force. The research also involved collection of official data about crime and law enforcement. The full
research paper will be available as a background paper to the present report as Jahan and Kashem (2006).
Ahmadiyya Ahmadiyya
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Law enforcement agencies and actors
and
and Village Defence Party (VDP
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)
The main law enforcement body is the national Bangladesh Police force, under the control of the Ministry of
Home Affairs. It is structured into sections with policing activities carried out through 539 police stations or
across the country. Police administration is governed by the Police Act of 1861 with operational aspects
guided by Police Regulation of Bengal (PRB), 1943. The Home Ministry retains power to issue administrative
regulations on personnel and police operations. Police officers are categorized as gazetted and non-gazetted,
roughly analogous to commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the military services. The lower levels of
the police force, the constables, constitute 80 per cent of the force (information from Police Headquarters, June
2006); and only 1.2 per cent of the force are women (UNDP 2003).
10
thanas
The other main actors in law enforcement are:
serve as village police and are employed by the Ministry of Local Government to
maintain law and order in rural areas and to assist the national police force; it is widely recognised that the
village police are inadequate in terms of their numbers, remuneration and their power to act (see UNDP
2002b)
) is a Government-recognised and supported volunteer force of
vast size and reach (4.6 million members, a presence in every village) but unknown effectiveness. The force
consists of the Bahini, the Battalion and the Village Defence Party (VDP), which are all tasked
with the maintenance of rural law and order and assisting other law enforcement agencies. Half of the 4.4
million VDP members are women
is a paramilitary force mainly charged with border protection and prevention of
smuggling. BDR increasingly assist the police in general law enforcement, particularly during raids and
was created in June 2004 based on the Armed Police Battalions
(Amendment) Act, 2003. It is a composite force drawing personnel from the police, the paramilitary and the
armed forces, with at present 12 battalions throughout the country (information from RAB Headquarters in
2006). The main functions of RAB include crime control, confiscation of illegal arms, arrest of wanted
criminals, controlling women and child trafficking, and money laundering. Compared to the police, RAB
members are well-trained, well-paid, and well-equipped. According to RAB Headquarters, in its first 6
months RAB confiscated 520 illegal arms, and arrested 2267 criminals, including some assessed by RAB to
be 'most wanted terrorists'.
RAB is an example of the campaign or 'crack-down' approach to law enforcement often taken when crime levels
reach intolerable proportions. These 'crack-downs' usually deploy the more effective military to supplement the
weak and compromised police force. Operation Clean Heart, which ran from October 2002 to January 2003, is
an earlier example: 45,000 citizens were arrested and around 60 people killed. Concerns articulated by civil
society and human rights groups and by foreign donors about human rights abuses and the excesses of
Operation Clean Heart led the Government to pass an ordinance precluding prosecutions for human rights
violations committed during this period.
The RAB model appears to have incorporated some lessons from the failings of Operation Clean Heart, one of
which is to avoid targeting innocent people. While human rights and civil society groups are strongly opposed
to RAB and their extra-judicial means of law enforcement, RAB appears to be widely popular, apparently
because they have been effective at tackling crime. But this has done little to improve the image or morale of the
regular police force. However, while the campaign approach tends to yield fast, popular results in terms of




Chaukidars Dafadars
Ansars
Ansar Ansars
hartals
10 These include the Traffic, Special, and Detective branches; Metropolitan police for the major cities; the new Highway unit, and the Central
Investigation Department (CID) for high profile cases.
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immediate arrests of notorious criminals, its effectiveness tends to wear off, so that 'crack-downs' typically yield
no enduring or structural reduction in crime.
A number of private responses to policing failures have emerged, including the growth of the private security
industry. This was a significant development starting from the late 1980s. An estimated 300 security companies
(Kashem and Chowdhury, 2003), including some global brand names, now offer a range of private security
services for homes and offices.
Hybrid forms of law enforcement, including various types of community policing appear to be emerging as a
promising response. Police departments in conjunction with Town Defense Party (TDP; the urban version of the
VDP) started to implement community policing in 1992 in Mymensingh town and parts of Dhaka under the name
of (Neighbourhood Watch). There are now more than 100 Neighbourhood Watch initiatives
under the Community Policing scheme. The TDP has a formal committee with close contact with the local police
station; uniquely, the costs are borne by the community (Alam 2002). The Asia Foundation has also started to
support pilot community policing initiatives implemented by NGO partners, designed on a baseline study
involving consultations with the police and other official and community stakeholders in 2004. Following the
example of Mymensingh, community policing was introduced in Chandpur, Habigonj, Moulvibazar, Jamalpur,
Thakurgaon, Sirajgonj, and some parts of Dhaka city (Detective 2005). It seems that the police department lacks
specific guidelines for implementing community policing. As a result, some police officers have been
implementing this system under their own initiative; in some areas, people did not welcome this model of
community policing and were reluctant to make financial contributions to meet the costs (Alam 2002).
Current trends in policing emphasize the importance of the relationship between the police and citizens.
However, the Bangladeshi public has little trust in the police. The police routinely come last in all opinion polls
and attitudinal surveys designed to assess perceptions of corruption and trust in public officials: only 9 per cent
of citizens trusted the police in a recent BBC survey (BBC 2005); around 70 per cent of respondents believed
that police corruption was 'heavy or malignant' (survey reported in World Bank 2002c); 82 per cent of people
considered the police to be the most corrupt Government department in a 1998 survey (reported in World Bank
2002c); and the police topped the 'most corrupt' list in the TIB Corruption Databases for 2004 and 2005.
In their most recent household survey, TIB found that 92 per cent of households who had lodged first
information reports (FIR) at police stations paid bribes averaging Tk 2,430; 91 per cent who registered general
diaries (GD) paid Tk 939 on average; 80 per cent of households who needed clearance certificates paid an
average amount of Tk 881, and 71 per cent of accused parties paid bribes averaging Tk 5,718 (TIB 2005). As
well as lacking trust and belief in police effectiveness, other studies show that most of the public would not call
the police if a crime was committed in their homes, and rank the police low compared to other professions,
such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, businessmen, and journalists (Kashem 2001, 2002, 2003; TIB 2004).
Police officers are aware that the public does not respect the police. One police officer interviewed blamed
antagonism towards the police as a colonial hangover, but there was generally awareness that current policing
practices are responsible and that community relations could be improved if the police behaved more
courteously, gave better service, or met regularly with community members. However, it is clear that the police
do not accept full blame for the state of police-community relations: many blame the media, including
commercial feature films, for misrepresenting their role. Some police officers felt that journalists were more
Protibeshi Nirapatta
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Public trust and accountability in the police force
11 Daily Star, 'Community Policing: Our experience', 10 February 2006.
12 For example, the low crime rate in Japan has been partly attributed to the close relationship between police, community leaders and
residents, and to a high degree of public cooperation with the police (Bayley 1976, 1991). Other research suggests that the less respectful
police are towards suspects and citizens generally, the less people will comply with the law (Tyler 1990; Paternoster 1997).et al
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corrupt than the police, citing examples of journalists blackmailing police officers to stop publication of false
reports. An Inspector (OC) of a said:
Police officers become hostages at the hands of the media because the higher authorities
don't listen to us and verify the contents of the report, but punish the concerned officer. So
why bother? We always try to oblige the journalist even though we are not at fault.
However, police interviewees also acknowledged that press reports on excessive use of force and police
brutality had improved police accountability and reduced the abuse of police power. One senior officer felt there
was a danger that the media would direct investigations, and that guidelines should be established for reporting
on police interrogations.
While officers believed the media helped limit the worst excesses of police behaviour, more routine means of
controlling and disciplining police behaviour are weak. There is no independent complaints commission.
Instead, the internal Police Security Cell is responsible for investigating complaints against members of the
police force. In many instances, it either does not receive the necessary approval from the Home Ministry or
punishments are delayed (Kashem 2005a). The integrity of officers working in the Cell has also been
questioned. Out of 101,490 complaints received against police personnel between 1995 and 2000, only 1490
officers were punished during that time. By contrast, a law drafted to discipline RAB members had seen 231
members of RAB punished for misconduct by June 2006.
Police interviewees did not, however, see this system as inadequate in terms of the number of officers
disciplined. Instead, many argued that the rate of punishment was high compared to other service-oriented
departments such as WASA or T&T. This suggests both a lack of perspective on how the roles of law
enforcement agencies differ in vital respects from those of the public utilities; and a lack of acceptance that
routine punishment for corruption and abuses of powers is correct and appropriate. Interviewees generally felt
that the existing system of punishment was sufficient to ensure police accountability, while many felt they should
be given more incentives and rewards for good behaviour.
One problem with the disciplinary apparatus is that it is widely seen as biased in favour of senior officers. Press
and research reports into the state of law enforcement in Bangladesh reveal that it is mainly constables and
junior officers who are punished in corruption cases, while top administrators are rarely punished. The
interviews conducted for this research confirmed a strong sense of bias, with constables and lower ranking
officers believing that the system is lenient towards senior officers. By contrast, senior officers tended to feel that
the disciplinary system is appropriate. Evidence supports this: of 1490 personnel who received punishment
between 1995 and 2000, 77 per cent were Constables and 22 per cent were non-gazetted officers. Only 5 senior
officers were disciplined for involvement in corruption during that period Kashem 2005b).
All the evidence suggests that corruption is a serious problem throughout the police force. Police officers
defend charging fees to register cases because they lack the budgets necessary to follow-up or investigate
complaints (see World Bank 2002c). In the absence of any strong accountability mechanisms to prevent
corruption, police officers have two strong incentives for accepting illegal payments for services. First, the cost
of entry into the police service needs to be recouped. A number of Sub-Inspectors interviewed for the present
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13 Daily Sangbad, 'Police bivage durniti: juniorder shasti holeo borokortara bohal tobiyote' (Corruption in police department: though junior
officers are punished, the seniors remains untouched), 25 April 2005
14 Daily Star, 'Special trial planned for RAB offenders' No access for convicts to HC in new rules; 2 separate courts; trial in 1 month; life term
maximum punishment', 29 July 2005. RAB's data does not distinguish between disciplinary and criminal misconduct.
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research reported having paid large amounts to the selection committee during the recruitment process. There
are also rumours within the force that top management sells the posting of Officers-in-Charge at various police
stations, presumably those with the prospects for lucrative illegal activities. Second, police constables' wages
are acknowledged by senior officers to be low. This is viewed as a reason why lower-level officers are involved
in corruption, but also suggests that low wages are used by senior police managers to justify police corruption.
Compared to petty corruption, a more serious obstacle to the rule of law in Bangladesh is politicisation. The
state exercises strong control over police agencies and many policy decisions regarding police are apparently
instigated for political purposes (see Box 2).
It is no secret that politics plays a role in the transfer and posting of police officers, and interviewees discussed
the matter fairly openly. In many cases the local MP personally selects the OC for his constituency. One police
officer was cited in the Daily Star as arguing that "as political parties use police for their interest, law enforcers
always keep themselves busy to make political leaders happy and so people suffer. Due to affiliation with
political parties they (policemen) do not even bother about people's interest. They always try to fulfill the political
will of the government." The vast majority of our interviewees argued that political influence, patronization and
victimization were key problems for the police force, and major determinants of inefficiency and other problems
in the service. It was reported that politicians even influence the preparation of charge sheets and final reports;
as a result, the 'fall out' rate of arrests is high.
A key finding from the interviews is that the police force is divided and subject to differential incentives and
constraints that detrimentally affect performance and morale. We saw above that disciplinary mechanisms
15
Incentives and constraints on police performance
Human resource issues
Box 2. Police politics
On assuming power in October 2001, the Government introduced major shifts in different tiers of the police
administration. A new police chief Inspector General of Police (IGP) was appointed and many Officers-in-Charge
(OCs) of various police stations were transferred, as well as 48 Superintendents of Police (SP) (head of the
district police administration). In addition, about 50 senior officials including Additional Inspector General,
Deputy Inspector General, and Superintendent of Police were sent on forced retirement.
Reports in 2005 suggested that the length of academy training for 205 trainee Assistant Superintendents of
Police (ASP) had been reduced to 9 months from 12 months, and in-service training reduced to 3 from 6
months. It seems that this abridged training time is for politically-aligned individuals whom the Government
wanted to ensure were finally selected before their tenure ended in late October.
Sources: news articles in Daily Star, 'Frequent transfers frustrate cops', 12 November 2001; Shamokal, 'Nirbachoner age shajano hoche police
proshashon: 205 shikhanobish A.S.P er proshikkhon shongkhipto kore churanto niyog deya hoeche' (Police administration is being rearranged
before the election: 205 A.S.Ps are being appointed upon completion of their training), 5 July 2006
15 Daily Star, 'Frequent transfers frustrate cops', 12 November 2001
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penalise lower levels of the service disproportionately. Motivations for joining the police force also vary widely
between different levels, suggesting significant differences in attitudes towards the profession. From the
perspective of many constables, the police force was just a job they had taken because they were unemployed;
they reported no special motivations for joining the force. Non-gazetted officers were attracted to the profession
because of power, including the capacity to protect their families and friends from crime, and to serve the
country. By contrast, top ranking officers took a careerist view, noting that compared to many BCS cadres,
career and promotion prospects in police cadre are better.
While most interviewees believed that the recruitment process was generally appropriate, there was a strong
sense of discontent among mid-level personnel about the system by which senior managers are recruited
separately and directly. First, it is believed to create inequality and mistrust; second, those who enter through
the lower ranks lack equal opportunities for promotion; and third, BCS cadre staff lack experience of the
problems and hazards of police work at the field level. Although our sample was small and purposive rather
than random, we found that many non-gazetted officers have post-graduate degrees, and thus feel resentment
towards BCS officers with the same educational qualifications, who lack their extensive field level working
experience, but who act as their supervisors. This animosity towards BCS officers is likely to hamper the proper
functioning of the police service.
Recruitment is also believed to suffer from corruption and lack of transparency, and a corresponding failure to
attract qualified personnel. It was pointed out that in recent years many Sub-Inspectors had been appointed on
the basis of political affiliation. Some respondents who had joined before 1991 said that large-scale corruption
in recruitment process began after 1990. One view was that political leaders reward student leaders or
supporters for their party loyalties with jobs in the police force. All respondents at the upper levels of the force
admitted corruption in the recruitment process at different entry points, particularly at the Sub-Inspector level.
Interviews with constables also suggest that the extent of corruption in recruitment at the Sub-Inspector level
varies. Political pressure is a major factor in recruitment, as highlighted by one recruiting officer:
Political leaders, especially members of the ruling party now think that recruitment is their
right, thus the local MP supplies a list of candidates and asks the SP to appoint them. As you
understand, we have no choice but to oblige them.
With respect to training, it was again mid-level personnel who appeared least satisfied with training received,
while constables and senior officers felt the training was effective and appropriate. One significant problem is
that able officers are reluctant to work at training academies and police schools. Some senior officers pointed
out that those incentives that apply to military training academies, such as a 30 per cent allowance for trainers,
are not available for police trainers. Army officers treat training institutes as a career posting, but for a police
officer, assignment at the training academy is viewed as punishment. While opportunities for foreign training
appear to have increased, mid-ranking police officers complained that these mostly go to senior level staff,
regardless of appropriateness.
Promotion and career prospects are another area in which the BCS cadre officers are better off, as their
promotion follows the gradation lists (although politics is also a factor in the senior ranks such as DIG,
Additional IGP and IGP). Legal, administrative and other obstacles mean that Sub-Inspector and Inspector
categories have fewer prospects for promotion. At present, a Sub-Inspector is eligible for the promotion test
after 6 years, but in practice, many remain in post between 12 and 20 years. This is partly the result of
inadequate training for career development. Many constables similarly find promotion difficult to achieve. One
who had joined the service in 1986 said, "during my 20 years of service I took the test three times and passed.
But I failed to obtain promotion. So I just gave up. One DIG explained that there are approximately 90,000
constables in the police department and each year only about 2,000 of them are promoted to Assistant Sub-
Inspector on the basis of merit. The overall standard of education among constables is low, and they face both
"
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a heavy workload and uncertainty with respect to promotion. As a result morale among constables tends to be
low; this in turn affects their performance.
In terms of their quality of life, most police expressed dissatisfaction. There is virtually no support system for
police and their families, and housing and medical facilities for lower ranks are poor. Welfare benefits in cases of
accident or death are not distributed in a timely manner and the amounts are in any case very small. Many
police officers are not granted permission to live with family in their postings, nor can most afford to rent houses
for their families, with the result that many live in poor condition in barracks. Others feel insecure: an
Inspector who had served as OC of a in the northern region of the country had not sent his children to
school because of security concerns. By contrast, senior level police officers and OCs generally have good and
relatively secure government accommodation. A similar pattern of discrimination exists with respect to hospital
care, which is particularly poor for lower ranking police officers.
In line with other assessments, our interviews uncovered a number of operational constraints on police
performance. The two key factors appear to be excessive workloads and the lack of an operating budget for
police stations. Between 2001 and 2006, the total budget for the Bangladesh police increased by 118 per cent,
while the number of police increased by about 12 per cent during that period (information from Police
Headquarters, 2006). However, operating budgets remain negligible and have not increased. As they lack
enough cars and funds to pay drivers of rented vehicles, they generate funds through toll collection from
businesses or other sources. The allocation for maintenance of vehicles, buildings and travel costs is negligible
compared to actual costs, and police officers frequently ask victims of crime to arrange transportation to attend
the crime scenes, or else attend at their personal expense, which is presumably recouped later. Research by
TIB (2004) reported that in the metropolitan police stations, supplies of stationery only covered 8 to 9 per cent of
need, which meant that people seeking services had to pay for the cost of forms and photocopying. Our
interviews suggested that is some cases, police offices procure their own furniture and stationery. This system
clearly feeds, enables and helps to justify corruption. Senior officers argued that the provision of an adequate
operational budget for police stations would reduce the necessity for this kind of corruption.
The excessive workload is compounded by the fact that police spend a high proportion of their time providing
escort services and security for VIPs, to the extent that in metropolitan areas police spend only 41 per
cent of their time on crime-related functions (TIB 2004). A Superintendent of Police commented that:
Nowadays, even Members of Parliament expect police protocol that they don't deserve. But
the police officer has to provide this service because of security reasons. If police can avoid
these non-crime related functions then it will greatly increase police effectiveness.
Other constraints identified by the police themselves included the lack of technology (there are no computers
for criminal investigations, crime analysis, and record keeping), political interference, low salary and benefits,
and heavy workload.
Donors are supporting police reform through the Strengthening Bangladesh Police programme, being
implemented by the Ministry of Home Affairs with financing and technical assistance from UNDP and DFID
Bangladesh. As a part of the reform programme the Government aims to establish naval police, metropolitan
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16 The Police Commission Report of 1988 found similarly that police spent only 38 per cent of their time on crime-related activity.
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police units in Sylhet and Barisal and to recruit 26,326 personnel. Additionally, in each upazila, an upazila police
officer at the rank of ASP will be appointed, and new posts and stations will be appointed in the Dhaka
Metropolitan Police. The programme will involve components designed to address crime prevention,
investigation and prosecution, human resource management and training and policing strategy and oversight.
Interviews with Programme officials reveal that 13 model have been established on a pilot basis and a
'Public Attitudes Baseline Survey' conducted to programme impact.
Some senior police officers pointed out that recent Government initiatives have focused on 'modernising' the
police force by procuring more sophisticated firearms and combat hardware such as armoured cars. While this
may improve law and order, it also carries a potential threat to police-community relations. When asked about
the UNDP/DFID reform programme, it seemed that awareness of the initiative was limited to the senior ranks:
lower ranking police officers had, if at all, only negligible knowledge of it. Overall, there was little optimism about
the programme. A commonly-held view was that the resources could be best spent on meeting the basic needs
of the police force such as improving working conditions of constables and establishing adequate support
services. Another view was that resources should be allocated to increase the investigative capability of police
through training.
A number of reform initiatives exist in the justice sector; some are driven by donors, others by civil society.
However, the activities remain fragmented and piecemeal in the absence of a strong commitment from
Government or a well articulated policy. The scope for legal and judicial reform is limited; neither major party
views judicial independence as in their interest should they come to power.
Donor-generated reforms have focused principally on technical and capacity issues. NGOs have established a
large and varied body of programmes designed to foster legal empowerment of women and the poor, mainly
through a range of legal services provision. Some have attempted to build in strategic links designed to bridge
the gap with the formal sector, but few have directly aimed to generate pressure for reform on the formal sector.
Pressure group activity to reform specific laws has been comparatively successful, as has Public Interest
Litigation (PIL).
On the Government side, the PRSP has prioritised reform of criminal justice and affordable justice for the poor,
including the reform of formal justice institutions and proposals to improve access to justice through informal
systems (GoB 2005a). Most crucially, the PRSP commits the Government to progress on separating the
judiciary from the Executive. This is in line with implementing the 2001 Supreme Court judgment known as the
judgement, which requires such a separation in line with the Constitution. Progress in
implementing has been slow, including legal and regulatory amendments necessary to support
its implementation (see ADB 2003).
A number of laws and legal practices, particularly relating to criminal justice, have been identified as
disproportionately affecting the poor and marginal: these include practices relating to bail, criminal
investigation, 'safe custody' and rape trials, and laws relating to vagrancy and public nuisance and the
dispossession of immoveable property (see UNDP 2002b). Between the preparation of the UNDP's Human
Security Report in 1998 and its publication in 2002, however, some key legal reforms occurred, including the
Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act (2000). Drafted in consultation with women's groups,
17
18
thanas
Masdar Hossain
Masdar Hossain
5.3 Reform initiatives
17 Twenty-six thousand new police are being recruited: River
police being introduced), 23 May 2006
18 Daily Star, 'Bangladesh police: A tale of admonitions and inactions', 4 January 2006
Shamokal, 'Chabbish hazar notun police niyog kora hoche: asche nou police' (
74 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
the Act increased the severity of penalties for violent crimes against women and children and redefined some
crimes and legal practices. While it marked progress in this area, it has been criticized for not going far enough
to tackle some existing provisions and practices that enshrine gender bias within the law, such as that of 'safe
custody' (UNDP 2002b). In reforming juvenile justice administration in 1974, the government enacted the
'Children Act'. The Act contains laws and provisions relating to custody, protection, trial and punishment and
treatment of juvenile offenders. Accordingly, three treatment institutions - (KUK)- were
established in Tongi, Konabari of Gazipur, and Jessore. Also, community-based (for example, probation) and
institutional based correctional services have been introduced (Zaman 2003).
To date, major donor-supported programmes for reform in the justice sector have focused on technical and
capacity issues. The ongoing Legal and Judicial Capacity Building Project of the World Bank, CIDA and DANIDA
(2001-2007) focuses on addressing capacity constraints of the civil court system, including case management
and training, and drafting legal reforms. Part of the programme supports creating a formal system for legal aid
to implement the Legal Aid Act of 2000 (ADB 2003), but has made little progress to date. Other reform
programmes mentioned above the Strengthening Bangladesh Police programme of UNDP and DFID
(2005-2007), which addresses recruitment and training, strategic planning, investigation, increasing forensic
capacity and improving work processes, and updating police procedures and regulations.
NGO interventions in legal advocacy and public interest litigation (PIL) are beginning to show an impact at the
national level. One of the most prominent organizations involved in PIL is the Bangladesh Legal Aid Services
Trust (BLAST), which initiates but also responds to requests for assistance with PIL and advocacy services.
Since 1996, BLAST has launched a number of key PIL cases, emphasising establishing the rights of women, the
poor and marginal (see Table 4).
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Table 4. BLAST: Selected Public Interest Litigations and their outcomes
Name and Year Facts at Issue Results as of September8 2005
Hem Ranjan Chakma v.
Bangladesh and others
(1996)
Illegal acquisition of Chittagong Hill
Tracts land without compensation to
ethnic minority landowners
Respondents ordered to show cause as to why
land acquisition should not be declared illegal.
Temporary stopping of land acquisition. Verdict
pending
BLAST and others v.
Bangladesh and others
(2001)
Challenging eviction of petty traders
living on railway pavements without
serving notice
Respondents ordered to show cause as to why
eviction should not be declared illegal. Temporary
stopping of eviction. Subsequently eviction
stopped by the government
BLAST v. Bangladesh
(2002)
Challenging the illegal forcible
eviction of slumdwellers in Cox’s
Bazar
No rule issued. Respondents decided against
eviction
Hasina Begum and others
v. Bangladesh and o
o
thers
(2003)
Challenging illegal forcible eviction of
3260 people from Vashantek Slum,
Dhaka
Respondents to show cause as to why the
eviction shall not be declared illegal
Nasrin Akhter and thers
v. Bangladesh (2003)
Challenging gender discrimination in
public sector recruitment
Case dropped after successful out of court
settlement
BLAST v Bangladesh
(2003)
Challenging eviction of 58 landless
fishing families in Jeleyapara Basti,
Chittagong without prior notice and
without arranging resettlement
Respondents ordered to show cause. Evictions
stayed until the case is disposed of
BLAST and others v.
Bangladesh and others
(2004)
Challenging forcible eviction of 1000
landless people of Agargaon Slum
without prior notice and without
arranging resettlement
Eviction was delayed from September 2004 when
the case was filed until a verdict allowing eviction
was rendered. The eviction commenced
September 2005 and the case is currently being
appealed
Nijera Kori and others v.
Bangladesh and others
(2004)
Challenging eviction of thousands of
landless people from the Chars
(riverbeds) of Noakhali
The Division bench stayed the eviction and
ordered the authorities not to disturb the landless
people for six months
BLAST entered as
intervener in:
Aysha Khanom and others
v. Bangladesh (2004) and
Farida Akhter v.
Bangladesh (2004)
Challenging reservation of seats for
women in parliament who are elected
indirectly by members of parliament
Respondents ordered to show why this
constitutional amendment reserving seats for
women was not unconstitutional
10 cases of various
members of the Chakma
tribe v.
.
Bangladesh (2005)
Challenging illegal eviction and
Section-3 of the Chittagong Hill tracts
(Land Acquisition) Regulation of 1958
All 10 cases had rule nisi issued and stay of
eviction until disposal of the case
BLAST v Bangladesh
(2005)
Challenging the illegal eviction of the
Sagorika Slum and enforcement of
fundamental rights under the
constitution
Rule nisi issued to show cause as to why the
eviction, harassment and intimidation in order to
illegally occupy the area should not be declared
illegal
BLAST v. Bangladesh
(2005)
Savar Palashbari Spectrum Sweater
Industries factory collapsed on
workers killing or injuring many
BLAST succeeded in getting compensation from
the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturing
Association (BGMEA) for the death and injury of
workers
Source: Keevil Harrold and Hassan 2006
76 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
While many are still pending, these PIL cases are improving the legal empowerment of poor and marginal
people in three ways: first, by raising public awareness and transparency about the abuses faced by these
groups; second, in some cases by succeeding in having discriminatory and illegal official actions overturned or
abandoned; and third, by demonstrating to Government and other powerful actors that marginal people can use
the law effectively to challenge abuses of their rights. This should act as a deterrent in at least some cases.
Another key area of BLAST's work is advocacy and working with Government to improve its legal aid provision.
Although the programme remained restricted because neither separate legal aid offices nor staff for legal aid
had been established in most districts, based on a rapid impact assessment, BLAST identified the following
achievements of its own advocacy work:
Fund allocations to the legal aid programme had increased, as had the utilization of these funds and the
number of cases receiving Government legal aid
The process of applying and being selected for legal aid had been simplified
Publicity and information about Government legal aid had improved in courts, Government buildings,
communities and jails
Access to justice usually refers to the ability of individuals to appear before formal state courts or otherwise
draw on the judicial and legal structures of the state. In principle, everyone is entitled to such access; in
practice, the gap between formal entitlement and actual access can be immense. Access to the formal justice
system is beyond the means of most poor people in Bangladesh because of exorbitant cost, excessive delays
and backlogs, and a lack of knowledge or resources (Siddiqui 2003).
Vested with a disproportionate amount of power and little
corresponding accountability, the police and the magistracy have become notorious for their susceptibility to
external political pressure. Their “capacity to punish” has become a prized resource, fundamental to party
politics and especially vulnerable to corrupt practices (Islam and Rahman 2002: 6).
Many NGOs in Bangladesh have promoted and facilitated access to justice for the poor, women, and other
marginalized populations in Bangladesh, through community legal service activities. These activities also
establish linkages between access to justice, governance reform, and poverty reduction strategies. Community
level activities include informal legal education and awareness raising, community counselling, legal aid,
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms based on traditional or other models of community-
based dispute resolution, and legal advocacy.
Activities by the big service-providing NGOs such as BRAC have focused primarily on the provision of legal
rights awareness, education, legal aid and alternatives to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. Other
organisations such as BLAST, Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) and Madaripur
Legal Aid Association focused on widening access to formal justice institutions among the poor and marginal.
This section explores whether NGO legal empowerment interventions are bypassing, competing with or helping
to reforming informal and traditional justice and dispute resolution systems, focusing on the extent to which they
move beyond legal service provision towards a rights-based approach to access through a formal system
bound by the rule of law.



5.4 Access to justice: are NGOs providing services or strategic linkages?
The geographical distribution of courts is
uneven, with the balance tilted toward urban centres. The rural poor have to bear travel and logistics costs that
pose additional burdens (Siddiqui 2003). The elitist and corrupt nature of the formal justice system ensures that
most people avoid contact with it (Wardak 2002).
shalish
19
19 This section is based on a number of recent reports and original research, including Keevil Harrold and Hassan (2006); Ali and Alim (2006);
Jahan (2005b).
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The performance of customary and NGO systems
Lack of formal legal basis.
Corruption and abuses of power
Gender bias
Conflict with human rights:
Informal justice systems resolve almost all types of conflict quickly and cost-effectively. However, while a
popular local response to a key governance failure, it does not fully satisfy equity considerations: most of the
key NGOs in the legal arena have collected case studies that reveal patterns of judgements favouring the
powerful and subjecting the voiceless to punitive measures.
Karim (1983) identifies the (society), as the primary arena, symbolically and organizationally, in which
local politics and governance are played out in the village. Senior members of leading lineages or village elites
head the , which acts as the court of first resort in resolving conflicts and disputes among villagers
through . Traditional and NGO-sponsored enable cheaper, easier and more
comprehensive access to justice. However, recent research shows that, despite gains made by NGOs in this
area, traditional remains better-known and is more likely to be used by village people (Jahan 2005b).
Ease of access and familiarity with the procedures and methods of the appear to be part of this
preference. In the system the village leaders personally and directly interacts with the litigant and plaintiff
to find a solution, through fines or punishments. They typically aim to maintain social harmony through the
verdict, whether the judgement rendered is biased or fair. Disadvantages of the informal system include:
There are three constitutionally controversial issues in : 1) the absence
of legal representation, which goes against the constitution; 2) the exclusionary and discriminatory light in
which women are not allowed to preside over courts, or participate in the proceedings; 3) the question
whether elites are appropriately qualified to preside over courts, as they lack training in law
: corruption can infect through solicitation of bribes and through
kinship and political influence (Golub 2003). If there is a power imbalance the judgment typically favours
the dominant group. Therefore, some solutions are arbitrary and imposed on disputants by powerful village
or community members. Such 'solutions' are based less on civil law than on subjective judgments and
biases (Khair 2002). Informal negotiation is less disruptive than formal judgement as it tends to minimize
subsequent revenge or retaliation. NGO interventions, in contrast, are relatively free from corruption and
abuses of power
: the traditional panel is usually composed exclusively of male members. Women are
particularly vulnerable to extreme judgments and face penalties (Khair 2002), characteristic of the class and
gender hierarchies of rural Bangladesh. In contrast, the majority of NGO interventions are in domestic
cases, frequently representing women against their husbands, so that the emphasis tends to be on justice
for women
social ostracism is not the most extreme version (or perversion) of
Amnesty International and other sources document numerous incidents of women - even rape victims -
being lashed or even stoned to death for violation of local norms. Often these abuses stem from
(religious rulings) handed down by local leaders who interpret or misinterpret (Islamic law) and who
belong to panels or otherwise influence them (Golub 2003). NGO tend to comply with
human rights as far as possible, and emphasise mediation between parties.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) also plays an important role for the poor. Minor disputes between husband
and wife or within the family are resolved appropriately through traditional dispute resolution and ADR. It is
notable however, that the political behaviour of the village leaders and other factors such as election, personal
somaj
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20 The political sociology and anthropology of rural Bangladesh suggests a formation of multiple clusters under the groupings of a (e.g.,
Bertocci 1970; Jahangir 1979; Thorp 1978; Arens and van Beurden 1977). See Adnan 1990 for a comprehensive overview of post-independence
village studies in Bangladesh.
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prestige and interest, status of the lineage, kinship, or patron-client relationships, influence the interaction and
relationships with one another in the village, and sometimes with external agencies thus affecting the village
justice system. In some cases the norms and values of the have been emphasized more than the actual
justice.
The available evidence suggests that NGO services have been more effective in terms of delivering appropriate
services than in generating pressure on the customary or formal systems. The wide reliance on NGO services
and traditional probably reflects the weakness of the formal system, and not necessarily satisfaction with
these alternative systems. One question that analytical work has yet to address adequately is to what extent
different forms of justice - the formal courts, NGOs, traditional and ADR - compete with each other,
making it possible for NGO dispensation of justice to create positive competitive pressures on other providers,
for example, to render gender-equitable judgements. While there is evidence of 'shopping for justice,'
suggesting competitive pressures might be present, it seems that some complainants or victims move between
different providers at different stages, often to appeal an unsatisfactory verdict. Many more, however, do not
perceive the systems as interchangeable, and for many, particularly the non-poor, NGO services would not be
acceptable or authoritative (see Ali and Alim 2006).
The dismal failure on the part of the judiciary to protect the interests of citizens, particularly the poorer
segments, has become the most notable manifestation of the institutional failure since the beginning of the
democratization process in the early 1990s. This has been brought about mainly by two factors: the lack of
political will for reform, and internal problems within police and justice organizations. The state appears to have
given up on ensuring accountability and security. New initiatives like RAB bring temporary relief but at very high
costs of extra-judicial killings; this points to a failure of a system where impunity, it is alleged, generates
popularity with the public. Moreover, RAB's success with its political, financial and technical resources further
undermines the institution of police. In the justice sector, many - especially the rural poor - depend on traditional
dispute resolution mechanisms maintained by local elites and alternative dispute resolutions initiated by NGOs.
As the chapter shows, the state of governance in the criminal justice system in Bangladesh is alarming. But,
perhaps due to the cohesive nature of Bangladeshi society and its residual respect for order and justice, the
system has not yet disintegrated. At this time more research is necessary to understand why and to answer
many questions generated by this chapter: Are crimes undetected because of the low reporting rate? Are
initiatives like Operation Clean Heart and RAB really effective? Has society adjusted to living in and taking
advantage of a police-less system? Or have institutions outside of state - the private security for the rich and
mob and informal justice for the poor - taken over?
somaj
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5.5 Conclusion
Local government has been repeatedly identified as a key strategic sector for improving governance and
development. This reflects acknowledgement by both Government and donors of its potential role in increasing
citizen participation and raising the quality and accountability of public services. Bangladesh's political context
poses several challenges for improved local government performance. Democracy has brought popular
representation to local government, but this has not been accompanied by effective powers to enact the local
popular will. Central government maintains substantial control over both rural and urban local administration.
Partisan influence rather than the functional and fiscal capacities of local government has deepened at the local
level.
This chapter discusses the structure and functioning of rural and urban local government. Primarily through a
literature reviews supplemented by primary research in urban local governance, it explores the autonomy of
local government; institutional arrangements for rural and urban local governance; the extent and effectiveness
of mechanisms for accountability and participation; and finally, service delivery. A notable point of this chapter is
a discussion of local government in both its rural and urban contexts. The two are, where relevant, contrasted
and compared. This approach is intended to reflect growing concerns about urban governance and the
continued 'rural bias' in public policy making in Bangladesh, particularly with regards to poverty reduction.
The Local Government Division under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives
(MoLGRDC) is responsible for rural and urban local governments across Bangladesh. Rural and urban local
governments are structured quite differently (see Figure 1), but with the emphasis on an overarching national
vision, reflected in Government's policy and practice, the concept of local government tends to be associated
with its rural version. In practice, the lack of a nationwide policy specifically for urban areas has detrimentally
affected the development of Bangladesh's cities. A case in point is the treatment of urban poverty in the PRSP.
The initial draft did not include a separate and distinct focus on urban poverty, even though research has shown
that the different needs and infrastructure capabilities of urban areas means that nationwide programmes
designed for rural areas typically do not serve the needs of the urban poor (Rashid and Hossain 2005).
Subsequent advocacy work ensured that the final PRSP included mention of urban poverty (GoB 2005a).
However, an urban poverty strategy is weakened in the absence of an effective urbanisation strategy.
6.1 Local government institutional arrangements: the 'unresolved wrangle'
1
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1 With the exception of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which has been granted a separate Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tract Affairs in order to protect
the political, socio-economic and cultural rights of the people of the region and provide a measure of autonomy to hill peoples.
Rural and urban local
governance
One of the most prominent concerns regarding both urban and rural local government has been the instability
of its regulatory framework. During 1996 to 2002, as many as 29 laws were passed by parliament, 25 of which
were amendments of previous laws on local government. Legislative changes have occurred in a hurried and
piecemeal manner and have not responded to critical issues such as authority, resource mobilisation or
functional autonomy (Siddiqui 2006b; GoB 2003). In addition, in many cases laws are contradictory: some
enhance autonomy, independence or responsiveness, while others do the opposite. Hobley (2003) argues that
although the policy and legal framework is supportive of elements of decentralised governance, the absence of
political commitment is notable.
Political circumstances have reinforced the instability of local government, leading to opinions shared by
officials that Bangladesh's political context has held back the country's development. Although city corporations
have experienced more stability than their rural counterparts, city officials have identified politics, rather than the
lack of resources, as the major barrier to development and poverty reduction in Bangladesh (Banks 2006a). In
almost all cases, local government reforms have been driven by long and short term political objectives
(Westergaard 2000; Zafarullah 1997; Rashid 2005).
Rural and urban local government perform similar functions, which can be divided into four categories: civic
duties, tax collection, law and order, and development work (Siddiqui 2006b; Siddiqui 2004). Both city
corporations and union parishads are required to form standing committees, to cover finance and
establishment, education, health and sanitation, works and building, water and electricity, social welfare,
accounts and audit and woman and child welfare, among others (Siddiqui 2006b, Siddiqui 2004). These
committees form the basic structure for planning, supervision and management of activities and play a large
role in coordinating issues and policies within their jurisdictions. However, the duties and responsibilities of both
rural and urban standing committees are not specified; functions are, therefore, discharged on an basis
which undermines their purpose. In rural areas, most standing committees formed are not functional for their
intended purposes. As Chapter Two documents, these are often used by local elites to control and access
resources.
The function and structure of local government
et al
et al
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Figure 1. Local government structure
Source: adapted from Ahmed (1999)
Administrative level Local government tier Number Average population
Average land area
(sq km)
Division --- 6 20.5 million 24,595
District Zila Parishad 64 1.9 million 2,250
Upazila (Thana) Upazila Parishad 460 250,000 300
--- Union Parishad 4,500 27,000 30
--- Gram Sarkar 68,000 1,500-1,750 2
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The structure of rural local government
zila parishad
upazila sub-district level
Union parishads
village level
Incomplete experiments with the structure, composition and functions of rural local government before the
return to democracy in 1991 have earned it the title 'the unresolved wrangle' (Siddiqui 2006b). Emphasis has
tended to shift from one tier to another with little rationale, and the return to multiparty rule has failed to bring
significant change in local government (Khan 2000a). Bangladesh is presently divided into 64 administrative
districts, governed by the following tiered structure:
At the district level, a consists of an executive secretariat with no elected members and little
functional purpose. A 2001 attempt by the BNP coalition government to politicise local government by
assigning a Minister responsible for every district was ruled illegal by the High Court in 2006
Representative bodies at the or existed under the Ershad regime (1982-1990),
but were replaced after the transition to democracy in 1991 by Upazila Development Coordination
Committees (UDCC). The upazila is the lowest administrative level of Government at which the civil
bureaucracy and line ministries operate. Headed by an Upazila Nirbahi (Executive) Officer, there is no
scope for representation or democratic practice: instead the UDCC is an example of deconcentration as it
coordinates, monitors and supports planning of development activities at the upazila level (UNDP 2002a;
UNCDF 2003). It has been widely argued that a democratically elected upazila level body would greatly
improve accountability and local-level oversight of local development (UNDP 2002a; Siddiqui 2006b)
, headed by a democratically-elected Chairman, are the core unit of rural local
government. There are between 9 and 10 unions per upazila. Democratic elections have been carried out in
union parishads since 1991. The chairperson is assisted by nine members, who are elected directly from
the nine wards. In addition, three female members are elected from reserved seats within the Union
Parishad, one for every three wards. The creation of smaller ward sizes, more wards and members, and
more female members in the 1990s have served to deepen representation and participation in local
government (see also Rahman 2001)
Two attempts have been recently made to establish functioning governance structures: the
1997 Act, which was halted under a High Court injunction, and the 2003 Act,
through which 40,000 institutions at the village level were created. Allegations of irregularities and political
manipulation in constituting the quickly emerged (Ali 2005). As selected bodies, these
typically gave supporters of the ruling party a platform. The High Court declared the 2003 Act
illegal and unconstitutional in 2006. Table 1 shows the size of territory and population covered by each tier
of the administration.

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Gram Parishad Gram Sarkar
Gram Sarkars
Gram Sarkar
2 See Crook and Manor (1998) for a comparative assessment of this experiment with democratic decentralisation.
Table 1. Size and population served by tiers of rural local government
Source: Adapted from several sources
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The structure of urban local government
zones wards
The six major cities in Bangladesh - Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi, Sylhet and Barisal - have been
awarded corporation status and are headed by City Corporations. Because Dhaka is overwhelmingly the largest
and most important city in Bangladesh, the example of Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) will be used to discuss
the structure of city corporations:
DCC is headed by a democratically-elected Mayor, assisted by a centrally-appointed Chief Executive
Officer, and heads of DCC's twenty departments
DCC's jurisdiction is split into ten and ninety
Zonal Executive Officers coordinate DCC staff and officials at the zonal level
Within each ward, Official Ward Commissioners are democratically elected to monitor development works
and manage municipal affairs. In addition to the ninety elected Ward Commissioners, an additional thirty
seats are reserved for female ward commissioners (Khan 1997b; Siddiqui 2004).
In addition to the six major city corporations, there are 271 pourashavas (municipalities) across Bangladesh, a
figure which has increased gradually in recent years. Although this trend is in line with the rapid urbanisation
and population growth experienced by Bangladesh, Ali (2002) argues that the growth of pourashavas is guided
by political rather than administrative considerations, with MPs and local leaders seeking pourashava status in
the expectation of receiving bigger grants for public works. Development assistance for union parishads does
tend to be lower than for their urban counterparts in terms of area and population (UNDP 2003). Although an
area must fulfil certain criteria to be considered a municipality, nearly 70 per cent of municipalities did not meet
these in the late 1990s (Ahmed 1999).
A serious constraint on both rural and urban local government is its dependence on central government. One
authority describes the relationship between national and local government as a 'clear patron-client relationship'
(Siddiqui 2006b). The limited powers, functions and jurisdiction of local government are all delegated by central
government, which retains a high degree of overall control in both rural and urban areas. This effectively limits
the autonomy and efficiency of local g . In city corporations the appointment by the centre of a Chief
Executive Officer effectively curtails the power of Mayors; in rural areas, Upazila Executive Officers and Upazila
Development Coordination Committees play a similar controlling role with respect to union parishads. The
extent of central control over local government is exacerbated by the limited nature of the resources available:
central government provides staffing allocations, specifies duties, and controls the ability to tax and review
budgets (Khan 2000a; Siddiqui 2006b; UNDP 2002a).
A major reason for highly-centralised administrative control lies in fear that increasing democratisation could
allow the opposition party to capture local government bodies. These fears may be well-founded: the loss of
Dhaka city to the opposition Mayoral candidate in 1994 has been identified as one of the contributing factors to
the decline of the BNP Government, which lost power in the next national election (Siddiqui 2004). Fear of
losing political ground in the vital space above the union level has been behind reluctance to democratise the
upazila and to concede power to Chairmen and Mayors.
The already limited autonomy and independence of local government is also increasingly being squeezed by
national-level political intervention at the local level. As Chapter Two describes, the growing strength of local

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3 The power initially devolved to zones has been gradually retracted back to DCC headquarters over time.
4 Pourashavas must have a total population over 15,000, a population density over 2,000 per square mile, and have over three quarters of its
population employed in industry other than agriculture.
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political party structures, namely local affiliates of AL or BNP, has in some contexts created a parallel source of
power and resources for development. Where local party organisations enjoy good relations with the local MP,
and he or she is capable of attracting resources to the area, these parallel structures can be more effective than
formal local government. In practice, there is likely to be an infiltration of the formal structures, particularly
through representation on the Committees, and support for or co-optation of Union Parishad candidates or
incumbents.
Although some have named the non-democratic selection of local government officials above the union level as
problematic, Ahmed argues that the primary consideration for improving local government efficacy should be
providing sufficient autonomy. The creation of independent, self-governed and functional local government
structures should take priority over promoting democratic elections (Ahmed 1999). Increasing the functional
autonomy of local government has been underrepresented in amendments to the local government regulatory
framework (GoB 2003; Khan 2000a; Siddiqui 2006b).
How accountable is local government, particularly to the poor, the marginal and to women? To what extent can
these groups participate in local governance or benefit from the services delivered by local government?
Questions of accountability and representation in local government have typically been addressed in isolation
from the discussion of development administration, as though the issues are separate or conflicting (Rahman
2002). Yet there is a compelling case for uniting the two, on the grounds that local governance needs to be
brought to the centre of the national poverty reduction strategy as:
A political and institutional process which can contribute to the required scaling up of the rate
of poverty reduction through enhancing the developmental choices available at the local level
and a better inclusion of all social groups in these choices (Rahman 2002: 1).
Participation by 'all social groups' in these decisions will necessarily involve more than the currently limited
formal processes by which the poor and marginal are currently represented - participation through the voting
process, and accountability exercised through voting options, at best. Direct participation in local government
has generally been the privilege of the rural rich: elected local government representatives have to date been
predominantly drawn from the local elite classes and closely responsive to their interests, as well as those of
their national counterparts.
The urban poor are in an even worse state by comparison. The formal rituals of political participation have been
denied to them until recently. Slumdwellers received the right to vote in municipal elections as late as 1994.
Since then, however, there have been signs of success in deepening the political participation of the urban poor
(see Box 1).
At the same time, interviews with selected Ward Commissioners indicate that progress in political participation
of the urban poor may be offset by the lack of autonomy of Ward Commissioners who are responsible to them.
As the most local representatives in urban government, Ward Commissioners play a key role in their ward's
development. The ward level is crucial for the implementation of participatory development initiatives, but this is
Khan 2000b;
6.3 Accountability and participation: how do women and the poor fare?
5
6
5 See Blair (1985) for empirical evidence demonstrating that land ownership and local government office have gone together in Bangladesh. See
Crook and Manor (1998) and Crook and Sverrisson (2001) on how the alliance between local elites elected at the upazila level and national political
elites effectively excluded the poor. For recent evidence and analysis on the consequences of the alliance between local elites and union parishad
representatives see Bode (2002); Hobley (2003); Rahman and Ahmed (2002).
6 Primary research for this chapter investigated the interaction of two Ward Commissioners with slumdwellers in their wards in Dhaka. Semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions were carried out in August 2006. See Banks 2006a, 2006b for further detail.
(2002)
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not combined with the strong decision-making authority necessary for to meet local needs. Ward
Commissioners argue that their accountability must be met with sufficient autonomy, including increased
powers, duties and responsibilities. The present structure of government within city corporations is such that
those who are accountable to residents have little power to make a tangible difference in their ward's
development. Highly centralised decision making authority within city corporations creates a culture of poor
transparency and poor accountability among major decision-makers.
NGOs are increasingly active in improving the participation of women and the poor in rural local government. An
important early example is the 1996 Local Democracy Education Programme funded by USAID, which in
collaboration with The Asia Foundation, BRAC and other implementing NGOs conducted voter education
programmes and post-election strengthening of the union parishad. This was seen to have had a positive
impact on the 1997 union parishad election, generating high voter turnout amongst both men and women from
poor households and facilitating the election of NGO member candidates (Siddiqui 2006b). While the evidence
remains somewhat fragmented and anecdotal, it strongly suggests a rising number of poor women and men
attached to NGOs standing for - and - winning local elections. In one instance, campaigns to support NGO
members to stand for election saw 44 per cent elected, while 41 per cent of the women that held reserved seats
came from poor or marginally poor households (BRAC 2004; ADB 2004). This is a particularly vital development
Box 1. Political participation and the urban poor: the BOSC experience
The Bastee Basheer Odhikar Surakha Committee (BOSC) has enabled the urban poor to participate directly in
urban governance. The BOSC network was initiated in 2000 as a non-violent replacement for the confrontational
protests that had previously characterised slumdwellers' resistance to their treatment by government. With the
support of the NGO network the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP), a network of local committees was
established in slums across Dhaka as a forum through which slumdwellers could organise and press their
demands upon local government. The purpose was to strengthen formal accountability mechanisms for the
urban poor, and incorporate slumdwellers into urban governance processes. Local committees work to solve
localised problems within their communities, and the network extends to address citywide problems such as
land tenure, resistance to eviction, and provision of services. Women are represented in equal numbers to men
on the BOSC committees.
As the most local representative, Ward Commissioners enable slumdwellers to access the DCC system of
governance. Ward Commissioners are in more direct contact with their poorer constituents, and can
demonstrate their willingness (or otherwise) to work for their welfare. The effectiveness of the strategy, however,
relies on the ability of Ward Commissioners to integrate poor communities into the wider governance structure
of DCC.
BOSC has initiated major successes. Active Ward Commissioners have played a major role in supporting
service provision from NGOs and Government. With assistance from CUP, Ward Commissioners and service
providers, slumdwellers have facilitated legal connections to electricity and water supplies. This has been a
major success: slums were previously unable to gain legal access because of landholding regulations.
Compared to slumdwellers without such external contacts, slumdwellers involved in BOSC committees are
politically aware and have regular contact with their Ward Commissioner, and are more optimistic and confident
about what can be achieved with respect to urban governance.
Source: Banks 2006a
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in local governance, and indicates strong potential for the political participation and empowerment of the rural
poor (Westergaard and Hossain 2002).
By contrast, election to urban local government positions is strongly dependant on the power and influence of
candidates, with a mixture of 'money and muscle' having characterised past elections. For a number of reasons,
NGOs have considerably less representation in urban slums and are less engaged in organising the urban poor
and in voter education. These factors may help to explain why to date, poor men and women have not
successfully stood as representatives in urban local government (Siddiqui 2004).
While the provision of reserved seats for women in local government has increased the formal presence of
women in political and institutional processes, women representatives still face many challenges that undermine
this formal improvement (Shamim and Kumari 2002; Khan 2000b; Siddiqui 2006b; for an up-to-date overview of
developments in women's political representation and participation, see Mohsin (2006)). The Local Government
(Union Parishad)(Second Amendment) Act of 1997 made provision for the direct election of three women in
reserved seats, with one female representative for every three wards. The growing activism of NGO activities in
voter education and campaigning has meant that a growing proportion of female representatives of local
government are poor NGO participants; there are indications that this is beginning to yield results in terms of
changing social attitudes toward women, and raising health awareness and living standards for poor women in
their constituencies (Mohsin 2006; ADB 2004). Similar provisions for female representation are made in urban
local governments, where one position of ward commissioner is reserved for women for every three general
seats. Ward commissioners elected to the ninety general seats select women into the thirty reserved seats. This
has led to a situation in urban areas whereby reserved seats tend to be filled by upper-class and well-connected
elite women. This stands in contrast with the progress made in representation of the poor in rural local
government.
The experience of reserving seats for women reveals several problems that the system has created. Structural
limitations within the reserved system have undermined the scope for the meaningful participation of women in
rural and urban local government (Mohsin 2006; Siddiqui 2006b; Uddin and Rahman 2003). Unlike their male
counterparts who are delegated specific duties, female representatives from reserved seats lack a job
description or role (CAPWIP 2002). As each female member from a reserved seat covers the same population
as members from three general seats, women must appeal to a larger group of constituents. This is particularly
problematic for women from large urban constituencies.
In both urban and rural areas, male representatives deliberately exclude women from standing committees,
meetings and decision-making processes (Mohsin 2006; Democracy Watch 2002; BRAC 2004; ADB 2004;
Omvetd 2005; Shamim and Kumari 2002; Uddin and Rahman 2003). One finding was that only 37 per cent of
women representatives were members of committees in union parishads; this membership was confined to
committees associated with social safety nets, family planning or social welfare (Siddiqui 2006b). Even there,
they can expect to play a minor role. Female representatives also face prejudice and hostility from male
colleagues, many of whom consider the presence of women ornamental, a 'favour' provided by government
(Mohsin 2006).
Two developments in recent years are likely to help stop gender discrimination in its more overt forms from
impeding women's participation in local government. The first is the 2004 High Court ruling against the Ministry
of Local Government policy of overtly discriminating against ward commissioners from reserved seats (i.e.
women) in city corporations. The Ministry had issued a circular that restricted certain activities to members from
general seats alone. Ten Khulna city commissioners had petitioned against this, with support from the legal
rights NGO, Ain-o-Shalish-Kendra, and other civil society organisations. While the ruling has been a signal
achievement for women's rights, legal victory does not always lead to practical change (see Box 2).
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The second promising development is NGO capacity building and gender training programmes designed to
improve the general capacity of local government officials to do their jobs as well as to sensitise them towards
the needs of women and the poor. These programmes have enjoyed considerable early success (see ADB
2004; BRAC 2004). BRAC's programme of capacity development for union parishad officials was originally
implemented as a pilot programme for ADB, which covered more than 1600 union parishad officials in 147
unions; its impressive achievements led BRAC to adapt and scale up the donor-led intervention as part of its
own social development programmes.
6.4 Institutional issues: finance and capacity
Institutional problems, namely a lack of finance and staff capacity weaken the ability of local governments to
function well (Ali 2002; GoB 2003; Siddiqui 2006b; Siddiqui 2004).
Both rural and urban local governments face serious financial problems regarding funding and revenue
collection capacity. One problem is the amount of direct finance available to local government bodies: the share
et al
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Box 2. ' ' Problems faced by women
ward commissioners in Dhaka
What is the problem with a female Ward Commissioner?
In theory, female 'official' ward commissioners are awarded the same roles, responsibilities and powers as their
male counterparts. In practice, women face serious obstacles in carrying out their duties.
The husband of one Ward Commissioner had been active in politics. Shortly after his election as Ward
Commissioner he was murdered as a result of inter-party politics. After her husband's death, the ward's
residents showed their sympathy and encouragement, and requested her to stand in her husband's place. She
explains that she was hesitant at first, but became convinced by the great support offered by the ward's
residents. Although the national political party to which she was affiliated was reluctant to support her
candidacy, she still won the seat.
One major obstacle she faces is from her political party. As a woman, she is kept out of any direct political
involvement. Although supported by high officials, including the Mayor and DCC, her political party provides no
support. Her party informed her that her position was secured only because of sympathy and her late husband's
good reputation. She knows that her party will not support her re-election at the forthcoming elections because
of her gender.
A second obstacle she faces is the prejudices of her male colleagues. At a meeting of Ward Commissioners,
she was told that as a woman, she would not be able to do a good job as Ward Commissioner. Her duties and
responsibilities, her male counterparts claimed, would involve working until 3am, which, as a woman, she is
unable to do. However, she claims that her colleagues 'work' till 3am for social reasons, not because they have
to. The work that she does, she further adds, is identical to that of male Ward Commissioners.
She is indignant about their discrimination against women in her position.
she asks. .
'What is the problem with a female
Ward Commissioner?' 'Any of the work that a male Commissioner does, a female can also do'
Source: Banks 2006b
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of ADP going to local government, including pourashavas, has been no more than 2 per cent (Ahmed 2002b).
A second problem is dependence on central government grants (Siddiqui 2006b; UNDP 2003; Siddiqui
2004). Although revenue collection is a mandatory duty of local governments, central government regulates
sources of income, taxation powers and grants. Central control over fund allocations, the budget review process
and the dependence of local governments on transfers severely undermines local government autonomy in
finance.
Internal sources of income for local governments include taxes, rates, fees and charges levied by local bodies,
rents and profits from properties, and payments for services. These sources provide a meagre sum and ensure
dependence of local bodies on central grants. Poor revenue collection capacity also ensures that only a fraction
of its taxation potential is realised in both rural and urban areas (UNDP 2003). At the union level, less than 50
per cent of total estimated revenue is collected, while in DCC, tax realisation was only around 65 per cent of
budget income in the mid-1990s (Atterhog 1995). In urban areas however, the internal mobilisation of revenue
continues to improve over time (Siddiqui 2005).
A major obstacle to improved revenue collection is outdated valuations of holding taxes, the main source of
revenue for local government (Siddiqui 2006b; UNDP 2003). In DCC, for example, holding tax has not been
revised for more than a decade, despite mandatory re-evaluations required every five years. Tax avoidance is
rife. Although recovery of arrears is provided for in law, the fear of losing electoral popularity provides a major
barrier to tax re-evaluation and enforcement (CPD 2001; Siddiqui 2004; World Bank 2002a).
The first half of the 2000s actually saw a contraction in union parishad resource mobilisation, as central
government transferred sources of finance to other agencies, including:
The right of UPs to lease out water bodies of 20 acres or less, which was given to the Ministry of Youth and
Sports
The right to receive and utilise a share of 1 per cent land transfer tax has been put under the jurisdiction of
the Upazila Nirbahi officer (UNO)
Before 2002, UP could lease out all (marketplaces) under the union for amounts up to Tk
100,000. MoLGRDC transferred this responsibility to the upazila, and the union parishad now only has the
power to lease one .
Annual development grants provide the bulk of external sources of income for local government. These were
previously channelled through upazila parishads, and distributed on the basis of population size, area, and
'backwardness' (levels of education, infrastructure, food security and health service access). However, instead of
following these selection criteria, fund allocation tends to be carried out in an manner (UNDP 2003;
UNCDF 2003). Prior to change in the system in 2004-2005, under the ADP block grant the union parishad could
only administer up to eight projects a year, not exceeding Tk 50,000 in total. At present, Government directly
allocates funds of Tk 200,000 annually to each union parishad, rather than through the upazila. Although in
terms of per capita expenditure this level of funding remains very low, it has introduced important principles of
'local discretion and accountability' (World Bank 2006b).
The heavy dependence on central grants limits the autonomy of local government to fund their local
development priorities (Siddiqui 2004). The centrally-appointed UNO still retains close control over fund
distribution and release. In addition, although funding allocations are shown in the budget as grants to union
parishads, in many cases higher levels of administration exercise the authority to utilise these resources. Each
union parishad spends on average only 20 to 25 per cent of total development expenditure incurred in a year,
while the rest is handled by upazila administration and other government agencies. Grants in the form of grain
for example, are used for various infrastructure and poverty alleviation projects prepared and implemented
centrally.
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What may be of even greater significance is the fact that the local governments have very little or no input in the
utilization of the rest of the ADP, which amounts to more than 95 per cent of development spending. Within each
union, the central government spends around 80 - 90 per cent more than is spent by the local union parishad.
This spending principally occurs through the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and the Public
Health Engineering Department (PHED) (World Bank 2006b).
A weak financing base and non-participatory development spending have been recognised by donors as core
features of the weakness of union parishads. In the 1990s a number of projects initiated performance-based
funding allocations to improve revenue and expenditure performances, such as JICA's Participatory Rural
Development Project and UNDP's Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project (see Box 3). The
Sirajganj project implemented performance-based funding mechanisms, including a performance grant
component whereby eligibility for funding depended on passing a participatory performance appraisal (GoB
2003; UNDP 2003). The World Bank's Local Government Support Project aims to develop accountable local
governments that provide services to meet community needs (World Bank 2006b). Future allocations will
depend on the performance of public representatives, particularly UP chairmen.
Box 3. Promoting decentralised participatory planning: the Sirajganj experiment
The UNDP Sirajganj Local Governance Project (SLGP) has assisted locally elected union parishads in the rural
Sirajganj district to adopt participatory decision-making and improve financial management and service delivery.
A project focus on pro-poor infrastructure delivery has been achieved through a strong emphasis on good local
governance. SLGP has illustrated that with assistance and the right incentives, local governments can perform
with efficiency, equity and accountability for improved poverty reduction and provision of locally-relevant
services.
Initiated in 2000, the SLGP was the first attempt to increase democratic and participatory decentralisation.
Having identified the limited ability of local governments to formulate and implement locally-relevant
development projects, the SLGP aimed to bring the formulation of participatory local development initiatives into
reach of local government. Two innovations were piloted: participatory local government planning and
budgeting and performance-based block grant funding of union councils. As well as performance-based
funding to incentivise improvements in governance, the regular funding provides local government a measure of
autonomy as well as regular and predictable budget allocations. Together, these provided incentives for local
institutional change and accountability, allowing union parishads to engage in medium-term and participatory
budgeting and planning.
Capacity building training was carried out for elected local government officials and community groups in 81
unions and 9 upazilas across Sirajganj district, relating to all aspects of improved service delivery. Following
these training programmes, UNCDF released funding for 523 small-scale locally-identified priorities. The project
introduced a performance grant component whereby eligibility for grant funding depended on passing a
participatory performance appraisal. As investments have been identified in relation to local need, great
achievements have been made in pro-poor infrastructure and service delivery. Stronger operations and
maintenance arrangements and higher quality works have been identified for infrastructure and services
provided under the SLGP, alongside the improvements facilitated in local governance.
Success in the Sirajganj district has led the Government to extend these innovations nationwide. A Local
Government Support Programme (LGSP) will now reach local governments right across Bangladesh. Building
on the Sirajganj project, Local Government Division issued a draft circular whereby well-performing local
governments will be rewarded with a 15 per cent bonus in ADP block grant, while others will face a
disproportionate reduction.
Source: UNDP 2002a, 2003; UNCDF 2003; UNDP Fact sheet
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Local government capacity
Capacity of local government personnel is another serious constraint: the entire process of planning, budgeting,
auditing and accounting in local bodies is weak due to inadequate personnel (Siddiqui 2005). The National
Institute of Local Government (NILG), the officially designated training organisation, itself lacks capacity to
provide the necessary quality of training or number of training spaces on courses. Even if used to full capacity,
NILG would not be able to train even 15 per cent of all union parishad members over the next five years. The
need for a comprehensive training and orientation programme has been widely noted (GoB 2003; Ali 2002;
Democracy Watch 2002; Siddiqui 2006b). As noted above, the ADB piloted one scheme to combine gender
awareness with general role orientation and training, and NGOs are increasingly involved in capacity building
for union parishad representatives, with a focus on training women.
The 10,000 strong DCC staff also lacks training facilities for new officers and for refresher courses, and no
efforts have been made to date to outsource the training (Rahman 1998; Siddiqui 2004). Other capacity
constraints include centrally appointed staffing quotas and salary levels: local governments are not able to
control staffing levels and salaries in relation to need and productivity (Siddiqui 2006b). There are therefore no
means through which they can increase the efficiency of staffing expenditures. In addition, many positions are
strategically appointed by Central Government. This limits the autonomy of local government and the staff's
accountability to local citizens (Lall 2005).
While World Bank (2002b) notes that service delivery within urban local government is in a comparatively better
situation than its rural counterparts, evidence suggests that service provision for the poor, particularly in health
and education, is comparatively worse in urban areas (Rashid and Hossain 2005; Katun 2000; Rashid
2004). Levels and constraints in the provision of services in rural compared to urban areas differ as evident
through discussion of the key issues below.
The governance crisis has been 'most blatantly exposed' in Dhaka's service provision (Siddiqui 2000). General
features of urban service provision in the case of Dhaka include:
Numerous autonomous service providers: Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (DWASA), Dhaka
Electricity Supply Authority (DESA), Titas Gas, and DCC itself (garbage removal) among others
Central government control over service providers undermines their autonomy. This 'vertical imbalance'
does not allow service providers to design and provide the most efficient local services (Lall 2005)
Institutional inefficiencies and stretched infrastructure impairs the ability of service providers to meet the
city's ever-increasing demand for services (see Siddiqui 2000; Siddiqui 2004)
Corruption and lack of responsiveness in service provision
Poor transparency and accountability that lead to high levels of 'unofficial' costs paid by service users
(World Bank 2002b)
Services are characterized by low user satisfaction rates: only three per cent of poor and two per cent of
wealthy households happy with electricity supplies in 2002 (World Bank 2002b). Twenty seven percent of
households were satisfied with their water supplies, and only 15 per cent satisfied with DCC's garbage
removal service (Lall 2005). A notable exception is supply of gas: 75 per cent of households were satisfied
with the supply after installation. The urban poor, however, have great difficulty in accessing gas supply
(Banks 2006a).
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With respect to the urban poor, the rural bias in public policy generally means they are excluded from service
improvements that benefit the rural poor; the Local Government Division's nationwide Pro-Poor Strategy for
Water and Sanitation is one example of a programme that bypasses the urban poor (Rashid and Hossain 2005).
A problem widely faced by the urban poor is that they typically do not own the land or legally lease the land on
which they live. Hence, without central government stipulating that they must make provisions for the urban
poor, there is little incentive for service providers to do so (Rashid and Hossain 2005). DWASA has been the
exception, providing water pumps in slum settlements in partnership with NGOs.
Another factor behind inadequate service provision for the urban poor is a lack of awareness of urban issues
among policy makers (Rashid and Hossain 2005; Banks 2006b). There have been signs of improvement,
however, particularly through the Coalition for the Urban Poor's involvement in the influential Dhaka Good
Governance Committee. Community-based organisations have supported poor slum households to install legal
electricity connections, and water and sanitation facilities have been provided to 252 slums (see Banks 2006a).
Two alternative channels of service delivery on which the urban poor rely, in the absence of official services from
Government agencies, are NGOs and However, sharing a rural bias with the Government, NGOs are
also comparatively less successful at reaching the urban poor. One reason is that the ever-present possibility of
slum eviction deters NGOs from investing in urban slum settlements. Banks (2006a) notes that slumdwellers are
highly critical of and hostile towards NGOs, and display frustration that NGOs have not been able to develop
services that match their primary needs. In a context where Government and NGOs fail, come in, who
bridge the institutional gap that excludes the poor from services. While the term is widely treated as
negative, they tend to play informal leadership roles at the local slum level, and to maintain connections with
officials enabling them to help their 'constituents' (Rashid and Hossain 2005; Rashid 2004). However some
services are provided through illegally tapping erratically-provided services, often at very high rates
(Rashid and Hossain 2005).
While water and electricity are available, although often illegally, access to health and educational facilities have
been more limited in urban slums. The urban poor are worse off even than the rural poor in terms of affordable
health care and nutritional programmes (see Rashid 2004; Perry no date given; GoB 2005a; Katun 2000).
The Urban Primary Health Care Programme (UPHCP) under the MoLGRDC and DCC, initiated in 1998, marked
a significant achievement in the provision of urban primary health services, bringing affordable and accessible
health services to the urban poor. The project is being implemented by the for-profit and NGO sectors, while
government plays a regulatory and enabling role. UPHCP has seen considerable achievements, including the
development of 42 health centres, pro-poor targeting, and good performance on immunization coverage (ADB
2005b).
While the national average of educational access has expanded, educational facilities for the urban poor have
been excluded, in part because official policy has highlighted an unwillingness to establish permanency
amongst slum dwellers. Educational facilities are inadequate for the urban population: an estimated 58 per cent
of six to seven year olds in Dhaka do not attend school, and dropout rates are twice as high in urban than in
rural areas (Rashid and Hossain 2004). Again, unlike in the rural context, NGOs do not fill this gap, and in some
cases NGO school fees are prohibitive for the poor (see Banks 2006a).
Service provision for the rural poor is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, but a general outlook for rural areas
is more positive. One of the main services provided by union parishads are safety nets during natural disasters
and crises, and the regular targeted food programmes such as the VGD and cash pensions for widows, the
elderly and the disabled. Another key service provided both formally and informally by union parishads and their
leaders is that of dispute resolution (Rahman and Islam 2002), as discussed in Chapter Five.
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In general, the rural rich tend to be more satisfied with the union parishad than the landless and the poor (see
World Bank 2002a). Pilot projects with donor support to improve service delivery through local government
include JICA's pilot 'link model', which aims to implement a mechanism to improve government services to rural
community by incorporating all stakeholders into local governance - union parishad, line ministries, local NGOs
and village committees comprised of 15-20 members selected by villagers (Kaida 2006). This project intends to
address problems of a lack of knowledge of the services available.
This chapter identifies the major constraints to local government efficacy in rural and urban areas. Bangladesh's
political context has restricted the efficiency of local governments through frequent amendments and
adjustments to the regulatory framework of local government, as well as a lack of functional autonomy.
Establishing a stable structure of local government has been difficult and local governments struggle to
formulate and implement participatory and locally-relevant development plans and service delivery in an
environment of central control. A lack of financial and staffing capacities have exacerbated local government
weaknesses. The recognition of structural and functional problems at the local level has led to a number of
donor-initiated local government reform programmes concentrating on performance-based funding allocations
to encourage revenue and expenditure improvements and participatory development initiatives.
Significant progress has been made in participation for the poor in rural areas. Local elections in rural areas
have brought popular representation of female NGO members, representing a new socioeconomic class in
elected local government officials. Although the poor are unable to match these successes in representation in
urban areas, recent advancements have been made in political participation for the urban poor. Yet the urban
poor remain underserved and under-recognised in service, delivery, healthcare and education, as well as in a
pro-poor policy of the Government, NGOs and donors.
6.6 Conclusion
Theory, evidence and donor policy agendas relating to governance all stress the vital role for a vigorous,
independent media and an active civil society. Media and civil society can create transparency, provide a
platform for marginal voices, and promote demands for greater accountability. In short, under the right
conditions, media and civil society can be expected to act as watchdogs of governance. Chapter Seven
explores the role of civil society and the media in attempting to promote better governance in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh's development NGOs are globally renowned for service delivery to the poor, but until recently their
impact on governance has been more muted. The chapter looks at how this situation has been changing since
the 1990s, as large service delivery NGOs and new activist civil society organisations have begun to address
local and national governance conditions. The role of the media in relation to governance is even more striking.
The thriving print and broadcast media are raising awareness about governance issues and creating new
pressures for more transparency and accountability. Critical concerns and constraints that both NGOs and civil
society and the media face are discussed in this chapter: the limits to autonomy set by financial dependence on
donors, businesses and in particular, government; fears of political reprisal; and problems of internal
governance. A preliminary assessment of the role of the mass print and broadcast media in promoting good
governance is based on literature review and original qualitative research.
Bangladesh provides an interesting exception to the wider global discourse on NGOs. While donors and the
development community may have become disenchanted with NGOs and civil society in other contexts during
the last decade, in Bangladesh, aid financing for NGOs and civil society has grown steadily. Their share of total
aid has risen from 14 per cent in the early 1990s to around 25 per cent since, and their share of grant aid has
increased almost four-fold since 1991 (World Bank 2006c). It is not a rising trend across the board, however:
one of the biggest donors to NGOs in Bangladesh, the UK government's DFID, saw the share of their
expenditure going to NGOs decline from 35 per cent in 2000 to 26 per cent in 2005. But in real terms, DFID
support to NGOs continued to grow over the same period (Verulam Associates 2005).
7.1 NGOs and civil society
The rise of NGOs in Bangladesh1
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Civil society and the media:
who will watch the watchdogs?
1 This section draws substantially on the recent World Bank study as the most recent
and comprehensive review of the evidence (World Bank 2006c).
2 See Lewis and Opuku-Mensah (2006)
The Economics and Governance of NGOs in Bangladesh,
Partly through donor financing, and partly through revenues generated from other activities, mainly credit, NGO
activities expanded dramatically across the country in the 1990s. A national survey of NGOs found that between
1995 and 2000 the proportion of rural communities with at least one NGO programme doubled (World Bank
2006c). There is now an average of 15 NGOs or NGO branch offices in each across the country. NGO
activities are overwhelmingly microcredit programmes, with education and family planning services the next
most common.
Why do Bangladeshi NGOs flourish in a less-than-favourable global environment? The reason may lie in their
unique scale, scope and impact. Bangladesh Governments of both political hues made space for NGO activities
from the 1980s (Smillie and Hailey 2001 for a comparative perspective), although at times reluctantly. Strong
donor support for NGOs from the 1980s onwards also helped secure their space. By the 2000s, Governments
seemed to find NGOs useful as a means of delivering services. This shows up in Bangladesh's PRSP, which
envisions a continued, significant role for NGOs, particularly in reaching the extreme poor.
For donors, NGOs appear to have been an effective means of delivering services to the poor in a context in
which Government would not or could not. In other words, Bangladeshi NGOs enabled donors to deliver aid
without working through Government. That Bangladeshi NGOs have disappointed less than NGOs elsewhere
owes much to scale: whereas NGOs typically develop approaches that work well on a pilot basis, many
innovative interventions remain small-scale. What Bangladeshi NGOs did differently was to develop
development models that could be 'franchised' and scaled up rapidly, cheaply, and effectively (see Zaman
2004). The global replication of the Grameen Bank microfinance model is well known, and BRAC has taken
parts of its model to other developing countries. NGO service delivery also created competitive pressures on
Government, with positive outcomes for public service delivery (White 1999; Hossain 2002).
This success is often contrasted with the activities of Government, and has overshadowed the fact that many
NGOs have in fact been working for Government: around 20 per cent of all external resources to NGOs are
currently estimated to be earned via contractual arrangements with Government from multilateral agencies
(World Bank 2006c). The significant role of Government in financing NGOs is not widely recognised, nor have
the implications been fully analysed. The most obvious implication is that NGOs that are financially dependent
on Government are unlikely to prioritise holding it to account.
At the same time as NGOs have been becoming more dependent on Government, the sector as a whole has
become less dependent on donors. The number of communities served by NGOs doubled in the five years up
to 2000, whereas aid to NGOs grew considerably more slowly (World Bank 2006c). In part this is because
NGOs, and in particular the bigger organizations, are increasingly earning their own incomes, particularly from
micro-finance. As the first BINGO study showed, while donor grants accounted for 94 per cent of the total
income of the 11 big NGOs in 1989-1990, this figure was only 35 per cent by 1998-1999 (Thornton 2000).
These very big NGOs increasingly dominate the sector's reputation, impact, and agenda. This is despite the fact
that there are around 2,000 development NGOs in Bangladesh, the vast majority of which are small or medium-
sized.
To a considerable degree, the continued expansion of the Bangladeshi NGO sector may be the effect of the
momentum generated by these big organisations. Early capital investments made by donors, investments in
human and managerial capital by the organisations themselves, and brand name advantages, which often
extend to commercial sector activities, are likely to have enduring effects. With these head starts the pioneers
have laid the foundations for their future growth.
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3 There are 480 , or sub-districts in total, each with an average population of 250,000.thanas
4 The BINGO studies were undertaken in 2000 (BINGO 1, cited as Thornton et al) and 2005 (BINGO 2, Verulam Associates). These were reviews of the
activities and impacts of the big NGOs funded by DFID Bangladesh who commissioned the studies.
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Closer engagement with governance since the 1990s
Another reason that Bangladeshi NGOs have continued to grow and receive external support is that they have
positioned themselves to engage directly with governance. Bangladeshi NGOs started by social mobilisation
activities to address local power structures in the 1970s - an approach abandoned early on with the shift
towards service delivery in the 1980s. Not all NGOs moved towards service delivery at this time, a notable
exception being Nijera Kori, nor did this entirely rule out advocacy activity. Aggressive responses to
conscientisation programmes; the conflict between microfinance and social mobilisation activities; and donor
pressure to demonstrate results supported a shift away from social mobilisation work. Service delivery
dominated the NGO landscape in the 1990s, but advocacy activities began to mature, particularly as a result of
the experience of the anti-Flood Action Plan (FAP) movement. Public interest litigation (PIL) scored early
successes at this time, in particular the 1994 landmark ruling that even individuals not directly affected could
represent an aggrieved community. Established service-delivery NGOs began to give institutional form to their
advocacy work at this time (e.g. Proshika's IDPAA; Ali and Hassan 2004).
By the mid-1990s, as Bangladesh settled into its new democracy, NGOs gained the confidence to tackle
governance issues. An initiative coordinated by The Asia Foundation with local NGO partners lobbied state
agencies, promoted transparency, and advocated electoral reforms and institutions to protect human rights.
Electoral process and slightly later, transparency and corruption, became prominent issues for NGO advocacy
activity to promote good governance (Ali and Hassan 2004). From these beginnings in the recent past, most
established service-oriented NGOs now feature advocacy programmes with a governance focus. Table 1
summarises the range of advocacy approaches used by some prominent NGOs.
Table 1. Advocacy methods among selected NGOs/CSOs
Source: Ali and Hassan 2004
* Proshika's lobbying was high during the Awami League government (1996 2001) but has been low since
Donor funding to this area appears to have stepped up considerably since 2000: funding from DFID, one of the
biggest donors to NGOs in Bangladesh, to BLAST, TIB, Manusher Jonno, Samata and Nijera Kori was set to
absorb nearly £36 million over the seven years from 2001, a significant portion of DFID Bangladesh's total
budget for governance (Brocklesby and Crawford 2005). However, the 'war on terror' is affecting Bangladeshi
NGOs too: DFID may be reconsidering their emphasis on 'demand-side' activity as they increasingly focus on
'human security' under these new conditions (Ibid.).
Manusher Jonno represents an experiment with aid modalities, as a funder of projects in the governance and
human rights area in its own right. This innovation would probably only have been possible in a context as
richly-endowed with professional NGOs as Bangladesh. Manusher Jonno has almost certainly stimulated the
growth and diversification into the governance domain of Bangladeshi NGOs.
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NGO advocacy on local governance
The growth of civil society activism on good governance
The 2000s saw an expansion of what could be categorised as rights-based programming among established
domestic service-providing NGOs such as BRAC, as well as international organisations such as the Save the
Children Alliance. In practical terms this has meant considerably greater investment in working with local
political structures - government officials, elected representatives and the semi-formal structures below - with
the explicit goal of improving the political, social and economic conditions faced by the poorest. While the
research literature is only beginning to document this important shift, it is clear that it has involved analytical
progress on thinking about the determinants and experience of poverty in Bangladesh. Improving governance
and the political environment is now seen as a crucial foundation to successful poverty reduction initiatives.
Part of this activity involves working directly with poor people, usually rural women, to;
Support their articulation of claims to services and resources (Samata and partners on land, BLAST,
ASK, Madaripur Legal Aid Association on legal service support)
Mobilise efforts to resist oppression by the powerful (famously, Nijera Kori's support for resistance to the
shrimp industry)
Create organisations that connect and represent the poor and enable cross-class coalitions (many,
including Proshika and BRAC's CFPR programme; TIB's Committeees of Concerned Citizens)
Support them as candidates for Union Parishad elections and for local committees (bazaar committees,
SMCs etc. Nijera Kori, Samata, BRAC, CARE).
Another strand involves closer work with local government, particularly Union Parishad representatives and
officials at the upazila level. Interventions at this level can be merely about disseminating information about
programme activities, but they may also involve more protracted coordination and local advocacy. External
reviews and some research have been done to show that a positive impact is being achieved through
engagement with local government. But overall, the relationship between NGOs and local government - which
evidence suggests may be warmer and more productive than that at the national level (see Verulam Associates
2005) - is still something about which little is known. This growing engagement represents a significant shift,
however, as the 1996 study noted that NGOs generally failed to engage with local
government (World Bank 1996b); a survey reported in the study similarly identified 'more
space' for collaboration (World Bank 2002a).
A second, more visible development has been the explosion of civil society activism on governance. Prominent
public discussion, research and dissemination activities aim to raise public awareness, stimulate public debate,
and create constituencies for reform. Media coverage is vital to this process. Research and policy analyses are
used as advocacy tools, and to influence policymakers behind the scenes. The undisputed leader of civil
society governance activism is the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), which marries intellectual credibility with
the weight of powerful supporters and a charismatic media presence. CPD publishes the annual Independent
Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), which frequently comments on the governance situation, as well
as other policy research outputs. Other prominent actors are TIB, which focuses on corruption (see Box 1),
Shamunnay, which has carved out a niche in participatory policy critique, and the Power and Participation
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Pursuing Common Goals
Taming the Leviathan
5 See Kabeer 2002 and 2003 on Nijera Kori, and for a widely read analysis of the political-governance context for poverty reduction as used by
CARE, see Bode (2002). Impact assessments undertaken for DFID Bangladesh in 2005 provide the most recent and comprehensive empirical
evidence of ongoing activity in this area. These were synthesised in Brocklesby and Crawford (2005). BRAC's CFPR programme has produced
some evidence about their work on 'engaging village elites', and their new advocacy programme. See Hossain and Matin 2006; Mannell 2005.
Samata has also started to produce research on its own activities through its National Policy Advocacy Cell (Samata 2003).
6 The IRBD format is the forerunner and arguably the model for all subsequent civil society efforts to provide a credible source of information
and analysis on which to monitor progress on development and governance. This includes the present report.
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Resource Centre (PPRC), which is known for its high quality, people-oriented research and analysis, including
inputs into Bangladesh's highly regarded PRSP document, and most recently, an annual report on governance.
Specialist and sectoral civil society groups have long made important contributions to the public discourse on
governance, including the activist lawyers groups and Nari Pokkho with its distinguished record of women's
rights campaigns. The Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE) produces its annual Education Watch reports
that monitor education sector developments. In late 2006, BRAC University's James Grant School of Public
Health will publish the first of an annual series of Health Watch reports, intended to play a monitoring role similar
to that of Education Watch.
While much of the visible activity of 'information civil society' focuses on engaging policy elites and powerful
individuals, the credibility of some of these organisations has depended partly on their capacity to decentralise
the debate about governance. Some have been more successful than others. Since 2003 TIB has been working
through its Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) to generate demand for improved accountability in its
'Making Waves' programme. CPD has established a nation-wide dialogue to involve citizens across the country
in a debate about the candidates for the 2007 election, and about the policy priorities for the new Government.
These activities appear to respond to a genuine demand to articulate voice and participate in public debate:
there is an atmosphere of excitement around these opportunities to monitor the activities of Government and
political parties.
Box 1. A thorn in the side of Government? The rise of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB)
The Bangladesh chapter of the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI) was started in 1994. Before
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) arrived on the civil society scene, corruption was skirted around
and accepted as a fairly marginal problem afflicting the upper levels of the bureaucracy and polity.
Between them, TIB and TI have altered this perception dramatically, and raised it to the level of a serious public
policy matter. Political will to tackle corruption has become an increasingly important condition of aid, with the
World Bank and others halting aid flows in response to concerns about corruption.
The first TIB in 1997 was seminal in the discourse of corruption in
Bangladesh, stimulating widespread public awareness and debate within civil society. TI's annual
(CPI) famously ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for five years,
and has taken the debate about corruption in Bangladesh into even the most remote corners.
In 2002, TIB shifted its emphasis somewhat with the launch of Making Waves', building on a pilot project in
Mymensingh to build a 'social movement' against corruption through Committees of Concerned Citizens
mobilised to demand and secure greater openness and honesty within government, among NGOs and the
private sector. A part of the Making Waves program, Youth Engagement & Support (YES) seeks to engage a
wider community of people in anti-corruption work.
Signs that TIB's activities were increasingly intolerable for Government came in 2006. The official response to
their most recent national survey on corruption was to deprecate its findings, question its methodology, and call
for a public investigation into the tax status of members of TIB's board and staff.
Survey on Corruption in Bangladesh
Corruption
Perceptions Index
'
' '
Source: TIB website; news reports
98 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
The impact of this civil society vibrancy has yet to be captured in a comprehensive manner, although donors'
commissioned evaluations on individual programmes exist. Three effects of what we have termed 'information
civil society' are discernible, if not quantifiable. First, awareness about governance issues has undeniably been
raised. The entire set of governance concerns and issues of relevance to Bangladesh - corruption, political party
regulation, the business climate, law and order, the politicisation of core public institutions, corporate
governance, public sector recruitment and accountability in service delivery - has appeared prominently on the
public agenda for discussion in the 2000s. Some of these debates have placed Bangladesh in international
comparative perspective, raising expectations of what is reasonable to demand in terms of improved
governance. In many instances, too, the general public now has access to credible information sources and
exposure to tools and approaches such as budget analysis and opinion poll surveys. There are signs that the
public discourse on governance reaches deep into society. The work of Shamunnay in facilitating poor people's
monitoring of the MDGs is relevant here, and debates about the budget have also attracted wide interest.
Second, in the absence of meaningful space for political opposition, information civil society facilitates public
scrutiny through the media. Third, there has been some engagement with policy and reform initiatives. This
seems to be the area in which impact has been least impressive, and will be discussed in more detail below.
While there is clearly a need for NGOs to fill the role of both critic and contractor, this gives rise to tensions: how
far can NGO advocacy extend given that working with Government is financially vital for many? There is also a
need to ensure contractual processes do not set up incentives for fake or 'briefcase' NGOs to emerge, as has
happened in the past. The World Bank study notes these tensions, and attempts to resolve them by arguing that
there should be no restrictions on NGO advocacy unless they engage in partisan politics (World Bank 2006c).
The proposed overhaul of the regulatory framework for NGOs is also expected to support this. But both are at
present hypothetical situations, and for the present, the tensions may not be resolved so easily.
It is increasingly plain that Government does not always choose to tolerate NGO activity of which it disapproves.
NGOs were first brought to heel when Gono Shahajjo Shongstha was taken over by Government in 1999,
apparently in response to concerns about financial misconduct and staff harassment. Earlier efforts to control
NGOs in the early 1990s had been prevented by donor intervention (see Hashemi 1995; Hashemi and Hassan
1999). A decade later, Government took more vigorous action on Proshika and other organisations, including
widespread and unlawful arrests of staff. The treatment of Proshika since 2000 has highlighted how far
Governments will go to unseat groups it deems to be dangerous or hostile. The 'war on terror' and its impact on
civil liberties in Western donor countries may have loosened any inhibitions in developing country governments
about dealing with opposition groups (Howe 2006). Donors have been less willing or less able to bring the kind
of influence to bear on the Proshika case that they did in the 1990s.
A recent development has been personalised counter-attacks which have sought to undermine the credibility or
integrity of the work or leaders of CSOs. While these imply that civil society activism can be painful for
Government, a concern is how far these personalised attacks might go: the treatment of Proshika senior
management is unlikely to comfort vocal civil society personalities.
Donors may be less willing to support NGOs in trouble with Government because those under fire - and NGOs
in general - are vulnerable to charges of bad internal governance. The debate on NGO governance has been
thoroughly scrutinised in the World Bank report (2006b). That study notes that questions have arisen from within
7
Issues and concerns
7 For an example of poor Dhaka slum residents discussing the budget see Banks (2006a); in a study of expectations of Government, Ali and
Hossain found unexpectedly high interest in, and discussion of, a range of governance matters among the poor in four parts of the country
(2006).
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politics, business, beneficiaries and donors about many aspects of NGO activity, including tax status, interest
rates and political activity. The World Bank study identifies a) improvements to the regulatory framework,
including for microfinance activities; b) establishing a process of NGO certification; and c) for NGOs to take
steps to tackle their own internal governance weaknesses - this is vital for the sector if it is to collectively defend
itself against such accusations. A recent outcome from the World Bank report is that Geneva-based SGS have
now set up their NGO certification programme in Bangladesh, in response to what they saw as an identified
need for their services.
The cause of good NGO governance is unlikely to have been furthered by the dissolution of the once strong
NGO apex body the Association of Development Agencies of Bangladesh (ADAB) in the early 2000s. The
conflict over Proshika contributed to the process, which has resulted in two apex associations: a smaller, weaker
ADAB and the Federation of NGOs of Bangladesh (FNB), now the chief authority over Bangladeshi NGOs.
One concern with respect to the approach taken by information civil society is that the reliance on the mass
media to pick up stories as the main means of dissemination may lead to a tendency to oversimplify and
sensationalise issues. This has its advantages in terms of raising awareness. The imperative of gaining a high
media profile is sometimes pursued at the expense of ensuring that research into governance issues is robust
and policy relevant. Chapter Nine contains a fuller discussion of this point. At the same time, even more sober
and cautious research such as Education Watch reports have rarely resulted in the kind of policy engagement
that yields incremental reform. Close engagement with official policymaking circles appears to remain unusual,
and it suggests that civil society and NGOs have chosen to emphasise the generation of demand for policy
reform while neglecting efforts on the supply side.
Finally, the recent explosion of 'unruly civil society', particularly militant Islamist organisations and spontaneous
single-issue protest groups (power sector, RMG workers), strongly suggests a gap between what NGOs and
CSOs have to offer, and what people appear to respond to and need. Research has highlighted ambiguous
feelings regarding NGOs, suggesting that like government, NGOs may not be responding to needs on the
ground. Banks (2006a) found signs of frustration and anger among the urban poor that NGOs were unable to
help them with their most pressing need - secure tenure; an opinion poll carried out by the BBC World Service
placed NGO staff at the bottom of the most trusted group, just above the police (BBC World Service). They may
not have disappointed their donors or even the Government all that much, but the same may not apply to the
general public.
That governance failures have become fully part of public debate testifies to the growing capacity of the media
in Bangladesh. The high level of popular engagement with political debate is remarkable in a country where half
the population cannot read and is too poor to own a television. Partly this reflects the growth and diversification
of the print and broadcast media since the return to democracy. Partly, too, there has been a qualitative change
in the media's treatment of governance issues: the debates and reporting are freer and more open, the analysis
is more pertinent and of a higher quality, and the packaging and presentation is more attractive to a wider
audience.
8
7.2 The role of the media
8 SGS is the world's leading inspection, verification, testing and certification company. See www.sgs.com for details.
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This much is evident to any newspaper reader or television viewer. However, the appearance of a flourishing
media conceals a number of serious constraints on its ability to address governance failures, including:
A regulatory framework with clear potential to muzzle the media
The lack of a legal requirement on the part of government to provide information and strong official
sanctions against public servants disclosing information
Constraints linked to ownership and partisan alignment
Weak internal governance and self-regulation
Financial and human resource constraints
Violence against journalists and involvement in corruption.
The discussion of the role of the media in governance is based on a review of the literature and interviews with
25 key informants associated with the industry. The publicly available data and literature on the media in
Bangladesh are limited, and the interviews were intended to help fill the gap in the literature and to support a
preliminary exploration of the role of the media in good governance.
After two decades of heavy-handed control under authoritarian rule, the 1990s witnessed a media boom. Many
popular Bangla dailies, including prominent titles like , , , ,
, and have emerged since 1991. stands out as a pioneer, combining
news, social action and entertainment in a way that appeals to readers and advertisers (Chowdhury 2005). Total
national circulation of daily Bangla papers is around 550,000; tops circulation, followed by
, (which has been in circulation since before Independence), and .
English language papers also emerged during the media boom. Launched in 1991, the Daily Star eventually
overtook the Bangladesh Observer as the leading English language newspaper (Chowdhury 2005). Apart from
the relatively new New Age, other English dailies trail far behind in terms of circulation. The Dhaka Hawkers'
Union, generally considered the best source of circulation figures, estimates readership for English newspapers
at less than 65,000. However, English papers tend to be read by policy elites, which make them
disproportionately more influential than their circulation figures suggest. As Table 2 suggests, the registered
print media is concentrated in Dhaka, but official figures on circulation and the number of publications is
contested (Bagchi 2002).
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A news revolution: the growth of the mass media in Bangladesh
Ajker Kagoj Janakantha Jugantor Amar Desh Naya
Diganta Samakal Prothom Alo Prothom Alo
Prothom Alo
Jugantor Ittefaq Amar Desh Naya Diganta
9 See Ali (2006) for a more detailed version of the present discussion.
10 Estimates for 2006 from the Dhaka Hawkers' Union.
11 See also Amader Shomoi, 'Over 250 Irregular Dailies Published From Dhaka', 17 August 2006
Table 2. Registered news publications, 2006
Source: Ministry of Information 2006
Frequency Dhaka-based Regional
Daily 183 225
Weekly 130 104
Fortnightly 34 3
Monthly 53 5
Quarterly 5 1
Total 405 338
101The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
Until 1990, electronic media consisted of the state-run terrestrial Bangladesh Television (BTV) and Bangladesh
Betar (Radio); these were the main source of news in rural areas. There have been some false starts in
deregulating radio, but FM radio stations are now starting. The mini-boom in private television in the mid-
1990s stalled when the popular Ekushey TV was closed down in 2002, officially because of licensing
irregularities, although it is widely believed that the prime motivations were political. The more recent growth in
satellite broadcasting has resulted in 10 satellite TV channels, including 2 foreign-owned channels. These new
channels feature news, talk shows and discussion programmes which regularly cover governance issues, with
guests from the worlds of politics, civil society, academia and business.
Circulation of the more than 700 registered news publications is officially 6.1 million, but word-of-mouth may
give some news a wider impact. The expansion of television viewing has been more egalitarian in
socioeconomic terms: a 2006 survey found that more than 65 per cent of adult Bangladeshis report watching
television at least once a week and 41 per cent of households owned a television, compared to only 8 per cent
in 1995. However, other viewing figures generated for commercial use suggest that the state-owned BTV
dominates; other channels are viewed mainly by middle and upper income groups, mainly in Dhaka. This
means that the media outlet to which the vast majority of the (poor rural) population has regular access is
Government-controlled.
The main consumers of print and broadcast media are thus the urban, educated middle classes. More recently,
the internet has enabled a large new affluent population to access the Bangladeshi media, namely the non-
resident Bangladeshis (NRBs). The large volume of letters from this group to the newspapers makes it clear that
this has increased NRB contact with local political events. Another related development has been the expanded
advertising market for satellite TV channels.
In theory, a vigorous, free media creates an informed polity, and an informed polity is better able to hold its
elected representatives to account, raise awareness about citizens' needs, and curtail corruption by increasing
the risk of exposure and spurring anti - corruption reforms (see Hudock 2003; Stiglitz 2002; Besley 2002;
Temin and Smith 2002; Kaufman 2006; also World Bank 2002d; Seleti 2000). However, these positive impacts
depend substantially on the media being; a) independent and free from over-regulation or undue pressure from
the state or commercial interests; b) able to produce sufficiently high quality news and information, including
coverage of government activity; and c) capable of reaching large sections of the population (Islam 2002; World
Bank 2002d; Krug and Price 2002; Owen 2002).
Perhaps because these conditions are rarely met, empirical evidence of the political and governance impact of
the media is limited (see Temin and Smith 2002; Dobrzynska 2003; Kuper and Kuper 2001; and Kim
2003). By contrast, in fragile states the media has been found to have negative impacts if it is not itself regulated
by a strong professional ethos and effective laws (Putzel and van der Zwan 2005). It may contribute to a cycle of
bad governance by focusing on the negative aspects of politics, and creating cynicism about policy and
governance (Patterson 1996; Cappella and Jamieson 1996). Where the media is overly commercialised it tends
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12 Daily Star, 'Going Back to the Radio Days', 20 June 2006; Daily Star, BANGLADESH: 65pc watch television, survey reveals', 10 September
2006; New Age, 'Radio Gets Final Order', 23 June 2006
13 Holiday, 'ETV Journey Halted', 30 August 2002
14 Figures from the Ministry of Information (2006).
15 Daily Star, ''BANGLADESH: 65pc watch television, survey reveals', 10 September 2006
16 These figures are commercially sensitive and cannot be cited in detail here. Similarly, the AC Nielsen survey is a commercial syndicated
product, from which reports and outputs are available for purchase.
17 Recent research into political attitudes by Ali and Hossain found BTV to be the major influence on poor rural people's political knowledge.
The phrase, the 'tide of development' (a favourite of the 2001-2006 government) was widely repeated, and poor women were particularly
impressed by having seen the Prime Minister personally hand out goats to poor women like themselves (2006).
102 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
to focus on appeasing business interests at the expense of providing information in the public interest
(McChesney 1999; Besley 2002).
How do these theoretical approaches and conditions fit the Bangladesh case? The brief review below attempts
to set out the issues for further exploration.
One view within the media is that the existing strict laws of contempt are so rarely implemented that there is
almost total freedom to 'print anything about anyone' with impunity. That this perceived freedom is at least
sometimes exercised is likely to do little to reverse the anti-media bias among public figures. But while the
media is certainly freer than in the 1980s, the claim to de facto freedom should be treated with caution. One
reason for caution is that media personnel are likely to be caught between the desire to represent themselves as
intrepid champions of free speech on the one hand, and the wish to broadcast the restrictions under which they
operate, on the other. Raising awareness of these restrictions, however, is important to further an agenda for
regulatory reform. A second reason to treat such claims with caution is the number of prominent libel cases
currently in court which suggest that sanctions are at least occasionally applied. Their very unpredictability may
be an effective constraint on what can be safely printed or broadcast, particularly given that the judiciary are not
well known for their independence from Government.
There is a constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press in Bangladesh, but this is subject to 'reasonable
restrictions' (Article 39; See Ali (2006) for a detailed description of the relevant laws and regulatory practices
governing the media). While they may not be regularly exercised, the set of regulations in place can be used as
an effective muzzle should government so choose (Kabir 2003). New legislation under consideration will require
previously licensed operators to acquire new licenses, as well as increasing controls over television broadcast
content. A significant curb on the media in recent years has been the Government's authority to issue and
revoke licences; this has at times been exercised, most notably in the Ekushey TV case(see Box 2). Satellite
television licences also appear to have become part of the political spoils of Government in recent years. While
Bangladesh is not unique in its burdensome regulations or in the use of media licences to reward political
supporters, research could valuably put the Bangladeshi regulatory framework into a comparative context,
identifying where it is most onerous and whether and where scope for reform exists to improve the impact on
governance.
et al
The governance of the media
The regulatory framework: can the watchdogs bark?
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18 Daily Star, 'Stringent Electronic Media Law Planned', 11 January 2004; Prothom Alo, 'Government Can Shut down TV Channels, Restrictive
law on the way', 5 August 2006
Box 2. Ekushey TV: appropriate legal sanctions or muzzling the media?
Ekushey TV, Bangladesh's first independent television channel, went off the air in August 2002 after losing an
appeal against a High Court decision that its licence to broadcast was illegal. The case against ETV - as it is
popularly known - is widely believed to have been driven by political concerns. The ETV experience highlights
the nature of political sensitivities about the broadcast media.
The only private free-to-air licence was placed for tender, and transferred to ETV by the initial winner. The
channel was first given the rights to broadcast in 1998 during the Awami League government. It soon gained a
large audience share, undoubtedly because it presented an entertaining, highly professional alternative to the
only other terrestrial channel available to the majority of Bangladeshis the state-run Bangladesh TV (BTV). ETV
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Reporting on governance failures is not helped by the lack of a legal obligation on the part of Government to
provide information to the public. Instead of a Right to Information law, there is the Official Secrets Act 1923 and
Section 19 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1979 which provides effective legal coverage - indeed,
makes it a duty - for public officials to deny the press information. The central importance of this right is
increasingly recognised, and is the subject of a new civil society campaign, which has created a draft Right to
Information law.
Industry insiders identified legal reforms on the right to information as only part of the battle: after legislation
there would remain a massive task to change the secretive and anti-press norms of the bureaucracy and
Government. The entire state machinery has only the Principal Information Officer at the Ministry of Information
as a conduit for official information. Getting information about newspaper circulation figures from the Ministry of
Information was an illustrative exercise in its own right. As no doubt is part of its intention, the situation sets up a
major obstacle to reporting on corruption, as it blocks access to concrete information that might support
otherwise flimsy accusations. Yet the impression this results in - of a Government somehow above and immune
to media debate - is inaccurate. As Chapters four and five show, public servants identify the media as one of the
few external influences on the way they view and enact their public roles.
Because Government is officially silent the news media rely on 'embedded' journalists who cultivate sources
within the state and political parties over time. It is widely acknowledged within the media that these
relationships are often personal in nature, and result in only the news that friendly sources would like publicised.
originated with the same media business group that started the Daily Star and Prothom Alo newspapers, and
shared the same progressive secular values. While ETV management consistently argued that their news
coverage was non-partisan and balanced, the main political opposition, at the time, the BNP and Jamaat-e-
Islami, disagreed.
The first ruling against ETV came during the caretaker administration in September 2001, when the High Court
ordered a temporary halt to ETV broadcasts just before the general elections. The case against ETV was filed as
Public Interest Litigation, but by a group of individuals widely believed to be connected to the BNP or Jamaat-e-
Islami. The basis of the case was that there were irregularities in the licensing process and that ETV lacked the
proper documentation to broadcast. In March 2002, ETV lost the case, and on August 29 2002, the appeal
against the ruling. ETV went off the air in August 2002, returning terrestrial broadcast media to the monopoly of
the state-run BTV.
Whether or not there were serious irregularities in the ETV licensing process has been highly contentious within
public debate. What does seem clear regardless of whether the licensing process was meticulously correct - is
that the closure of ETV was not so much in the public interest as it was in the interests of political actors, willing
to use the courts to achieve political ends at the expense of media freedom.
ETV was issued a new licence, for satellite transmissions only, in 2005 and resumed broadcasting in December
2006.
Sources: Daily Star, 'From BTV to ETV and Beyond', 15th Anniversary Special, 4 February 2006; BBC, 'Blow for Bangladesh Broadcaster' 26
September 2001; BBC, 'Private Bangladesh TV goes off air', 29 August 2002; Reporters without Borders, 2002, 'Government Closes Leading
Ekushey Television after Government Withdraws Licence' (accessed on http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=3586); Daily Star, 'Bangladesh:
ETV gets fresh licence', 13 April 2005
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Naturally, this raises questions about accuracy, omissions and over-friendliness. Ironically, the governmental
culture of secrecy results not only in concealment of dubious official activities, but also ensures that the
Government's achievements are buried. Enabling Government to advertise its achievements through the more
credible non-state media may provide some leverage in improving this situation.
The media's role in good governance is identified as having been impeded by its own subjugation to and
reinforcement of the partisan political culture (Alam 2005). This reduces the media's credibility, offers it little
protection against being maligned by governments and oppositions alike and reduces the scope for impartial
analysis of social, economic and political issues. This is especially true of the print media, as the electronic
media's superficial news coverage and lack of analytically-based programming gives it the veneer of impartiality.
As is the case in many countries, print and broadcast media outlets in Bangladesh are owned by members of
the political and/or business elite. The key informants interviewed for the present research generally agreed that
media outlets are established for a number of reasons, including the promotion and protection of business
interests, the promotion of political ideologies and parties, or the provision of political favours. Media observers
and insiders agreed that media oulets set up purely for journalistic purposes or to serve the public interest are
the fewest in number.
The interests of owners are likely to have an impact: some reporters interviewed mentioned feeling limited by
the political connections of their owners. Pressure to conform was at times clearly spelt out, and at others
hinted. More serious concerns apply to the large 'underground media' that is questionably funded and probably
serves merely to act as channels for money laundering and other illegal activities. But most media owners face
conflicting interests: the benefits from providing political favours and serving business interests are greater than
the public interest benefits of governance coverage, and reliance on advertising revenue, particularly from
Government, is likely to contain aggressive reporting on governance failures. Where newspaper owners own
other businesses, reportage of corruption implicating rival business houses may also lack credibility if it is seen
as an attempt to discredit competitors.
This does not mean that the leading examples of outlets set up with business or political motivations are entirely
without journalistic merit. Observers and commentators note that the past 15 years has seen the rise of relatively
unbiased commercially competitive print and electronic media outlets. One view from a private satellite channel
was that the boom in private satellite TV channels has been politically sponsored, so that these channels would
not be overtly partisan, but would play it safe so as not to alienate their political benefactors. But there are also
signs that some publications and TV channels are developing a type of journalism that is largely independent of
party bias, informative and attractively packaged. The public has reacted positively, and these products enjoy
high circulation or viewing figures. This raises the hopeful possibility that media independence will increasingly
be recognised as a commercial advantage; this should reduce the extent of media capture by business and
political interests and therefore also of public cynicism (see also Besley 2002; Cappella and Jamieson
1996).
Self-regulation of the media is weak, afflicted in particular by partisan bias, as noted above. Professional
associations are also partisan, with at least four major associations of journalists and two owner organisations,
all split along partisan lines. An independent and functional Press Council is generally understood to be vital to
Ownership and partisan alignment
Watching the watchdogs: weaknesses in the internal governance of the media
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105The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
reform and improvements to the industry, but in the present context it is dysfunctional because of the lack of
political will and the lack of pressure from partisan professional associations to invigorate it. There is therefore
no institutional basis for setting rules for good conduct by the media, nor to defend it against attacks. In fact,
successive governments have used the Press Council to muzzle the press, including recent steps to increase its
authority to admonish and censure the press.
Finally, a public service ethos is not widely found in the Bangladesh media. A senior manager from a private TV
channel interviewed for this research noted that the objective of electronic media is to make profits, and that any
public service role is incidental. As will be seen next, staying profitable does impose serious pressures on the
media, and there are inevitably many examples of bad practice. But the current healthy state of leading media
products indicates that there is a section of the industry that is oriented towards being more accountable and
independent.
The positive influence of the media is critically influenced by its quality (Islam 2002). One view is that the more
suppliers, the higher the quality of the product is likely to be, and the more pressure there is likely to result on
the state (World Bank 2002d). At the same time, however, there tend to be large economies of scale in the
media, favouring bigger firms (Owen 2002). There are many suppliers of media in Bangladesh, particularly in
print, and the sector is growing fast. But whether or not this amounts to effective competition, and how it
impacts on governance reporting are issues about which little is known. Both the literature and key informant
interviewees agree that there are serious human and financial resource constraints on performance, including:
Lack of technical capacity for political and economic policy analysis and resources for investigating
corruption and long-term stories
General lack of qualified staff and training opportunities
Intense competition for advertising revenue, as the number of media outlets is high, and market saturation
is a serious threat; reliance on government advertising is a factor limiting the extent to which the media can
operate as critic (Anam 2002)
High costs of production, with a tax on imported newsprint of 25 per cent (75 per cent of newsprint is
imported), and taxes and surcharges adding 57 per cent in total to production costs
Slim profit margins, or none. A media analyst estimated that there were between 5 and 7 profitable print
media products, and even fewer if political support in the form of government tenders and advertisements
is taken into account
Poor pay: only a handful of newspapers pay the official minimum wage for journalists, and there are
concerns that the abysmally low remuneration is an incentive for corruption and the abuse of influence.
One implication of weak incentives for journalists to behave professionally is that corruption is more likely.
Stories of corruption within the media are common - although naturally, they are rarely published or broadcast.
Some within the electronic media report that favourable coverage can be bought. Newspaper crime reporters
are widely believed, including by their colleagues, to be paid off by crime syndicates. Political reporters are
often reported to be too close to their sources. The print media faces a particularly serious problem at the local
level, where regional correspondents are kept on retainer by major newspapers and are paid by the number of
column lines that are published monthly. The monthly retainer is nominal, as is the rate per line printed. In some
cases, the retainer is not paid unless a certain number of column lines are printed per month. Local
correspondents thus compete with each other to provide news that will be printed. This gives rise to a culture of
sensationalism, in which local correspondents are regularly embroiled in local politics and business -
particularly land-grabbing and crime - where they may be paid-off for squashing stories.
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A related concern is the recent rise in violence against journalists, which has sometimes resulted in death. In
interviews with journalists and media personnel, respondents shared the view that violence against journalists
was concentrated in districts with high rates of organised crime, suggesting that the problem was linked to
involvement in local disputes (Ali 2006). One implication of this is that violence towards journalists needs to be
understood within the wider context of criminality and corruption, and cannot be limited to the political context
within Bangladesh. There are incidences of violence against journalists related to the political climate, however
(see Chapter Five), which can inhibit investigative journalism, and holding public officials and parties to account.
Assessing the impact of the media on governance is no easy task. The review of the limited available literature
and the key informant interviews suggest that impact occurs in three ways: through creating a platform for
political debate; by raising awareness about politics and the policy process; and by exposing corruption.
A major success of the media is the creation of a space for political debate which is still absent from within
institutionalised political forms. This space is literally present in the growing number of televised political
debates and chat shows in which opposing political groups are pitted against each other and/or engaged in
debate with civil society representatives. These, as well as opinion pieces and columns are a growing means by
which politicians broadcast their ideas to the people. A senior opposition politician commented that while it is
regrettable that politicians are more likely to be on talk shows than in parliament, it still helps people when they
come to make their political choices. Journalists complain, however, that the political establishment is
inconsistent in their attitudes to the media: willing to appear on televised debates and talk shows, but apparently
not feeling obligated to provide meaningful commentary when approached by the press.
The relationship between the media and civil society is a second positive institutional development. The print
media has created a space for civil society representatives, mainly the 'think tanks', research organisations and
NGOs discussed above, to raise public awareness about governance issues, as well as to engage in debate
regarding socio-political concerns. The relationship between civil society and the media is symbiotic. A few
leading dailies have been particularly prominent in partnering with civil society and NGOs on awareness
campaigns and programmes, including issues such as acid violence, help for the blind, improving education
and legal aid. It may be these partnerships that have led to the notable rise in reporting and coverage of human
rights violations. While there are concerns that some reporting of human rights offences and extra-judicial
killings could be politically motivated, it is widely viewed within the media as a positive development.
There is not universal approval of the new social activism of the media. One criticism is that some newspapers
have been co-opted by particular NGOs or CSOs and now act as their mouthpiece. There are concerns that
such close relations preclude investigation of corruption within NGOs or investigation into the action of the
foreign donors who fund them, and that NGOs should be subject to the same scrutiny as political actors.
Media coverage of policy and government activity has been less successful. The view of observers and insiders
interviewed for the present report includes the following: media coverage of governance failures is episodic,
often politically motivated, inadequately followed up, speculative and Dhaka-centric, unless local events occur
of sensational news value. Policy analysis was widely felt to be inadequate, although analyses made by civil
society representatives tend to feature prominently. There are exceptions and successes, from which lessons
are learned. For example, the recently proposed uni-track education system policy attracted tremendous
The impact on governance
a) A platform for debate
b) Coverage of politics and the policy process
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attention from the media, which generated a great deal of information and critical debate, leading to its eventual
abandonment. The key points to emerge from the interviews regarding coverage of politics follow:
The most informative coverage was felt to be of government performance on law and order, agricultural
production, inflation and price rises, energy, corruption and local government problems. However, this
coverage was irregular and 'seasonal', and felt to lack sustained analysis
Investments were being made to improve political analysis and coverage, particularly in light of the
upcoming elections. Coverage of the opposition mainly focuses on confrontational politics, partly because
the opposition historically prioritises these activities over engagement with parliament or its shadow
government role
Reflecting Parliament itself, Parliamentary debate coverage tends to be superficial and rarely issue-based.
Private television companies are excluded from Parliament, and all media from the Parliamentary Standing
Committees. This means that information about these proceedings must rely on leaks
Electoral reform is covered in detail, in particular the heated debates concerning the Caretaker Government
and nomination process. The nominations process, particularly at local levels, was considered to be a
particularly important weakness in media coverage
Reporting on internal party governance issues has recently been stepped up, although there are concerns
about how much is partisan.
Corruption appears almost daily in the media (Box 3), which is widely accepted to have played the key role in
turning this problem into an issue for collective national discussion. Some within the media feel that coverage of
corruption has improved, but others view corruption reporting as little more than entertainment, as there is little
expectation of serious impact in terms of sanctions. There are concerns about the accuracy and motivation of
reporting, and of the methods employed to investigate corruption. Corruption reporting is characterised by its
source-based and speculative character. Because of the resources required, adequate investigation is rare, as is
follow-up reporting. In part, the weaknesses of the reporting reflect the nature of the subject: corruption is
difficult to prove. But these weaknesses also mean that many corruption stories do not have much impact.
Most corruption reported in the media is in the public sector, usually resulting from a lack of due process in the
awarding of licenses and procurement. Media observers note, however, that it is rare for grand corruption in the
upper levels of the administration to be reported on; instead it is mid-level malfeasance that receives attention,
which suggests that a degree of scapegoating occurs. By contrast, the Government's use of constitutional or
parliamentary apparatus for political purposes is not generally reported by the media. Private sector corruption
is increasingly receiving coverage, although there is a tendency for some newspapers to report on alleged
corruption in companies that own rival newspapers, or in opposition parties or competitors. This type of
reporting lacks credibility. One exception is that massive private sector corruption in the form of bank defaulting
has been reported on widely (see Box 3). However, media personnel noted that corruption within the media and
NGOs is generally ignored. Coverage of NGO mismanagement and internal governance issues tends to be
made only when the situation reaches scandalous proportions; in the case of Proshika, when it had already
been officially accused of political activity. Many seem to regard NGOs as 'untouchable' because of their pro-
poor image, and it was felt that there was insufficient questioning of their business activities or of the impact of
their development programmes. It was also noted that many NGO leaders have close links with the media
industry.

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7.3 Conclusion
NGOs and civil society have been justly identified as vital actors in the pursuit of better governance. The media
has been rightly credited with exposing cases of corruption and dysfunctions of the state to the public, thus
raising awareness and generating public debate about governance. Together NGOs and media put pressure on
political actors and the state, and help to generate demand for their greater accountability to the citizens.
However, as NGOs are becoming less dependent on donors and more on government financing, and as the
media continues to rely on government advertising and controlling business interests, their capacity to address
governance issues may be weakened. There are concerns that fears of reprisal from the Government or the
ruling party may influence decisions over what the media decides to cover and, for NGOs, which activities to
pursue. Both sectors also suffer from weak regulatory frameworks and poor internal governance, and neither
has been exempted from the taint of partisan affiliation. Questions for future attention include whether watchdog
integrity can be maintained under weak regulatory conditions; and how trust in public institutions can be built in
a climate of cynicism and a discourse of bad governance.
Box 3. Exposing corruption
The restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991 was accompanied by the birth of new newspapers
promising new standards in reporting, including in the exposure of corruption.
Bad debt in the state-owned banks was one of the first issues tackled by this new media. Over several years, the
print media uncovered new evidence and unmasked bank defaulters, analysing the web of vested interests
involved in systemic corruption in the banking sector. Some of the reporting was slanted along political and
business lines. But media scrutiny was sufficiently powerful to result in stringent loan rescheduling conditions
and to stimulate other financial sector reforms.
A milestone case was when a major Bangla daily tabloid published evidence that Justice Latifur Rahman had
had long telephone conversations with ex-President Ershad. He had been accused and subsequently convicted
in a graft case, in which Rahman had been the judge. The Chief Justice found a prima facie case in the media
allegation of corruption against the judge, and referred the issue to the President for inquiry by the Supreme
Judicial Council. Justice Rahman escaped the probe by resigning in November 2000.
In 2002 a dubious deal by the Bangladesh Telecom and Telegraph Board (BTTB) in awarding the long-awaited
submarine cable project was exposed. After a major English-language weekly exposed and consistently
reported on the issue, the deal was finally scrapped for a more transparent one. Also in 2002, another major
corruption scandal erupted. Another major English-language weekly found 'widespread procedural irregularities'
in a private container terminal project in Chittagong which had been approved by the Prime Minister's Office.
Following the report, the project was cancelled.
By the mid 2000s, corrupt practices were being exposed on an almost daily basis. In 2005, two major Bangla
dailies reported that the State Minister for Energy, AKM Mosharraf Hossain, had received an expensive car as a
present from Niko Resources, a Canadian energy company blamed for the Tengratila Gas Field Explosion in
January of that year. Following the reports, the Minister had to step down. It was one of the first instances of a
ministerial resignation in light of corruption reporting by the media. However, he remains an MP for his party.
Most recently, in 2006, a national English-language daily exposed the corruption in a major government project
to give machine-readable passports. The project eventually failed to get approval.
Sources: newspaper reports and key informant interviews
In a context in which mass poverty is understood to coexist with bad governance, as is the case in Bangladesh,
it is appropriate to attend to the impacts of governance failures on poverty reduction and the poor. The
approach taken in Chapter Eight is to explore the governance dimensions of social policy and social protection,
with a focus on corruption and accountability in education and social safety nets. Corruption in the social policy
and social protection sectors has received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, partly as
evidence of the negative impact of bad governance on the poor. By focusing on accountability this chapter
represents an attempt to understand why Bangladesh has performed well on social and poverty indicators while
maintaining its poor standing with respect to governance; a phenomenon recently called the Bangladesh
'conundrum'. The chapter briefly reviews the evolution of policy in safety nets and education in the 1990s,
followed by a discussion of corruption and accountability in each sector. While it is clear that leakage is a
problem across the board, the evidence on corruption is uneven: overstating the extent of the problem in some
areas, and ignoring it in others. The chapter also reviews key accountability relationships governing social
safety nets and the education sector, indicating that in the absence of formal accountability institutions, informal
pressures have often effectively compelled service providers to supply at least a minimum level or quality of
services.
Bangladesh has made impressive gains on a range of indicators of social and human development and poverty
reduction, particularly throughout the 1990s. These include steady declines in the prevalence of poverty;
expanded access to and gender parity in primary and secondary schooling; rapid declines in infant and under 5
mortality rates and a narrowing of the rural-urban gap in infant mortality; declining fertility rates; high
immunization coverage; and some reduction in the severity and extent of malnutrition (see BIDS 2001; World
Bank 2003b).
While poverty, vulnerability and deprivation remain severe and widespread, progress is being achieved at a
pace that allows Bangladesh to compare favourably on some indicators with other countries in the region, and
with others at comparable levels of economic development (see Table 1). Bangladesh also compares well
against countries with similar income levels in terms of the proportion of public spending going to the social
sector (World Bank/ADB 2003b).
8.1 The paradox of bad governance with good social sector performance
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Social protection and
social policy
Indicators
(based on most recent
estimates)
Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka Low-
income
countries
Poverty headcount ratio
at PPP$1 a day
36 35.3 17 5.6 ..
Under 5 mortality rate
per 1,000
69 87 98 15 122
Ratio of girls to boys in
primary and secondary
education
106.8 88.5 71.1 102.8 87.2
Primary completion rate 73.3 80.9 .. 98.2 71.5
% of population with
access to improved
water source
75 86 90 78 75.1
Fertility rate (births per
woman)
2.9 2.9 4.5 2.0 3.6
These creditable achievements in a country once infamously termed the, 'basket-case of the world', have been
ascribed to the direct effects of social service provision and to the growing share of public spending that went to
the social sectors through the 1990s (Sen 2000; BIDS 2001). But Government cannot take sole credit for
achievements in service delivery. From the 1980s, social service provision in Bangladesh became increasingly
pluralist, with Government policy permitting - or at least not thwarting - a major role for service-providing NGOs.
By the 1990s Bangladeshi NGOs were working directly with the poor and very poor in a wide range of health,
education and social protection programmes. In addition to their own substantial contribution to social sector
service delivery, they have also played a role in complementing, partnering and catalysing Government service
provision (see World Bank 2006c for an overview). Crucially, the pluralism and scale of NGO activity supported
the expansion of social services, particularly to the hard-to-reach poor.
The major policy thrust in the 1990s was the expansion of service provision, particularly to the poor. These
policies were popular, and in many respects politically easy to bring about. One concern has been the rising
corruption that has accompanied the flow of new resources that enabled improvements in service provision.
The significant social policy challenges that remain are rooted in problems of governance, and include
improvements in service quality. This may be a more difficult and complex challenge involving reorienting
professional incentives and organisational cultures within the public sector to make teachers, doctors and local
officials more accountable and more responsive to the people they are supposed to serve.
1
2
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Table 1. Social sector performance compared to the region and low-income countries
Source: World Bank 2006a
1 Recent analysis indicates that while public spending on primary grew in absolute terms since 2000, it remained stagnant as a proportion of
public spending (Al-Samarrai 2006).
2 The best example of a social policy problem requiring deep-seated reforms is maternal mortality, on which progress has been slow, and on
which faster improvements require more far-reaching institutional reforms within the public sector. The evidence suggests that Bangladesh is not
likely to meet this particular Millennium Development Goal.
HIES 1991-2* HIES 1995-6 HIES 2000 HIES 2005**
Poor (consuming
less than 2205 kcal
per day)
.. 48 44 ..
Food
intake
method Extremely poor
(consuming less
than 1805 kcal per
day)
.. 25 20 ..
Poor (upper poverty
line)
59 53 50 40
Cost of
basic
needs
method
Extremely Poor
(lower poverty line)
43 34 34 25
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8.2 Social protection
The proportion of the population living in poverty is estimated to have declined by 9 per cent over the 1990s: by
2000, 50 per cent of Bangladeshis were defined as poor, down from more than 70 per cent during the 1970s. By
the same measures, the proportion of the extreme or absolute poor also declined by around 9 per cent,
reaching 34 per cent by 1995-1996. It then declined by less than a percentage point over the period up until
2000 (World Bank/ADB 2003b). More recent figures suggest that this pace of progress may have accelerated in
the 2000s, with poverty estimated to have reduced by nearly 10 per cent between 2000 and 2005. Other
estimates are that around 20 per cent of the population was extremely poor in 2000 (see Table 2).
Recent analysis of poverty dynamics in Bangladesh shows that while poor households can increasingly help
themselves out of poverty, the circumstances which start the downward slide are frequently beyond their control
(Kabeer 2004; Sen 2003). Social protection measures remain vital in such a context, to support the poor and
vulnerable in crisis, and help them to manage risks and prevent deeper impoverishment (Shepherd 2004).
In Bangladesh, informal protection has been provided through local patronage politics and semi-formal
institutions of governance (see Blair 2003; Hossain and Matin 2006). But there is clearly a case for public social
safety nets to cover more of the extreme poor, and to reduce excessive economic inequalities which incur wider
social costs and impede pro-poor growth (see Ravallion 2003).
et al
Successive Governments have demonstrated commitment to the provision of public safety nets targeted
towards the poor and vulnerable. There are sound historical reasons why mass food insecurity or famine is
closely associated with political legitimacy in Bangladesh. The 1974 famine was the key event: one of the
lessons donors and officials drew from that episode was the urgent need for targeted food aid programmes to
protect the poor (see Atwood 2000); at the same time, the political elite learned that famine symbolised
political failure of the most unambiguous kind. Despite strong political incentives for large-scale targeted
programmes since the 1974 famine, only comparatively recently have such programmes dominated the social
protection agenda or its budget.
et al
3
Table 2. The reduction in income-consumption poverty over the 1990s (%)
Source: BRAC 2004 except figures for 1991-1992; * from World Bank/ADB 2003b; and ** from BBS 2006
3 For the perspective of a contemporary Government insider and observer of the famine see Islam (2003).
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The pro-poor shift towards targeted programmes, away from the relatively privileged middle class former
beneficiaries of rationing, came about with the return to multiparty democracy in 1991. Important innovations in
targeted food aid programmes since then have occurred under Governments headed by both major parties.
However, there is no simple relation between political commitment to safety nets for the poor and democracy; it
was under unelected military rather than popular democratic rule that the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)
programme was established in the 1970s. Democratic governments have been as likely as their authoritarian
predecessors to be criticised for tolerating systematic corruption in food aid programmes as a means of
rewarding their supporters.
More recently, targeted safety nets received heightened prominence in the PRSP, as one of four 'Strategic
Blocks' for tackling poverty. The PRSP stresses that this is not a "relief mentality", but a "net-and-ladder"
approach to addressing risk, providing social protection specifically to support a process of graduation out of
poverty. The portfolio of social safety net programmes was assessed as robust, responsive, and innovative,
although problems were identified, including lack of coordination, limited coverage, inadequate resource
transfers, lack of attention to gender and finally, targeting and leakages. Minimising the number of
intermediaries involved in the distribution of safety net resources, and improving their accountability were
flagged as issues worth considering (GoB 2005a)
Depending on their definition, there are 27 safety net programmes in Bangladesh at present. Table 3 lists the
types of programmes categorised as social safety nets in Bangladesh; Annex Table 1 provides a more detailed
description of the larger safety net programmes. In terms of budget and coverage, the two education
programmes are by far the largest. Whether or not these fall under the category of social protection is, however,
another issue. As both will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, neither is looked at in detail here.
However, the Food for Education (FFE) programme, replaced in 2003 by its cash version, the Primary Education
Stipend Programme, will be discussed below in the section on corruption and leakage, as it has featured in a
number of key discussions about food-based safety net programmes. The next biggest programmes are the
Rural Infrastructure Development Programme (Food for Work or FFW), and Vulnerable Group Development
(VGD), with respective beneficiaries of around one million and 500,000 annually and respectively, and budgets
of US$40 million each. FFW and another large safety net programme, the Rural Maintenance Programme
(RMP), both focus on rural infrastructure and employment for the vulnerable poor. In the case of FFW, this is
focused around the relief of seasonal unemployment. The RMP, an 18-year partnership between the
Government and CARE, targets poor women exclusively.
4
4 Key accounts of the process and politics of food aid reform are in Ahmed 2000, in particular chapters by Chowdhury & Haggblade and
Attwood (both 2000).
et al
et al
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Table 3. The main types of safety net programmes in Bangladesh
Allowances in the form of cash transfers for the most vulnerable poor, including elderly, widowed and
abandoned women, and the disabled poor, were established in 1997. While the Old Age and Widows
programmes were established under the Awami League Government of 1996-2001, its BNP-led successor
retained and extended their coverage, and added the Disabled Allowance. While the cash transfers involved are
small (around Tk 180 or US$ 2.75 per month), the regularity of these cash payments make them a valuable
source of support for these groups (see Begum and Paul-Majumder 2001). More than one million elderly,
around 100,000 widows and another 100,000 disabled poor people receive these allowances each year.
Aside from whether or not they are sufficiently well-funded to reach enough of those who need support, the
impact of safety nets is largely a function of a) how effectively they target the vulnerable and/or poor groups in
greatest need; and b) the extent of corruption and leakage in the distribution of the benefits. These issues will
be looked at next.
This section reviews some of the evidence relating to corruption and accountability in the public safety net
system. The common assumption that corruption is widespread in official safety nets has historical roots in the
tradition of theft from the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS): grain dealers, local political leaders and
administrative officials were all understood to have enjoyed an impressive cut from the rationing programmes in
this system. The level of corruption was so high that when rationing programmes were finally withdrawn in
response to evidence of extensive corruption and pressure from donors, there was no protest from the
supposed beneficiaries, who had in fact been benefiting very little (see Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000;
Adams 1998). Until its reform in the early 1990s, features of the PFDS supported and institutionalised
corruption: for example, in 1989 MPs were brought in to select the grain dealers to participate in (rural)
rationing, which they took as a clear signal to use the resources for “patronage and graft” (Chowdhury and
Haggblade 2000: 173).
Corruption, leakage and the politics of safety nets
5
pally
5 Corruption was reportedly rife in the relief programmes of the 1970s (see Hartmann and Boyce 1983).
Type Programme
Old Age Allowance
Widowed and distressed women allowance
Cash transfers
Disabled Allowance
Primary Education Stipend Programme (formerly Food-for-
Education)
Conditional cash transfers
Stipends for Female Secondary Students
Rural Maintenance Programme
Food-for-Work
Public works or training based
cash or in kind transfer
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)
Gratuitous relief
Emergency or seasonal relief
Test Relief
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Research-based evidence of corruption in the current system of targeted public safety nets is mixed, however.
The source of the most influential evidence of extensive corruption and leakage in safety net programmes is the
World Bank. The other significant bodies of research are those by IFPRI, whose findings are of considerably
more modest levels of leakage, and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS). Below debates
about two programmes are briefly reviewed: Food for Education (FFE) and Vulnerable Group Development
(VGD).
The short life of the FFE programme began in 1993, when Government launched the programme to transfer
wheat to targeted poor households whose children met a set of primary schooling conditions. The aims were to
use up food aid resources saved through rationing programmes abolished the previous year, and to encourage
poor households to send their children to primary school. FFE was also intended to improve the targeting of
Government food subsidy programmes, an intention shaped by IFPRI research that had shown that local
authorities were effectively able to target the poor (Ryan and Meng 2004). Accordingly, the ward Primary
Education Committee and School Managing Committee (SMC) were jointly responsible for the selection of poor
beneficiaries at the local level. The selection of the poor unions, within which all schools that met a set of criteria
were to be eligible, took place in Dhaka. At its peak, the FFE reached more than two million students across 112
upazilas.
Bangladesh's FFE was initially championed as an innovative demand-side approach to increasing access to
school. But concerns about corruption and leakage rose, leading to two reforms. The first was the
implementation of a recommendation in a BIDS report on the programme which was to distribute FFE resources
through grain dealers instead of school authorities. This occurred in 1999, despite previous experience that
grain dealers were usually closely implicated in corruption in safety net programmes. The second reform
followed from a World Bank study which reported that as much as 75 per cent of resources allocated to the FFE
did not reach households, implying losses to corruption or leakage. Most of this leakage, it was suggested,
could be attributed to “considerably lower” numbers of beneficiaries than the records indicated (World
Bank/ADB 2003b: 75). This finding was initially made public in 2001, and has been highly influential and a factor
behind the Government's decision to monetise the FFE in 2002 (Ryan and Meng 2004).
The evidence on leakage is mixed, however, as Table 4 shows. In particular, two studies by IFPRI researchers
reported lower estimates of leakage; these are, however, less well-known and appear to have had less influence
over policy than the higher estimates. The issue of differences in findings of leakage and that of the policy
impact of research will be looked at in more detail below.
Food for Education (FFE)
6
7
Table 4. Estimates of leakage in the Food for Education (FFE) programme
6 It may have been grain dealers associated with opposition political parties rather than grain dealers in general whom the Government aimed to
undermine through the 1991 food aid reform. In any case, it is clear the reform was not a success: an IFPRI survey in 2000 found that 92 per cent of
FFE beneficiary household members preferred distribution by SMC members to grain dealers.
7 World Bank/ADB 2003b; Murgai and Zaidi 2005.
FFE leakage estimates Source
7% Ahmed and Billal 1994 (IFPRI)
30% BIDS 1997
up to 75% World Bank / ADB 2003b
14-17% Ahmed and del Ninno 2002 (IFPRI)
115The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)
The Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) Programme emerged as a food aid-supported development
programme targeted at very poor women in the mid-1980s, after a brief incarnation as a relief programme,
starting in 1975. It is a national programme, reaching some 500,000 women per year. Participants selected by
local government representatives take part in an 18 month programme involving a monthly wheat ration and
training, accompanied by savings and income-generating inputs, principally from NGO partners. Evidence
indicates that VGD has been effective in terms of targeting the poorest women and in helping many 'graduate'
from relief to participation in mainstream development (Halder and Mosley 2004; Hashemi 2001).
There have also been concerns about leakage and corruption in the VGD programme, and a number of studies
have been conducted to assess this problem. Findings indicate that there are four main ways in which
corruption occurs in VGD: a) at the local supply depot (LSD) (see Akhter 2004; del Ninno 2000); b) when
Union Parishad leaders sell grains to cover transport and other costs (Mannan and Paul-Majumder 2003; Akhter
2004); c) by forcing beneficiaries to pay for programme membership (over 8 per cent of beneficiaries
claimed to have paid in Akhter 2004); and finally, d) short rations, when recipients receive less than they are
supposed to. All studies have shown short rations to be the most significant source of leakage. The World
Bank/ADB (2003b) assessment of the VGD, part of the same study that assessed leakage in the FFE noted
above, found that leakage through short rations was as much as 41 per cent; the IFPRI leakage survey and the
survey by Webb (2002) found shortfalls of around 21 per cent, and del Ninno estimated a shortfall of
around 15 per cent (2000).
Interestingly, the more in-depth research shows that much of the leakage identified in the VGD cannot be
attributed to simple corruption on the part of officials. First, some of the reported shortfall in rations is explained
by cheating by local wheat traders, who have an interest in reporting short rations because they both weigh and
sell grain for the beneficiaries. Second, beneficiaries who are required to share their cards are often required to
do so with other poor people. Third, a portion of the grains (around 7 per cent according to del Ninno 2000) is
distributed to other poor people who gather at the union distribution point on the delivery day. So while there is
significant deviation from officially prescribed distribution practices within VGD, much of the leakage may not
amount to corruption. Overall, del Ninno calculated that around 94 per cent of grains went to poor women, even
though they were not all selected beneficiaries.
Accountability relationships are understood be important determinants of the extent of leakage and corruption,
but there is little evidence specifically relating to accountability in public safety nets. However, the general
literature on local political elites sheds some light on how accountability pressures work in practice. It is clear
that while local politics does not provide a perfect or even a good mechanism for accountability, it provides a
rough and ready means of delivering some services to the poor. A review of the literature suggests that, at its
best, the VGD programme works because formal and informal accountability pressures help keep local
politicians in check. Formal pressures include regular WFP monitors and the close scrutiny of beneficiary lists
by NGO partners; the impact of these should not be underestimated. But there are also informal political
pressures that mitigate against unbridled corruption and overt leakage. These include that:
As VGD programme areas contain high proportions of food insecure households, beneficiary selection
takes place under close scrutiny by the community
Sympathies for particular groups of the poor may reinforce the moral case for fair selection (see Matin and
Hulme 2003)
et al
et al
et al
et al
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8 Undertaken as a background paper on 'The Politics of What Works', for the Second Chronic Poverty Report (forthcoming). The VGD case is made
available as a background paper on the CPRC website.
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Proper implementation of programmes for the poor may make good political sense in rural areas with a
high concentration of poor people. Even local leaders who are willing to divert resources from road-building
or construction projects may seek to demonstrate good leadership by delivering resources targeted to the
poor (see Hossain 2005)
Local political leaders face such consistent pressure to provide for the poor that they may use official safety
net resources as patronage to reward their poor supporters.
This last point merits further discussion. The process of selecting VGD beneficiaries is widely reported to be
biased and corrupt (see Mannan and Paul-Majumder 2003; Bode 2002; Hobley 2003; Matin and Hulme 2003);
however evidence also suggests that VGD is effectively targeted to poor women (BBS 1992; WFP 1999; del
Ninno 2000; Webb 2002). These apparent contradictions can be reconciled when it is recognised that the
scale of need dwarfs provision, so that while bias may operate in the selection of beneficiaries, there are enough
eligible poor people to ensure that those who do benefit are mostly eligible. But many more who are also
eligible - perhaps even 90 per cent - have to be excluded (World Bank 2003a; Matin and Hulme 2003). This
means that political competition and selective patronage can carry on without formal corruption or bias against
the poor. Problems chiefly arise if the same poor people are included repeatedly, and less well-connected poor
people are left out. An implication is that VGD - and other safety net programmes administered by local elites -
are firmly part of the local political-patronage system, so that more stringency and less partisan bias in selection
processes might actually reduce the political incentives that currently operate to ensure (some of) the poor
benefit. Another implication is that beneficiaries have a greater chance of joining the programme if they are
vociferous, making it politically costly to exclude them. Interestingly, VGD participants tend to be those who
actively lobby for inclusion (see Matin and Hulme 2003; Akhter 2004).
One issue that merits further discussion is that of the policy influence of research into corruption and leakage.
The review of the literature conducted for the present chapter found that there were concerns about the
methodology used in a highly influential piece of research by the World Bank, discussed above with reference
to the FFE and VGD programmes. It is worth noting that all research methodologies have their weaknesses,
particularly in complex areas like corruption. However, it is necessary to highlight the risks inherent in such
research, and the need for caution in research that is intended for public policy purposes. In the case of the
World Bank figures, these high estimates of leakage have been extremely influential, featuring prominently in the
decision to monetise the FFE programme, a reform the World Bank had been urging for some time. The
estimates even feature in the PRSP (GoB 2005a). The overall point is that high estimates of leakage have been
extremely influential, while evidence which is likely to be more robust and which shows far lower levels of
leakage is less widely known and has apparently had less impact on policy.
The World Bank now appears to have accepted that their own research on this issue was flawed, recently noting
“mixed evidence” of leakage from safety nets (World Bank 2006e: 22-23). They have not, however, publicly
disclaimed the high estimates. Instead, and despite the weakness of their evidence base, the World Bank has
recently recommended new safety net reforms. These include “outsourcing” the delivery of safety net
programmes, possibly to the private commercial sector (World Bank 2006e: 37). It should be a matter for
concern that such major reforms are being recommended on the basis of such weak evidence.
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9 Staff on BRAC's CFPR-TUP programme, which aims to target an even poorer group than one reached by VGD, consider the difference between the
two ultra poor groups to be that those who do not get selected for the VGD programme usually have weaker social capital and political connections.
10 The main concern about the methodology is that the analysis does not draw on a representative sample of either the VGD or FFE beneficiaries. A
fuller discussion of this issue is beyond the remit of the present chapter. A full discussion of these issues will be made available in Hossain
(forthcoming).
11 These recommendations appear to be partly on the basis of the findings reported in Ahmed (2005), although it is not clear how comprehensively
that study addressed the leakage issue.
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8.3 Education
The expansion of primary education enrolment was the great social policy success story of the 1990s. The
policy elements of the primary education expansion story are by now familiar:
The 1990 Jomtien conference stimulated political commitment; the Education For All (EFA) plan focused on
a massive community mobilisation thrust
Both democratic Governments of the 1990s drove the expansion, in part the result of party political
competition over the content of the curriculum and the popularity of the expansion policy
Massive investments in schools and teachers: over one 5 year period in the 1990s, an additional million
school places were created every year
Innovative demand-side programmes like the FFE from 1993, replaced by the cash-based Primary
Education Stipend Programme (PESP) in 2002, which successfully attracted poor children to school
Planning and overall direction was highly centralised, but space was permitted for non-state providers;
NGOs were able to enlarge their own provision of pioneering non-formal schools and simultaneously acted
as a competitive spur to the Government to maintain the pace of expansion in the formal system
Donors proved willing to finance the expansion of a sector which enjoyed strong domestic commitment and
was a cause they could support; in particular, the General Education Project (GEP; 1992-1997) united
multilateral and bilateral donors to strike an effective balance of support and donor coordination without
reducing national Government ownership.
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Table 5. Primary and secondary educational enrolment in Bangladesh by gender, 2000s
Sources: Primary: DPE (2006); secondary: *total enrolments are for 2003, from BANBEIS
( ); gross and net enrolment rates are for 2005, from CAMPE (2006)http://www.banbeis.gov.bd
Supporting conditions included positive attitudes towards mass education among policy and civil society elites,
and a strong predisposition among ordinary Bangladeshis to invest in their children's education as the best
prospect for social mobility (see Hossain 2002; Hossain and Kabeer 2004). A civil society 'watchdog' in the
form of the Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE) has provided a critical monitoring role since the late
1990s, in addition to independent information and analysis on education sector performance through its annual
Education Watch reports.
The expansion meant that gross enrolment rates almost doubled in the first 30 years of independence. In
absolute terms, in 2005 there were more than 16 million primary school places - in theory enough for the entire
school-aged population - in addition to more than 2 million children enrolled in NGO schools. Taking into
account enrolment outside the official system, the primary gross enrolment ratios exceeded 100 per cent as
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12 See Unterhalter, Ross and Alam (2003) for an overview of the impact of research on education policy in Bangladesh. Civil society activism on
education appears to have blossomed in recent years, with the promising emergence of the - a 'movement for quality
education' - which plans to publish , an annual report on the state of primary education.
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early as the mid-1990s (CAMPE 1999), and gender disparities in enrolment are now in favour of girls. The
expansion of enrolments at primary level has also fed the growth of secondary . Table 4 summarises
the enrolment situation in primary and junior or lower secondary (class 6 to 10). Bangladesh now boasts one of
the largest basic education systems in the world.
The expansion is widely recognised to have come at a cost to quality, which by the late 1990s was squarely on
the policy agenda. CAMPE's 2000 Education Watch report confirmed what many suspected: educational
attainments were abysmally low, with less than one per cent of Bangladeshi children growing up with the basic
competencies as defined by the national curriculum (CAMPE 2000). The PRSP confirmed the new priority of
quality (GoB 2005). Nor have concerns about access disappeared: enrolments among children from urban
slums and ethnic minority communities and boys from ultra poor households demonstrate that access is by no
means universal (CAMPE 1999).
A recent development is that enrolment in the Government and registered non-government primary schools
actually declined by around 13 per cent over the first half of the 2000s, most markedly among boys. This has
been accompanied by a more than doubling of enrolments, some, but not all of which can be
attributed to improved data (see Al-Samarrai 2006). The decline in enrolment in the mainstream schools,
coupled with an apparent stagnation in NGO school enrolment and what looks like a corresponding rise in
enrolment in highlights the existence of a gap in our understanding of the mass demand for
education, and suggests that neither the mainstream nor the NGO schools have been able to meet the needs of
a particular section of the society. Research into understanding why appear to be increasingly
popular, particularly among poor boys, would help to fill this gap. In the current global political context, and
amidst fears about the Islamic militant potential for poor Bangladeshi youths, such research would also
contribute to a fuller understanding of Islamic militant organisation.
The donor response to quality concerns has been twin-track: the two major externally-financed development
programmes after GEP, Primary Education Development Programmes (PEDP) I and II (1997-2003; 2003-2009)
both aimed to improve access and to raise quality. PEDP I suffered from its own internal governance problems,
including poor donor coordination, and the ongoing PEDP II was initially slow in starting implementation,
although progress since appears to have been more rapid. Other recent projects include the World Bank's
Reaching Out of School Children (ROSC) project, which addresses access for the most disadvantaged children;
the WFP School Feeding Programme, which aims to improve learning capacities through nutritional inputs; and
ESTEEM, a well-regarded project focused on reorienting education management.
Secondary education attracted less attention during the 1990s, despite progress over that decade: net
enrolment rates rose over the 2000s (see Table 5; see CAMPE 2006). The major success in secondary schools
has been that girls' net enrolment now outstrips that of boys by more than 10 percentage points (CAMPE 2006).
Khandker estimated that girls' participation had increased by 13 per cent per year since 1994, compared to
2.5 per cent for boys (2003).
The most important factor behind this achievement is the intervention known collectively as the Female
Secondary Stipends project. Starting in 1994, after a pilot initiative in the early 1980s, all girls in rural upazilas
across the country who meet a set of minimum requirements are eligible for cash scholarships and tuition-free
education, under different projects, three with donor financing. The evidence suggests important impacts,
enrolments
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13 In brief, PEDP I was a collection of 25 donor and Government projects, amounting to US$750 million, half of which was externally financed.
External financing has risen for PEDP II, with US$654 million of the budgeted US$1.815 billion from donors. The budget for ROSC is US$
58million; the recently completed School Feeding Programme was budgeted to spend more than US$30 million, including food aid. Information
on education programmes are from summary data published on the Education sub-group of the Local Consultative Group website.
14 See Sedere (2000) for an insider's account into the shortcomings of PEDP I.
15 Amounts range from Tk 25-60, depending on year; school fee waivers; and lump sum payments of Tk 250 in classes IX and X to cover exam
costs and books. Students need a) to be unmarried; b) to hold attendance records of at least 75 per cent; c) to score 45 per cent in school
tests.
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including delayed marriage (Arends-Kuenning and Amin 2000) and rising enrolment among girls (Khandker
2003). However, Mahmud (2003) notes that systematic impact assessment has not taken place and that there
have been some contradictory effects, including declining examination performance and high rates of drop out.
The positive impact on attitudes towards girls' education from signals from Government about the high value it
places on girls' education through the scholarships scheme, is, however, identified as a major step (Mahmud
2003; Hossain and Kabeer 2004).
The World Bank's 2000 sector review identified the secondary sector's strengths as including expanded access,
gender parity, and the flexibility associated with private management (the overwhelming majority of secondary
institutions are in the private sector), including scope for resource mobilisation. The weaknesses were
understood to include the relevance of the curriculum; equity of access and outcomes; low learning
achievement levels, poor examination results, and high dropout and repetition rates; inadequate incentives to
improve quality; and ineffective management and supervision arrangements (World Bank 2000b).
Raising quality is increasingly seen as a matter of improving the governance of the education sector. PEDP II is
not centrally focused on governance, but failures to take the weakness of existing accountability mechanisms
into account have been identified as a source of potential risk to its implementation (Wood 2003). By
contrast, the US$100 million Education Sector Development Support Credit agreed by the World Bank in 2006
holds governance issues central to its objectives. It aims to address accountability (linking school subventions
to performance, strengthening SMCs) and equity; to devolve implementation and introduce better monitoring
and evaluation; and to raise teacher quality through certification; and to improve the transparency of textbook
production (see World Bank 2006e).
It is interesting to note that a number of key actions against corruption in education were also taken during the
first half of the 2000s. One was the closure of the Department for Non-Formal Education in 2003 after evidence
emerged of the failure of the Total Literacy Movement. Reports also emerged that NGOs contracted under the
Hard-to-Reach Project were 'briefcase (i.e. fake) NGOs'. Another was the clampdown on leakage in both
stipends programmes, including through closer adherence to the performance and attendance criteria (as
detailed below). A new certification body for secondary school teachers has also recently been introduced; this
should reduce the scope for the simple cash-for-jobs system that prevails in the previously unregulated non-
government secondary schools, and have knock-on effects by making SMCs less attractive as business
options.
By the 2000s, problems in the education system were increasingly viewed as rooted in governance, and
governance was increasingly glossed as 'corruption'. The media gave extensive coverage to research
activities that uncovered evidence of bad governance and corruption. High profile reports on corruption at this
time included:
TIB's 'Report Card' survey and 2002 and 2005 Household Surveys, which reported findings of illegal fees;
bias and leakage in the selection and implementation of the FFE programme; and bribery and delays in
service provision by education officials (see Karim 2004)
TIB's Corruption Database Reports (2004, 2005) findings that education as a 'most corrupt' sector in
terms of frequency of media reports of corruption
The World Bank's analysis showing up to 75 per cent leakage from the FFE programme (World Bank/ADB
2003b; as discussed above).
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16 In Ahmed's (1998b) comprehensive review of the 'crisis in governance' in education in the 1997 Independent Review of Bangladesh's
Development, corruption was a side issue; the focus was instead on an analysis of the administrative and political roots of the problem.
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These reports and studies were successful in terms of raising awareness about the general problem of
corruption in education. They were not designed to, nor did they substantially improve our understanding of
how corruption occurs, nor of its impact on service delivery. At the same time, there were concerns about their
methods. We saw above that concerns about the World Bank analysis have rendered their estimates of the
(massive) extent of corruption in the FFE suspect. The limitations of the TIB 'Report Card' work are different: the
apparent reliance on untriangulated attitudinal data, while not in itself a problem, means the results are findings
about reported corruption, not of corruption per se. Similarly, the frequency of media reports of corruption (the
TIB Database method) suggests that education comes under closer scrutiny by the media than other, less
accessible sectors. It does not logically follow that education is one of the most corrupt of these sectors, in
terms of losses to the public purse or bribes from the public.
Corruption in education probably achieves such a high profile because more people have daily contact with
schools than with, for example, land administration authorities. While reporting people's experiences of
corruption is important in its own right and as an advocacy tool, reliance on personal experiences may exclude
more serious forms of corruption - in contracting and schoolroom construction, for example - from receiving
adequate attention.
More robust evidence of corruption includes the Education Watch reports (in particular CAMPE 2005), and the
Social Sector Performance Surveys (SSPS), conducted in 2004 and 2005. CAMPE (2005) found a widespread
belief, including among education officials, that corruption featured in the construction and repair of primary
school buildings, a finding with serious implications for the large-scale classroom building planned for PEDP II
(see also Wood 2003). Illegal fees were also charged, including for textbooks. Based on research into
school systems themselves, the CAMPE study situates the practice of charging illegal fees in the context of
inadequate and uncertain maintenance funds and ludicrously low budgets for administrative costs, describing it
as “creative ways” of mobilising resources to cope with the shortfall (2005: 54). Contextualising illegal fees in
this way avoids demonising what are undoubtedly often constrained school authorities, as well as helping to
explain the practice in a policy-relevant manner.
Public concern about corruption in the primary education stipends programme (PESP) runs high, no doubt
because of the ethical dimensions of theft of resources intended to encourage poor children to attend school.
There are similar concerns about the female secondary stipends programmes (FSSP), and indeed, the two
programmes are not always clearly distinguished, including in some of the published literature. The main
concerns appear to be a) beneficiary selection; b) resource (now exclusively cash) diversion away from
beneficiaries; and c) illegal payments taken from beneficiaries in return for receiving benefits.
Qualitative research undertaken to contextualise and triangulate the findings of the SSPS surveys provided an
opportunity to explore these issues in considerable detail. This research uncovered a number of sound reasons
to believe that the public discourse and some of the published literature may actually overstate the extent and
severity of corruption in these programmes.
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17 These were public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) that covered the primary and secondary education and the health and family
planning sectors. These were undertaken as part of the ongoing DFID-funded Financial Management Reform Programme (FMRP). The reports
for health and secondary education have been published, but the report on the primary survey is still awaiting final approval for public release
from within Government. The UK-based company responsible for the SSPS, OPM, undertook a qualitative follow-up study to further explore
some of the governance dimensions of the SSPS findings, with research support from BRAC's Research and Evaluation Division. Some findings
from that research are outlined here (cited as FMRP forthcoming), but the full report will not be published till later in 2006.
18 FMRP (forthcoming). The research involved in-depth qualitative case studies of 18 schools, including interviews with education officials,
school authorities and students, SMCs, students and parents in 9 districts across the country. The qualitative data were then triangulated and
analysed in conjunction with quantitative data for each institution drawn from the detailed SSPS surveys.
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First, neither stipend programme exclusively targets the poor. The PESP is not targeted to the 40 per cent
poorest students, but to the 40 per cent poorest students in each qualifying rural school; this means that even
when selected correctly, not all beneficiaries in rich areas will necessarily be poor. Many poor students in poor
areas will also have to be excluded. Of course, while this explains some of the 'targeting error', it cannot explain
all of it. Instead, it seems that the perceived conflict between selecting 'meritorious' students who will be able to
meet the academic and attendance criteria, and selecting poor students, is frequently resolved in favour of
selecting a group known as the - the moderate poor. At secondary level, the matter is far
simpler: it is not only the poor but all unmarried girls who meet attendance and performance criteria in
qualifying schools who are eligible.
Second, primary schools frequently receive fewer funds from Dhaka than they have claimed for their stipend
beneficiaries. Schools are then required to adjust the stipend amounts to meet the shortfall. This has three
serious governance implications:
Perverse incentives are set up with respect to student attendance and performance, as it is students who
are eligible to receive the full Tk 300 amount whose payments are most likely to be reduced
Parents learn to distrust teachers, whom they suspect of 'eating' the stipend money; at least part of the TIB
and similar findings may be explained by this
Transparency is reduced, as the scope for community-based scrutiny is affected by unclear and changing
criteria on which the distribution of resources is decided. Where corruption is actually occurring, this is hard
to detect.
One issue worth raising here is that research, which only measures leakage in terms of the gap between what
official project documents state will be distributed and what beneficiaries actually receive, will not be able to
identify this issue. At least some of what looks like corruption from outside a system is likely to involve a
deviation from officially recognised practice which is not documented, even if it has become standard
procedure. Often these deviations occur because the programme is under-funded, as in this case and in the
case of VGD discussed above.
Third, there is some ambiguity about deductions from the secondary stipends, because a routine practice is to
deduct 'exam fees' or occasionally 'session charges' from stipends. Implications of this are that:
Reports of informal payments may include reference to these deductions, particularly if parents are not
aware of or have not agreed to the deduction
Whether students and parents present this as corruption or not may depend on how the question is framed
Even if these practices are innocent, the ambiguities they introduce into the system both increase the
scope for concealing corruption and the perception of corruption.
Qualitative research undertaken in mid-2006 identified a widespread belief that corruption and irregularities in
this respect had declined as a result of clamping down by the Government. There was objective support for this
view, in the form of improved provision for supervision and monitoring (monitoring officers at district level:
AUEOs now cross-check attendance and examination scores); the eligibility criteria relating to performance and
attendance have been re-publicised, and adherence tightened up by the authorities; and parents have become
more aware about the purposes and requirements of the programme. The number of beneficiaries in the
secondary stipends programme declined by some 60 per cent over 2002 and 2003. The role of the media in
preventing this form of corruption was highlighted by an upazila education official interviewed for the qualitative
research who bluntly explained, "no head teacher wants his face in the paper for taking money from students"
(FMRP forthcoming).
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19 Students receive the full stipend for those months in which they have qualified in terms of attendance and enrolment.
122 The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
A sensitive issue which further clouds the matter of corruption is the extent to which parents and students are
complicit in practices that subvert programme goals. At secondary level, both the practice of registering 'ghost'
students, who do not actually attend school, and that of false certification of student eligibility for receiving the
stipend may involve some student collusion; this seems to represent the bigger problem in terms of extent. The
finding that schools were involved in helping students to cheat is, perhaps, a related governance problem
(CAMPE 2005).
Concerns about governance and school quality are linked with concerns about corruption in teacher
appointment. Despite the perception that corruption in the system of recruiting teachers is systemic and
generalised, discussions with officials and teachers suggest that there may be considerable variation within the
sector in terms of the extent, severity and impact of corruption. Overall, it seems to be a less common problem
in Government compared to non-government schools. At primary level, 'unfair means' in recruitment of
Government teachers has reportedly become more difficult since 1997, when the present process was
established. Seventy five per cent of marks in the recruitment process are now based on an anonymous test on
which it is reportedly difficult to cheat (unless others are brought in to take the test), and 25 per cent of marks
are allocated for the viva, which means that bribes to the viva board do not guarantee a post, as the final
decision depends on the combined score. Bribe-givers who fail to gain posts can expect to have their bribes
returned, suggesting that the system of corruption is weak: the payment is for being considered as a candidate,
rather than an assurance of a post (which the viva board cannot guarantee).
By contrast, the rapid expansion of education appears to have had negative impacts on the integrity of SMCs:
reports of payment being accepted in exchange for posts are routine in both primary and secondary non-
government schools. It is clear that there are SMCs in which members' principal interest is in the potential
material and political gains; many sector insiders see this as a growing phenomenon (see also World Bank
2006e, particularly Annex D). Again, an ambiguity arises in cash-strapped non-government primary and
secondary schools, in which corruption in appointments merges almost imperceptibly into a school fund-raising
exercise, exploiting the authority to accept community and private contributions. The practice appears to be
particularly well-entrenched in non-government secondary schools. The new centrally-administered
examination/certification process for secondary teachers seems to be a response to realistically widespread
concerns about corruption in teacher appointment at secondary level.
The main impact of corruption in appointment lies in the extent to which the quality of entrants into the service is
believed to be compromised. This varies: sector insiders believe that despite corruption, the Government
schools recruitment procedure remains highly competitive, because of high application numbers and because
the written test eliminates the weakest candidates. But teaching quality is clearly compromised, particularly in
non-government secondary schools and , where common complaints are that teachers are
not trained in the subjects they teach.
One point that emerges from this discussion is that lack of transparency and information provides rich
nourishment for perceptions of corruption. An interesting side-effect of the stipends programmes, which has
probably been strengthened by TIB's successful advocacy work, is that parents and the wider community have
become more engaged in scrutinising the activities of school authorities now that they handle cash resources
intended for the poor. One teacher interviewed for the forthcoming FMRP qualitative study complained that, "the
Teacher appointments
Accountability and the politicisation of SMCs
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20 Official oversight is provided in the form of final approval of a shortlist of candidates being made by the Upazila Education office.
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way people abuse chairmen and members, that's how they abuse teachers now". This suggests that people
now assume teachers are corrupt, just as they assume local politicians to be. Responsibility for stipends
disbursement has undeniably had negative consequences for teachers, whose collectively high status and
previously unassailable respectability has taken a serious knock. On the positive side, this may reduce the
social gap between poor parents and teachers, bringing the practicalities of holding school authorities to
account within closer reach.
Where they have been shown to function, Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) have a positive impact on school
performance (CAMPE 1999); however, they tend to exist on paper and play little role in the management or
governance of schools (CAMPE 2005). Why is parental participation in schools so limited? One explanation is
that there is a reasonable flow of information between schools and parents through formal and informal
channels, including school visits. Unschooled parents may not have additional ideas about or expectations of
their children's schools that they would wish to articulate in a PTA. However, it seems clear that PTAs can only
under specially supportive circumstances enable poor parents, particularly women, to work through the social
hierarchies of gender, class and social differences that govern the relations between themselves and teachers
(which persist, although the gap may be diminishing), as well as those between themselves and School
Managing Committees (SMCs).
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that SMCs play an important role, and that they are relied on much
more to deliver good school governance than would be the case were PTAs not so weak (see Wood 2003).
Where SMCs are led by respected individuals who are responsive to their communities' needs and motivated by
civic purpose, they can yield positive results (see Nath 2004). But field-level education officials plainly feel
SMCs are an anachronism, a throwback to a time when there were few educated villagers and authority was
unquestionably concentrated in the hands of the traditional landed elite. SMC headship was then a position of
respect, an honorary function associated with leadership. The expansion of the school system, the
diversification of the rural elite, and the infiltration of party politics into all levels of public institutional life has
changed this context. SMC headship is now prized as a rich source of political capital: SMC headship is sought
among those thinking of reviving or establishing a political career (FMRP forthcoming). There is of course also
scope for corruption, with the richest pickings in the non-government schools and , particularly at
secondary level (see World Bank 2006e).
However, the growing role of local political competition in SMCs is not all bad in terms of its impacts on school
performance - regardless of whether or not it constitutes good governance. CAMPE makes a sensible, safe
case for de-politicising school management, but the FMRP qualitative case studies suggested that while an
element of local competition to sit on school managing committees may be a good thing, both too little and too
much competition was not. The better schools, including those in which improvement was most rapid, tended
to be those in which SMC management was a matter of local political interest. But where competition had
descended into conflict and featured individuals involved in corruption and criminality, this had paralysed school
development plans, and little progress was made. By contrast, where there was no competition over the SMC,
this tended to signal either the head teacher's monopoly of authority, or a lack of local initiative with respect to
the school (FMRP forthcoming).
Part of the answer to the conundrum of how bad governance has coexisted with impressive social sector
performance in Bangladesh seems to be that weak formal accountability systems have coexisted with informal
pressures on providers which fill at least part of the accountability deficit. This appears to have been 'good
21
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21 For evidence that women can be more involved in school management with support, see ESTEEM's action research report (ESTEEM 2004).
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enough' governance to deliver the social services received so far, but is unlikely to produce the quality reforms
that are urgently needed. On corruption, the consensus appears to be that corruption is a serious problem, but
the evidence is not strong enough to support this view without qualification. Popular perceptions are that
corruption is rife, but at least some perceptions result from lack of clarity about programme entitlement or
process.
An important point to raise here is that there is evidence that some research into corruption has not been
undertaken or disseminated in a sufficiently responsible manner. The review of the literature presented here
suggests that a) research into corruption would benefit from greater attention to context, to local
understandings and to how programmes are implemented in the field (as opposed to project proforma); and b)
some humility and caution are warranted in the presentation and use of results of research into corruption.
Accusations of corruption in Government programmes are serious matters, in some cases with massive
programmatic and financial implications. Looked at closely, the evidence showing lower estimates of leakage is
considerably stronger than that showing higher estimates of leakage.
One worrying implication of the discourse of generalised widespread corruption is that it leaves no space for
priorities for action to emerge within the public discourse. Specific problems of large-scale corruption that are
serious constraints on service delivery become buried in such a debate. An example is in education, where
public attention to corruption in the stipends programme and public sector teacher appointments procedures
have meant that areas in which there is serious scope for massive corruption with negative impacts on service
delivery - the vast civil works programme being undertaken for PEDP II and extensive corruption in non-
government school teacher appointments, for example - are effectively sidelined. On an optimistic note, this
chapter has highlighted areas in which Governments across the party divide have responded to concerns about
corruption in both education and social safety nets: abolishing programmes and directorates; changing delivery
mechanisms or tightening up targeting criteria; and adjusting recruitment procedures to make corruption more
difficult. But serious challenges remain, particularly in terms of improving access for those who remain 'hard-to-
reach', and in establishing formal systems through which those who currently lack connections, power, or voice
can hold the rest to account.
The contribution of the ReportState of Governance
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006 report has attempted to provide an up-to-date review and analysis
of evidence on the conditions of governance in Bangladesh since 1991. The target audience is academics,
researchers and expert practitioners in the field of governance and development, among whom it is hoped it will
provide a basis for discussion and debate. It is also expected to serve as an introduction to the topic of
governance for students on the increasing number of academic courses devoted to development and
governance within Bangladesh. Criticism and comments are actively welcomed, as the State of Governance
Research Project continues beyond the publication of the present Report.
The first point that needs to be underlined is that the Report is not concerned exclusively with the dimensions of
governance believed to affect economic growth and foreign investment. It is worth stressing this point: the
global governance indicators on which Bangladesh typically performs poorly and which play such a significant
part in the global debate on governance are based on data that monitor precisely those dimensions of
governance that are of most concern to foreign investors and their businesses. The scope of the present Report
is comprehensive, covering many of the main debates and issues relating to the governance institutions and
functions of the state; the major national political parties; key aspects of the economic process; the public
administration, national, local, rural and urban; the role of the media, NGOs and civil society; and the impact of
governance on policies of direct relevance to poverty reduction and the poor. This broad perspective was
deliberately adopted in order to shed light on how the performance of state institutions shape social and
economic outcomes, as well as on how non-state actors and institutions influence governance. The broad
viewpoint was applied to help frame the problem so that it becomes possible to see how the pieces of the
puzzle fit together. Chapter Two on Political Governance, for instance, highlights the incentives faced by parties
to maximise the politicisation of all other aspects of public life. In doing so, it provides a basis for understanding
the roots and consequences of problems identified in other chapters, including those on public administration,
media and civil society, and law enforcement.
A second notable feature of the Report is that it takes the role of politics, and in particular party politics,
seriously. Each of the chapters discusses the impacts of the growing stranglehold of the 'partyarchy'. To the
extent possible, it provides confirmation that partisan affiliation has affected many public institutions in ways that
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contribute to corruption and reduce the effectiveness of public administration. It also contains new empirical
evidence about the extent of the reach of the major parties into rural society and public institutions. At the same
time, the evidence on politics is analysed with a fresh eye and without automatically assuming all aspects of
politicisation are necessarily negative. Looking at how politics features in governance across sectors, a pattern
emerges that suggests that political actors experience competitive pressures at the local level which, under the
right conditions, can result in more responsive or more effective services. More research is undoubtedly needed
to understand these pressures and their outcomes.
A third distinguishing feature of the Report is that it introduces a sociological dimension into the governance
debate by locating the behaviour and incentives of key governance actors within a fuller understanding of their
professional and social contexts. It helps to understand that public service morale is generally low, and that
there are divisions of status and incentives within the police and teaching forces as well as within the wider
administration. Such understanding makes it possible to avoid demonising public officials, a tendency that
blocks fuller understanding of the prospects for reform. The analytical framework of accountability focuses on
how social relations structure the encounter between the state, its political representatives and its citizens. It
helps to understand, for instance, that for the poor, justice is still largely mediated by accessible but uneven
institutions dominated by traditional social elites.
An important theme is the conditions under which knowledge about governance is produced. The Report
demonstrates that there are gaps and weaknesses in the evidence about governance, and that some issues
receive too little attention and others too much. In part this reflects the fact that governance is still a
comparatively young subject within development research in Bangladesh. Compared to the policy debate on
poverty reduction, for example, which benefits from a wealth of world class Bangladeshi scholarship, the debate
on governance is in its infancy. As yet, knowledge of governance has been dominated by donor intellectual and
policy agendas for a solid indigenous body of Bangladeshi research to emerge. This situation is changing, and
it is not too optimistic to assume that the policy debate on governance will be enriched as a result.
Overall, the view of the state of governance in Bangladesh that emerges goes well beyond the domain of cross-
national indicators on which, as readers will be aware, Bangladesh fares badly. The point was not to explain why
Bangladesh fares so badly on conventional global governance indicators, nor to explore the possibility that
Bangladesh is unfairly judged by such indicators. As the Report takes into account a wider range of
perspectives from a broader spectrum of sectors, the state of governance emerges as more varied and more
variable than the monolith of bad governance depicted by Bangladesh's invariably poor performance in global
surveys. There are undeniably whole sectors that are poorly governed, but the Report also identifies areas in
which poor governance does not limit progress.
There are a number of important issues that the Report was not able to adequately address, but which merit at
least a mention. These include:
Donors and the impact of aid on governance. Coverage of donors and aid relations was limited in the
present Report to issues relating to the role of aid donors in promoting reform and in financing civil society
and governance research and analysis. Significant gaps include a) the impact of aid and donor practices
on corruption; b) the burden of weak donor coordination on the effectiveness of government agencies and
on project implementation; c) the governance impact of aid on the relationship between the state and its
citizens; and d) the sustainability and ownership of aided governance reform efforts
The environment. Although background research on urban governance addressed the impact of some
governance failures on the urban environment, the Report itself was unable to address broader issues of
relevance to the governance of the environment, such as the regulation of industrial waste and planning
procedures governing building regulation
Gaps and limitations


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Infrastructure and energy. While these were identified as key governance failures with respect to the
environment for business and investment, and are widely acknowledged as the prime examples of how
corruption creates obstacles for economic development, adequate coverage of these issues was beyond
the scope of the present Report. These have been earmarked as priorities for future research
Justice institutions, including prisons and the entire penal system, and the Supreme Court. In the absence
of a sufficiently large body of literature available to review, the present Report was unable to provide a full
discussion of either of these sets of issues. Again, these have been earmarked for future research
Workers' rights and labour regulations. Events in 2006 highlight the need for better enforcement of workers
rights and labour regulations. This is an aspect of governance with particularly direct implications for poor
formal sector workers
Corporate governance. This issue has been more than adequately covered in recent publications by the
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, so this Report did not attempt to reproduce that discussion
Professional associations. The discussion of the role of civil society would have been far richer had it been
able to look at the impact of professional associations and interest groups. Those that clearly merit further
research attention from within the perspective of governance include associations of business, the legal,
medical and accountancy professions
Religious extremism. This gap may appear to some to be an unforgivable omission given international
concerns in the last two years about the prospects for Islamic militancy in Bangladesh. The gap reflects the
weakness of the research literature on this topic, and the general absence of any empirical evidence
beyond newspaper coverage, rather than a lack of interest in the topic.
Other limitations of the Report include that neither gender nor poverty analysis have been mainstreamed
sufficiently thoroughly to enable a full and detailed picture of the gendered and poverty impacts of current
governance conditions to emerge. There are pockets of evidence about how women and the poor are affected
by governance, but by no means does this constitute a comprehensive analysis. This is despite efforts to
incorporate such a perspective into each sectoral analysis and chapter in the Report. In part, this limitation
reflects the constraints of space and time, and in part relates to the emphases in existing literature. Future
research into governance conditions in Bangladesh will need to mainstream gender and poverty analysis more
comprehensively if it is to provide a meaningful and grounded perspective on governance.
One of the main objectives of the Report was to examine the available literature on governance in Bangladesh in
preparation for setting out an agenda for future research. The intention was to map the available evidence to
identify and assess existing empirical sources and to identify gaps and weaknesses in the overall evidence base
to inform the design of a future research agenda. In addition, the project has also produced a number of
background papers on governance topics that provide in-depth coverage of issues addressed in this report.
Possible next steps to be taken include developing indicators of relevance to the Bangladesh context, preferably
which will enable some comparative regional analysis to be undertaken, and on which performance can be
assessed over time. This is an ambitious and difficult undertaking. It is also, however, clearly important, given
the identified need for more robust evidence and to indigenise governance analysis in Bangladesh. This does
not necessarily entail that a single institution should undertake a full-scale national survey. One possibility is to
draw on the work of ongoing regular research projects and data collection exercises by organisations such as
the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, TIB, Ain-o-Shalish Kendra, the Education Watch Reports and donor
agencies, to create a database or compilation of sources of data on governance in Bangladesh. Such an activity
may be supplemented by surveys of attitudes and experiences of governance in sectors that are of key concern
domestically, as well as targeted research using case study methods to develop indicators of performance in
key institutions.
Next steps: an agenda for future research on the state of governance in Bangladesh
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An important lesson from the review of the literature conducted for the current Report is that robust indicators of
governance need to move beyond an exclusive reliance on survey data of perceptions, whether of foreign
investors or of Bangladeshi citizens. The interpretation of attitudinal data is always a delicate matter, requiring
careful and close attention to context and existing discourses. It can be greatly enhanced if it involves
complementary qualitative research and objective indicators of change. As far as possible, indicators of
governance should also attempt to include transparent and objective markers of change, for example, whether
or not policy reforms of relevance to governance conditions (e.g., deregulation, legislation to separate the
judiciary from the executive, attempts to reduce corruption in public sector recruitment, steps towards fiscal
decentralisation) have been undertaken.
The next steps for the State of Governance in Bangladesh research project include the analysis of indicators of
governance used to assign Bangladesh's place in governance performance globally and to monitor its
performance nationally. This will be accompanied by the preparation of an initial set of domestic indicators with
which to monitor Bangladesh's performance, to take into account existing data sources. This exercise will
require new knowledge partnerships among research organisations involved in governance research, and will
be used to identify the scope for the compilation or creation of a new dataset on governance. The purpose of
creating a more transparent, robust and regular source of information on governance is to move our knowledge
of governance away from its current reliance on perceptions and closer towards the lived experience and
realities of the state of governance in Bangladesh.
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